- What is the neuronal basis of our subjective conscious experience?
- Why does neuronal activity in the cortex give rise to consciousness, but not in the cerebellum?
- Do other animals experience similar subjective experiences to humans? If so, what kind of experience do they have?
- Can we generate conscious machines or robots?
- How can we know whether other animals or machines have conscious experience?
These fascinating fundamental questions used to be amenable to philosophical speculation alone, but many are beginning to be the target of empirical enquiry by the cognitive sciences. At tLab, we use a multitude of neuroscientific methods to attack the problems of consciousness.
Our current projects focus on:
- Behavioural effects and neuronal correlates of conscious and non-conscious processing.
- Clarifying the relationship between consciousness and attention.
- Analysis of multi-channel neurophysiological data to understand the neuronal mechanisms of consciousness.
- Testing theories of consciousness, in particular, the Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness proposed by Guilio Tononi, using empirical neuronal data.