Frequently Asked Questions

What are the disputes in the South China Sea?

The South China Sea disputes involve conflicting and overlapping sovereignty claims over offshore features in the Spratly Islands and the Paracel Islands, between China (People’s Republic of China), Taiwan (Republic of China), Malaysia, the Philippines, Vietnam, and Brunei Darussalam. All the claimants have adopted domestic legislation related to their claims, occupied features, and established outposts within their claimed areas.

The South China Sea disputes also concern overlapping maritime claims with China’s ‘nine-dash line’ overlapping the 200 nautical miles exclusive economic zones (EEZs) and continental shelves entitled to the Southeast Asian littoral states by the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). China’s artificial island-building also caused irreparable harm to the marine environment in the South China Sea and negatively affected the economic activities of Vietnam, Malaysia, and the Philippines.

Which countries are involved in the disputes?

China – In the note verbale submitted by China to the UN Secretary-General in response to Malaysia and Vietnam’s Joint Submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) on 9 May 2009, China asserts that:

China has indisputable sovereignty over the islands in the South China Sea and the adjacent waters and enjoys sovereign rights and jurisdiction over the relevant waters as well as the seabed and subsoil thereof. 

While this ‘nine-dash line’ claim by China was already rendered invalid in the Award of 12 July 2016 in the South China Sea Arbitration, China continues to assert its illegal historic rights and excessive maritime entitlements in the South China Sea.

From the early 1990s until 2013, China embarked on a gradual but extensive land reclamation and artificial island-building in seven features in the Spratlys, namely Cuarteron Reef, Fiery Cross Reef, Gaven Reef (North), Johnson Reef, Hughes Reef, Subi Reef, and Mischief Reef. Initially, China argued that these artificial islands will serve as fishermen shelters. Nonetheless, the installation of fighter jet hangars, deployment of anti-cruise missiles, stationing of maritime militia vessels and coast guard ships, raised concerns that China is trying to control the waterways and airspace of the South China Sea while subsequently pressuring other claimants to abandon their rights.

Recently, in an attempt to redefine its claims, the Chinese referred to the “Four Sha” or “Four Island Groups” referring to the Spratlys, Paracels, Scarborough Shoal and Pratas Islandsas the extent of their territorial claims, although the nine-dash line has not been completely abandoned.

Taiwan – In the “Four Principles and Five Actions” guidelines released by Taiwan, it asserts that the South China Sea Islands are part of its territory. Taiwan maintained that it is entitled to all rights over the islands and their relevant waters in accordance with international law and UNCLOS. Taiwan asserts that it should be included in multilateral mechanisms aimed at resolving disputes, and that negotiations should be conducted on the equality basis.

Philippines – The Philippines claims sovereignty over the land features enclosed by the President Decree 1956, s. 1978 polygon, and sovereign rights and jurisdiction over the maritime zones these features lawfully generate under UNCLOS. The Philippines also reserves the right to claim an extended continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles in the South China Sea. Following a standoff with China over the Scarborough Shoal, the Philippines instituted arbitral proceedings against China under Annex VII of the UNCLOS.

Vietnam – Vietnam asserts sovereignty over the Paracel and the Spratly Islands. However, following the South China Sea Arbitration, Vietnam clarified that the maritime entitlements of the high-tide features in the South China Sea shall be determined in accordance with Article 121(3) of UNCLOS, while low-tide elevations are not capable of appropriation and do not generate entitlements to any maritime zones. Vietnam also objects to China’s “Four Sha'' claim.

Malaysia – Malaysia has overlapping sovereignty claims with China, the Philippines, and Vietnam in the Spratly Islands, and overlapping maritime boundaries with Indonesia, the Philippines and Vietnam in the South China Sea. On 12 December 2019, Malaysia submitted to the UN CLCS information on the limits of its continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles. The Philippines protested such submission as it covers portions of North Borneo (Sabah), over which the Philippines never relinquished sovereignty.

Brunei Darussalam – Brunei has claims to Louisa Reef, Owen Shoal and Rifleman Bank which are within its EEZs. In comparison to other claimant states, Brunei does not assert sovereignty over these features, nor has deployed military assets there.

Indonesia – While not a party to the territorial disputes in the South China Sea, Indonesia protests the excessive maritime claims of China which encompasses the waters off the Natuna Islands, bordering the South China Sea.

United States, Australia, and Japan – The United States makes no territorial claims in the South China Sea and takes no position on the sovereignty of the features. It however objects to China’s claim to historic rights and excessive maritime claims as it restricts navigational rights and freedoms enshrined in the UNCLOS. The United States has strategic, political, and economic interests in the South China Sea as its allies and partners in the region are parties to the dispute. Australia and Japan hold similar positions, believing that freedom of navigation and overflight is essential to their security and prosperity. It should be noted that critical sea lines of communication essential for Japan regularly pass through the South China Sea.

What is the South China Sea Arbitration?

After exhausting all possible avenues for a peaceful political and diplomatic negotiated settlement, the Philippines, on 22 January 2013, initiated an arbitration case against China regarding its excessive claims and activities in the South China Sea.

An Arbitral Tribunal was established in accordance with Annex VII of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) to clarify the following issues:

The Arbitral Tribunal issued two awards—Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, and Award (on merit). The Permanent Court of Arbitration acted as a Registrar and facilitated the arbitration.

China argued that it did not participate in the arbitration proceedings, thus not bound by the ruling. Is this correct?

As affirmed by the Tribunal’s Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Article 9 of Annex VII of the UNCLOS provides that the absence of a party (in this case, China) or its failure to defend itself in a case will not constitute a bar to the arbitration proceedings. Even with its non-participation, China is still considered a party to the arbitration, and is thus bound by the Awards issued.

What is FSI’s role in promoting the South China Sea Arbitration and the Award?

The Foreign Service Institute (FSI), as the research and training arm of the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), convened several events and published commentaries and policy papers that facilitated critical discussions on the South China Sea disputes, including the Arbitration Award of 12 July 2016. The FSI’s Mabini Dialogue Series and Mangrove Forum on International Relations served as platforms for local and international specialists, experts, and practitioners to share their thoughts on the possible opportunities for conflict management and resolution.