The ERATO Kojima Market Design Project (Economic Theory Group) and the University of Tokyo Market Design Center (UTMD) will host the Tokyo Conference on Market Design, inviting researchers in microeconomic theory and market design.
Prior to the conference, on June 17, we will hold the TCMD 2026 Young Theorists' Forum, a research exchange meeting for graduate students from Japan and abroad.
This conference has ended. Thank you for attending.
Date & Time
Date: Wednesday, June 17 (13:00-17:20) - 2026
Venue: In-Person
In-Person: FUKUTAKE Learning Theater, B2, Fukutake Hall, Interfaculty Initiative in Information Studies, the University of Tokyo (capacity: appx. 180 people)
Language: English
Hosts: ERATO Kojima Market Design Project and The University of Tokyo Market Design Center (UTMD)
Organizers
University Professor, The University of Tokyo
Economic Theory Group Leader, ERATO Kojima Market Design Project
Professor, The University of Tokyo
Research Director, ERATO Kojima Market Design Project
Director, The University of Tokyo Market Design Center
Speakers
PhD student
Northwestern University
PhD student
The University of Tokyo
Master student
The University of Tokyo
Master student
Seoul National University
PhD student
The University of Texas at Austin
PhD student
Stanford GSB
Master student
The University of Tokyo
PhD student
Stanford GSB
Master student
The University of Tokyo
Program (PDF)
13:00-13:25 Session 1
Harrison Ridland:
"Dynamic weighting as a screening mechanism in all pay auctions"
13:25-13:50 Session 2
Keita Kuwahara & Kento Hashimoto:
"Selling Multiple Items to a Unit-Demand Buyer"
13:50-14:10 Coffee Break (20 min)
14:10-14:35 Session 3
Mingeon Kim:
"Strategic Vagueness in Political Campaigns: Mudslinging, Platitudes, and Voter Demobilization"
14:35-15:00 Session 4
Francesco Conti:
"To be free, we have to be vague'' - Ambiguous Communication in Corporation Games"
15:00-15:20 Coffee Break (20 min)
15:20-15:45 Session 5
Filip Tokarski:
"Targeting Without Transfers"
15:45-16:10 Session 6
Meina Takahashi:
"A Solution to the Roommate Problem"
16:10-16:30 Coffee Break (20 min)
16:30-16:55 Session 7
Joey Feffer:
"A First-Order Approach to Optimal Multi-Good Auctions"
16:55-17:20 Session 8
Yuki Kawahatsu:
"On the Limits of Strong Obvious Strategy-Proofness in Shapley-Scarf Housing Markets"
Registration Form
Registration for participation is now closed (as of June 10, 2026).
*Event details have been emailed (June 12, 2026).
If you haven’t received them, please email us .
Contact
eratokojima[at]e.u-tokyo.ac.jp
*Please change “[at]” to “@”
Venue
FUKUTAKE Learning Theater, B2, Fukutake Hall
7-3 Hongo, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo
113-0033 JAPAN