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TCMD 2026
Advances in Economic Design
The ERATO Kojima Market Design Project - Economic Theory Group and the University of Tokyo Market Design Center (UTMD) will host the Tokyo Conference on Market Design on June 19-20, inviting researchers in microeconomic theory and market design.
Date & Time
Date: Friday, June 19 (10:00-17:10)- Saturday, June 20 (10:00-16:00), 2026
Venue: Hybrid format
In-Person: FUKUTAKE Learning Theater, B2, Fukutake Hall, Interfaculty Initiative in Information Studies, the University of Tokyo (capacity: appx. 180 people)
Online: Zoom
Language: English
Hosts: ERATO Kojima Market Design Project and The University of Tokyo Market Design Center (UTMD)
Organizers
Michihiro Kandori
Michihiro Kandori
University Professor, The University of Tokyo
Economic Theory Group Leader, ERATO Kojima Market Design Project
Fuhito Kojima
Fuhito Kojima
Professor, The University of Tokyo
Research Director, ERATO Kojima Market Design Project
Director, The University of Tokyo Market Design Center
Speakers
Ben Brooks
Ben Brooks
Professor of Economics
The University of Chicago
Karen Wu
Karen Wu
PhD Candidate in Economics
The University of Chicago
Toan Le
Toan Le
Postdoctoral Research Fellow
University of Oxford
Takuro Yamashita
Takuro Yamashita
Distinguished Professor
The University of Osaka
Michihiro Kandori
Michihiro Kandori
University Professor
The University of Tokyo
Kenzo Imamura
Kenzo Imamura
Project Assistant Professor
The University of Tokyo
Vasiliki Skreta
Vasiliki Skreta
Leroy G. Denman Regents Professor of Economics
The University of Texas at Austin
Jinwoo Kim
Jinwoo Kim
Professor of Economics
The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology
Bruno Strulovici
Bruno Strulovici
Harvey Kapnick Professor of Business Institutions
Northwestern University
Program (PDF)
Friday, June 19
10:00-10:30 Doors Open
10:30-11:20 Session 1
Ben Brooks:
"Market Order Mechanisms"
slide
11:20-11:40 Coffee Break (20 min)
11:40-12:30 Session 2
Karen Wu:
"Collusion-Robust Auction Design"
slide
12:30-14:00 Lunch Break
14:00-14:50 Session 3
Toan Le:
"Strategy-Proofness versus Collusion-Proofness"
slide
14:50-15:10 Coffee Break (20 min)
15:10-16:00 Session 4
Takuro Yamashita:
"Data Disclosure to Inferentially-Naive Consumers under Adverse Selection"
slide
16:00-16:20 Coffee Break (20 min)
16:20-17:10 Session 5
Michihiro Kandori:
"The second welfare theorem in markets with discrete and continuous goods"
slide
Saturday, June 20
10:00-10:30 Doors Open
10:30-11:20 Session 6
Kenzo Imamura:
"Strategy-proofness and competitive equilibrium with
transferable utility: The necessity of gross substitutes"
11:20-11:40 Coffee Break (20 min)
11:40-12:30 Session 7
Vasiliki Skreta:
“Mechanism Design with a Continuum of Agents”
12:30-14:00 Lunch Break
14:00-14:50 Session 8
14:50-15:10 Coffee Break (20 min)
15:10-16:00 Session 9
Bruno Strulovici:
"Public Insurance Design under Electoral Competition "
slide
Registration Form
Registration for both in-person and online participation is now closed (as of June 12, 2026).
*Event details have been emailed (June 12, 2026).
If you haven’t received them, please email us .
Contact
eratokojima[at]e.u-tokyo.ac.jp
*Please change “[at]” to “@”
Venue
FUKUTAKE Learning Theater, B2, Fukutake Hall
7-3 Hongo, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo
113-0033 JAPAN
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