The growing disregard for the humanitarian ethos traps entire populations in inhospitable conditions. The risk to turn humanitarian action into a military operation is always there when accessing communities in need. Reflecting on your ‘story’, we carefully analyse with who, whether and how to interact. Besides the legal circumstances, we debate a broad range of considerations, including the use of armed escorts.

There are also some day-to-day obstacles to overcome. For instance, thousands of aid workers are waiting for months to receive entry visas. The terrain and weather conditions block us from accessing the people in need of assistance. Cultural norms and customs are difficult to incorporate into effective response plans, etc.

Take our microlearning on Ethical Influencing Techniques.

Watch two videos on Humanitarian Access in South Sudan and Accessing Communities in Niger.

Complete our microcourse on UN-CMCoord in support of humanitarian access.

Explore humanitarian access constraints

Identify solutions to enable humanitarian access

Discuss alternatives to the use of armed escorts

Complete our microcourse on Normative Framework and Implications of Engagement with NSAGs

Here are a few quotes from our graduates.

I feel that it is important to acknowledge how quickly the time has passed and our knowledge on UN CM Coord has improved. I continue to revisit the topic of communication and relationship building. This week learned about influence and the NSAGs. The topics seem separate but I see commonalities. There is a need to build a relationship, to have influence in order to gain access for our humanitarian work.

The issue of neutrality and the need to be apolitical in our humanitarian work is challenging in this work especially when governments insist that there can be no negotiation with NSAGs. We must figure out wonder how to go about our tasks without the interactions with all the parties and ponder the cost to more than a whole party approach. The same can posited about conflicts involving non-declared actors.

Seeking alternative forms of access strikes me as a constant, but necessary, challenge in humanitarian work. As said in the session today, over reliance on military assets for security not only limits the reach of humanitarian actors, it can change the tenor of the operation. Creative alternatives may not be as directly effective as using armed escorts to gain access to communities, but can have long term benefits of demonstrating neutrality and dedication to positive outcomes in affected communities.

This was an interesting week, insofar as it did a good job in making the linkages between the types of reasoning/persuasion techniques we all (can) use, and some of the challenges and risks in engaging with, particularly with non-state armed groups, in practice. It's easy to see why/how engaging with NSAG may be particularly challenging, in that their systems for command/control, and underlying political interests may be less predictable, than more organised national forces. What is perhaps more difficult to fully analyze/predict are the risks associated with this engagement. While we are now more comfortable with such contacts as humanitarians, and no longer so concerned with the problems of "legitimising" or "empowering" such organisations, there remains the manifold complex ethical and practical dilemmas associated with any involvement with organisations whose interests and mandate run contrary to our own.

This was an interesting week for me. In my work, I don't see a lot of engagement with NSAGs (I'm not in an operational area). However, what was apparent was the need to engage with NSAGs. With this comes the need for strategies for engagement and how to influence them to achieve humanitarian outcomes. The story telling was a useful way to better understand the operational challenges and the reality of the situation.

This week provided a fascinating opportunity to begin to unpack the role of the CMCoord Officer in dealing with NSAGs... a topic I suspect could be a 6-week course in itself!

One issue that has struck me is the ability of an immediate operating environment to shape/dictate how we carry out the CMCoord function. The current and significant breakdown of services in most of Tigray means that regardless of dealing with the opposing military forces and their respective hierarchies, the exercise is at points reduced to finding who you can in the immediate vicinity when there are no (or severely limited) comms. Amidst such extreme constraints the operational complexity or otherwise of an armed group almost becomes secondary.

This again brings home both the centrality of interpersonal relationships, and the resilience needed by CMCoord Officers in dealing with complexity, and/or things not going to plan. Whilst the Assessment process is critical, it is important not to be drawn into thinking that the plans you create in the capital will closely represent the operations you deliver in the field. Again reinforced when the operational picture in Tigray changed almost overnight in recent weeks with the withdrawal of the ENDF. This does not diminish the importance of planning, something which reminded me perhaps of the Eisenhower quote: "Plans are nothing - planning is everything."