I am a political economist specializing in examining the repercussions of political changes and public policy adjustments. My ongoing research centers around several key subjects, including elections, political geography, and redistricting. Specifically, my primary focus is on investigating the evolving political landscape in America and its influence on election outcomes. To achieve this, I analyze the effects of partisan gerrymandering in both federal and state redistricting processes. In my second area of study, I explore the correlation between the escalating political polarization and the shifting political geography. Additionally, I am intrigued by the potential social and economic factors contributing to these changes in political geography. To carry out my research, I heavily rely on a range of empirical methods, primarily utilizing the simulation-based inference approach alongside detailed spatial and election data.
Over the past few decades, numerous researchers have observed a rise in safe congressional seats for both political parties while political polarization deepens in the United States. As people seek to comprehend the underlying reasons for this trend of growing political polarization, some scholars and activists have naturally drawn connections between these two occurrences and partially attribute these shifts to the increased use of the partisan districting process. As a result, there is a growing demand for redistricting reform, such as the adoption of independent redistricting commissions, aimed at reducing the number of highly partisan districts.
In this paper, I critically assess this claim to determine whether redistricting and gerrymandering truly bear responsibility for the proliferation of safe seats. Utilizing the nonpartisan redistricting algorithm, which is also employed in my job market paper, along with detailed election data from 2004 and 2020, I uncover two compelling findings.
Analyzing data from New Jersey, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and Texas, the evidence reveals that the increase in safe seats is not significantly influenced by partisan gerrymandering or the entire redistricting process. Instead, it is primarily a consequence of the evolving political geography. Second, Contrary to voters’ self-residential sorting, the data indicates that this shift in the political landscape results from people undergoing an ideological transformation over the past few decades.
Over the past two decades, partisan gerrymandering has become increasingly prevalent in the United States, prompting researchers to devise metrics like the efficiency gap to aid courts in determining the legality of redistricting plans. However, the existence of natural election advantages for political parties due to different political geographies, even in nonpartisan districting, raises doubts about the accuracy of these measures in identifying illegally gerrymandered districts.
To address this concern, I utilize a simulation-based approach by employing nonpartisan computer redistricting algorithms to generate a substantial number of artificial nonpartisan congressional districts. This study evaluates two of these measures: the efficiency gap and the mean-median. Using a simulation-inference approach, I evaluate whether current implementations of these measures accurately determine whether a district has been illegally gerrymandered by partisans.
Through the evaluation of two widely used metrics, namely the efficiency gap and the mean-median difference, I observe that the influence of natural election bias on these statistical measures differs across various states. I find that both measures encounter challenges in distinguishing between partisan gerrymandering and advantages resulting from natural election bias in practical scenarios. Finally, my research provides compelling and evident proof that certain deficiencies exist in the fundamental assumption underpinning the design of the mean-median measure.