Eight provocative Geopolitical Predictions

Not every geopolitical headline deserves equal attention. Bremmer’s central challenge was to distinguish overstated risks from developments that could demand rapid board-level attention. The first four are, in my view, the most consequential for directors.

1. Russia–Ukraine: escalation involving NATO  |  Next 1–2 years

Bremmer’s starkest warning was that the war in Ukraine could become substantially more dangerous—not merely drag on—with intensified Russian aggression potentially drawing NATO countries closer to direct confrontation. For boards, this is a scenario that could quickly turn European exposure into a company-wide crisis.

Board response: Stress-test European operations, cyber resilience, supply chains and business continuity; establish clear triggers for immediate management escalation.

2. An accelerating U.S.–China AI cold war  |  Already underway; escalating

Bremmer sees the competition for AI supremacy becoming a defining strategic rivalry, while safeguards for an AI-driven international crisis lag behind the technology. Companies may discover that their models, chips, cloud providers and data flows are caught between competing national-security regimes.

Board response: Examine AI governance, model and vendor concentration, technology restrictions, security controls and crisis readiness.

3. A lasting weakening of U.S. alliances  |  Structural; beyond 2029

His prediction is not simply that allies are frustrated with Washington: it is that Europe, Canada and others will permanently reduce their dependence on the United States. Even if political relationships improve, companies may face a lasting reordering of trade, defense, technology and investment relationships.

Board response: Revisit long-range geographic assumptions, market access, trade relationships and international capital commitments.

4. No Chinese invasion of Taiwan  |  Through January 2029

In one of his most counterintuitive calls, Bremmer sees virtually no likelihood of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan or a U.S.–China war over the island during this period. That challenges the tendency to treat an invasion as imminent—but a confident forecast is not a substitute for resilience planning.

Board response: Keep semiconductor, manufacturing and Taiwan dependencies visible; test disruption scenarios without assuming war is inevitable.

5. A Chinese astronaut on the moon  |  Within 2 years

Bremmer suggested China could achieve a headline-grabbing lunar milestone sooner than many expect. Beyond the symbolism, his point is that space capabilities increasingly signal technological and geopolitical influence, with commercial consequences far beyond the space industry.

Board response: Track satellite infrastructure dependencies, space-enabled services and emerging strategic technologies.

6. A China-backed alternative to Starlink for Russia  |  Next 6–12 months

He raised the possibility that China could help Russia develop a satellite communications alternative to Starlink, reducing Ukraine’s communications advantage. The larger warning is that technology infrastructure—not only weapons—can rapidly alter the balance in a conflict.

Board response: Test communications redundancy, cyber exposure, critical vendors and European contingency plans.

7. Separate Iran–Gulf state agreements  |  Next 3–6 months

Against the backdrop of the Iran conflict and shifting regional leverage, Bremmer suggested Tehran might pursue separate arrangements with Gulf states rather than a single broad settlement. For businesses, a diplomatic opening would not necessarily mean the region’s energy, shipping and security risks had disappeared.

Board response: Define monitoring and escalation thresholds for energy prices, Gulf shipping routes, regional facilities and supplier interruptions.

8. Constraints on U.S. defense spending  |  Next 5 years

Bremmer expects mounting debt-service costs and congressional pressures to constrain defense spending, despite a dangerous global security environment. That would challenge an easy assumption that geopolitical tension automatically translates into sustained budget growth for defense suppliers.

Board response: Stress-test government revenue forecasts, program concentration, procurement delays and capital allocation.

THE BOARDROOM TAKEAWAY

Geopolitical oversight should be selective, forward-looking and responsive. The question is not simply “What is happening in the world?” but “Which developments could materially change our strategy or risk profile—and how quickly would we know?”

Source note: Based on Ian Bremmer’s October 2026 Summit remarks as summarized for this recap. Predictions and timeframes are his, not NACD Chicago forecasts.

Tough questions for boards. But where were the tough questions for Elliott?

Jesse Cohn of Elliott Investment Management argued that directors must ask difficult questions, confront underperformance and avoid the comfort of boardroom collegiality. I agree with that challenge. But I was struck by an irony: while boards were urged to be tougher, the interview itself seemed to offer relatively little tough scrutiny of Elliott’s own methods, incentives or results. If directors should welcome hard questions, shouldn’t one of the world’s most influential activist investors welcome them, too?

FIVE KEY TAKEAWAYS FOR DIRECTORS

1. “90% of engagements are collaborative.” Cohn described most Elliott engagements as constructive rather than confrontational. This is his claim; the presentation did not supply supporting data.

2. Underperformance attracts activists. Weak share-price performance, questionable capital allocation and leadership shortcomings invite outside intervention.

3. Activists come prepared. Elliott says it invests heavily in research and draws on expertise in operations, pricing, costs and executive recruitment.

4. Collegiality can become complacency. Directors may recognize problems yet hesitate to ask uncomfortable questions. For me, this was the strongest point.

5. Shareholder value stays central. Boards should regularly test alignment among strategy, results, capital allocation and investor expectations.

THE QUESTIONS I WISH ELLIOTT HAD BEEN ASKED

Cohn portrayed activism as increasingly collaborative, yet Elliott’s record includes highly contentious campaigns, including at Southwest Airlines. Collaboration can follow considerable pressure. I would have liked to hear more about how Elliott measures lasting value creation, when its interventions have not worked, and whether its time horizon always aligns with that of long-term owners. His “90% collaborative” figure also deserves a clear definition and independent support.

THE BOARDROOM CHALLENGE—IN BOTH DIRECTIONS

Are we confronting difficult issues ourselves—or waiting for an activist to force the conversation? And when activists come calling, are we asking them the same rigorous questions they ask of us?

Wake up, boardrooms! Is good governance going bad?

Eric Ries challenged a deeply held assumption: what if practices directors believe protect shareholder value sometimes damage the companies they oversee? His argument is provocative—and should invite curiosity, not unquestioning agreement.

FIVE ASSERTIONS WORTH DEBATING

• Boards can destroy great companies while pursuing higher profits. Ries calls the gradual sacrifice of customers, employees, innovation and trust for financial returns “financial gravity.”

• Some enduring companies resist shareholder pressure. He points to Costco and Novo Nordisk as examples of structures and cultures that can preserve long-term commitments.

• Independent directors may not always be independent thinkers. He asks whether directors sometimes privilege familiar governance conventions over a company’s distinctive mission.

• Trustworthiness may be a company’s most valuable asset. How rigorously does a board evaluate whether its choices build or erode trust?

• A mission statement is not a mission. If incentives, capital allocation and strategy contradict the stated purpose, what does the organization actually stand for?

THREE QUESTIONS EVERY DIRECTOR SHOULD CONSIDER

• Are we creating long-term enterprise value—or extracting near-term gains at the expense of the future?

• Are we protecting the corporate mission—or shielding management from accountability?

• Are our governance practices strengthening the enterprise—or simply satisfying conventional expectations?

WHERE I WOULD CHALLENGE RIES

Research on long-term ownership structures lends credibility to parts of his argument, but it does not establish that unconventional governance causes superior results. Delaware law already gives directors considerable room to pursue long-term enterprise value; protective structures can also entrench management. The right response is neither reflexive agreement nor dismissal.

The point is not that Ries has all the answers. It is that directors should be willing to challenge the assumptions behind their own decisions.