Ryan Frant

Title:  Political Justification amid Reasonable Disagreement

Under what conditions is a political decision normatively justified? The presence of deep, reasonable disagreement virtually guarantees that some citizens will disagree with any given political decision, but this disagreement does necessarily invalidate a political decision’s justification. This thesis explores three traditional theories which try to explain political justification amid disagreement. These include John Rawls’s liberal proceduralism, Jürgen Habermas’s deliberative democracy, and Bonnie Honig’s agonistic democracy. After reviewing a number of issues with these traditional theories, this thesis leverages the resources in pragmatist thought to create a better theory, what I call pragmatist proceduralism. This theory solves the issue of political justification by relying on commonly-agreed procedures. Thus, while citizens may disagree with a political decision, they all have a reason to endorse the political decision’s justification in virtue of the political decision passing a commonly-agreed procedure. The exact mechanisms of these procedures are influenced by pragmatist thought.

First Thesis Advisor: Professor Melvin Rogers

Associate Professor of Political Science and Associate Director of the Center for Philosophy, Politics, and Economics

Second Thesis Advisor:  Professor David Estlund

Lombardo Family Professor of the Humanities