Policing, Racial Bias, and the Moral Obligation to Address Racial Inequality
Abstract: This paper aims to identify the relevant moral obligations with respect to policing and policy in order to address racial disparities in police violence. There are substantial racial disparities in the police use of lethal force, particularly against Black people. Implicit racial biases of police officers have often been used as an explanation for this data. However, implicit bias training programs in police departments have been ineffective in the long term. However, a more recent model of implicit bias suggests that instead of trying to reduce the implicit biases of police officers themselves, more effective interventions would involve changing the situations and contexts in which the police work. One way to do this would be to reduce the number of police in Black communities. Lastly, I argue that these considerations point to unique moral obligations to address racial disparities in policing. The best way to understand such moral obligations is through the philosophical notion of collective moral obligations. This is because governments and large movements that change them are arguably most capable of bringing about a favorable future state of affairs where policing is equitable. My approach differs significantly from other philosophical accounts of moral obligations and ethics in policing.
Individuals and Structures: A Path to Pluralism in Moral Responsibility for Implicit Bias
Abstract: Psychologists have argued that unconscious attitudes related to various demographic features can influence various behaviors in pernicious ways. This phenomenon is known as implicit bias. Philosophical engagement with these results from psychology has brought about much debate regarding moral responsibility for behaviors where implicit bias is pertinent. Psychologists have developed at least three models of implicit bias. I provide support for two claims. First, I argue that these different models suggest different senses of moral responsibility for implicit bias and that they are not mutually exclusive. Secondly, I argue that the newest models of implicit bias imply a new sense of responsibility for actions related to implicit biases. These claims point to a pluralistic interpretation of moral responsibility for implicit bias. This novel approach can address some critics who claim that focusing on implicit bias neglects structural inequalities.