Allies in Order-Building: Powershifts, Interstate Coalitions, and the Unexpected Origins of the Liberal Order"

Because they have focused on cases of order-building after systemic wars, scholars have overstated the importance of hegemonic powers to order-building. In this paper, I argue that order-building can also take place in peacetime in response to powershifts among the great powers. The politics of order- building during powershifts, however, are distinct. Declining hegemons are not always enthusiastic champions of new rules or norms, rising powers are not necessarily implacable opponents of order- building, and successful order-building requires the mobilization of broad coalitions of states. I illustrate this argument using both a novel case and novel methods. My empirical focus is on the development of the Hague system in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries. While often dismissed because of its failure to prevent the First World War, the Hague system represented an early and ambitious effort to refashion the rules and norms of the international system in a liberal direction. In terms of methods, I take advantage of the fact that the conference records include more than 5,000 roll call votes cast by 44 countries. I use this data to estimate the ideal point preferences of the states that attended the conferences and to identify coalitions based on networks of states with similar voting records. I find that order-building outcomes cannot be explained by the actions of the hegemon or the intensity of rising power preferences, but by patterns of interstate coalitions. [link]

"When Threats Work: Unpacking the Varieties of Compellence"

States routinely threaten to harm one another to advance their interests. Yet the conventional wisdom is that compellence—threats intended to convince adversaries to change their behavior—rarely succeed. Because compellence requires visible changes in behavior, targets worry that giving in to threats will damage their reputations, invite future challenges, and require them to accept painful losses. In this paper, I argue that this pessimistic view ignores important differences among different kinds of compellence. Not all episodes of compellence are identical, and threats can vary in their relative likelihood of success. In particular, compellent threats can vary in terms of the nature of their demands and the character of their punishments. All things being equal, it is easier to issue compellent threats that demand a return to the status quo rather than a departure from it. These types of demands tend to be clearer, more credible, and easier to bundle with assurances. Compellence is also more likely to succeed when coercers threaten to initiate new punishments, rather than escalate existing ones. Threats to escalate punishments tend to lack clarity and credibility, and are more difficult psychologically for targets to accept. An initial empirical test of this framework, using a dataset of 210 militarized compellent threats from 1918 to 2001, confirms that certain kinds of compellence are more effective than others, although rates of success vary over time and across issue areas. [link]

"How Dangerous is Decline? Falling Great Powers and International Disputes" (with Joseph M. Parent)

The consensus is that shifts in power are perilous moments in international politics. Rising powers seek to use their newfound power to overturn the existing order, while declining powers are tempted to use force fend off challenges to the status quo. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, we find that declining great powers are less likely both to initiate and to be targeted in militarized interstate disputes. We hypothesize that declining powers are more pacific because they recognize their decline and adjust their policies to minimize the risk of conflict. The pacifying effect of decline decreases at greater distances, which suggests declining powers strive to avoid disputes close to home that have the potential to escalate. We also find evidence that declining great powers tend to win the disputes they do initiate at higher rates than their non-declining counterparts, which suggests that they purposely pick favorable fights. A case study of France in the late 1880s and early 1890s provides additional support for the hypothesis that declining powers can avoid disputes through a combination of defusing potential flashpoints and bolstering deterrence at vital strongpoints. [link] 

"Revenge of the Luddites: The Logic of Self-Defeating Military Innovation" 

The conventional wisdom among security studies scholars is that have powerful incentives to pursue military innovations, and that states with the most advance militaries tend to perform best during wartime. In this paper, I contend that there are important—and overlooked—exceptions to the claim that technological innovation enhances a state's military effectiveness. I examine the potential of technological innovations to consume scarce resources, introduce unintended risks, distort existing doctrines, and provide unintended benefits to potential adversaries. I also explore the conditions under which self-defeating technological innovations are most likely to harm military effectiveness, and even hasten defeat. [link]