How to Increase and Sustain Cooperation in Public Goods Games: Conditional Commitments via a Mediator
with Mehmet Y. Gürdal, Özgür Gürerk, and Edip Kart
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 228 (2024), 106789. Link
Conditional commitment devices, such as price-matching guarantees, legal agreements, and smart contracts, can significantly enhance cooperation and improve outcomes in various scenarios. Despite their potential, empirical evidence of their effectiveness in the context of public goods is limited. This paper addresses this gap by demonstrating that conditional and binding commitments can indeed increase voluntary contributions to public goods. We begin by theoretically analyzing the impact of conditional commitments managed by a mediator on public good contributions. Our analysis shows that conditional commitments can be structured to achieve a Pareto Optimal Nash Equilibrium (PONE). We then validate our theoretical findings with laboratory experiments. The results reveal that when a PONE exists, nearly all participant groups adopt conditional commitments and achieve high levels of sustained cooperation. Conversely, when conditional commitments lead to socially inefficient outcomes, their use declines and cooperation levels drop significantly.
Retailer Remittance Matters: Evidence from Voluntary Collection Agreements
with Tejaswi Velayudhan and Eleanor Wilking
National Tax Journal, 76(2) (2023), 239–265. Link
Recent reforms have shifted tax-remittance responsibility for online purchases from consumers to sellers, thereby eliminating an important disparity between tax treatments of online and brick-and-mortar commerce. Despite the attention these reforms received, we know little about how shifting the responsibility to remit affects consumption or the tax system. To remedy this, we study US states’ staggered adoption of voluntary collection agreements, which committed large online retailers to remit sales taxes. We find that this change stemmed sales-tax base erosion and shifted consumption toward brick-and-mortar retailers. The increased tax burden resulting from the effective tax increase fell mainly on consumers, but it did not significantly alter the distributional burden of US sales taxes.
The Role of Information Aggregators in Tax Compliance
International Tax and Public Finance, 29(2) (2022), 237–285. Link
Fifty-six percent of the US taxpaying population uses a paid tax preparer, but the effect of these tax preparation services on tax compliance is not well understood. Although governments conceal the algorithms they use to determine which taxpayers to audit, tax preparation firms with large client bases may be able to infer these algorithms and therefore offer strategic advice to taxpayers. This paper formalizes this role, using a simple asymmetric information model where agents can purchase information about the government’s enforcement rules. In a competitive market for tax preparation services, demand for tax preparers is selective and increases in taxpayer income. Moreover, the presence of tax preparers always reduces compliance when tax preparers have perfect information. Perhaps surprisingly, if the demand for strategic advice is high enough, the government can mitigate evasion by revealing full information about its audit rule. Alternatively, when the tax preparers have imperfect information about the audit rule, if the top income within an audit class is low enough, the government can utilize tax preparer firms to increase compliance by influencing the audit information available to these firms.
Tax Evasion and Enforcement
In Routledge Handbook of the Informal Economy, edited by Ceyhun Elgin. Routledge, 2024. Link
Tax Enforcement with Somewhat Honest Taxpayers
Draft available upon request
Classic models of optimal auditing find that the tax authority should audit low reports with full deterrence and leave reports above a cutoff unaudited. This paper shows that this result is knife-edge: it holds only when misreporting is costless. When taxpayers face any convex cost of evading, such as lying aversion, evasion responds continuously to the audit intensity. Lowering the intensity slightly below full deterrence then costs little in additional evasion, while the budget it frees lets the authority raise the cutoff, so that taxpayers who bunch at it report more income. The revenue-maximizing authority, therefore, audits more taxpayers, less intensively, including some with incomes above the standard cutoff. In a numerical example, the best cutoff rule reduces the revenue lost to evasion from 35 to 23 percent of full-compliance revenue. I also characterize the optimal audit rule: incentive compatibility no longer requires the audit probability to fall with reported income, and the optimal rule pools the lowest incomes and then raises audit intensity with the report in a sequence of rungs.
Order Effects, Reciprocity, and Equilibrium Play in a TV Show
with Mehmet Y. Gürdal, Tolga Umut Kuzubaş, and Büşra Yavuz
Revise and resubmit, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
This paper theoretically and empirically analyzes strategic behavior in a Turkish reality TV cooking competition with a unique scoring system. The structure differs from prior studies in several ways: contestants must assign scores from a restricted set, publicly reveal evaluations after each round, and are additionally evaluated by a program host whose scores are concealed until the last stage. Contestants generally assign the lowest permissible scores to opponents, consistent with a payoff-maximizing equilibrium strategy rarely observed in similar games. While the points received from other contestants exhibit an order effect, with later performers receiving higher scores, the winning probability itself does not depend on the order of performance. The analysis finds no evidence of generalized reciprocity but does find dyadic reciprocity, with contestants reciprocating scores in one-on-one interactions. Given the incentives, this reciprocal behavior does not contradict rational play. Overall, the contest design provides new insights into how institutional rules and information structure shape strategic interactions in competitive environments.
Supplier Salience: Incidence, Market Entry, and Welfare
with Elisa Yu-Chun Cheng and Eleanor Wilking
Draft available upon request
This paper explores how optimization frictions in supplier price-setting affect tax incidence. We use a natural experiment that varied the effective hotel tax rate in certain cities at different times to document heterogeneity in tax pass-through using multiple proxies for price-setting acumen. Pass-through is lowest for sophisticated hosts whose prices before the policy closely follow local hotels. In contrast, less sophisticated hosts are much less likely to adjust their pre-tax price, passing the entire tax burden onto consumers. We develop a model for welfare analysis that incorporates supplier salience and other price-setting optimization failures.
Learning to Deter: Optimal Experimentation in Tax Enforcement
Tax authorities justify much of their audit activity by deterrence, yet deterrence is the one component of the return to audits that their data cannot reveal. Audits at a given rate identify evasion at that rate, not how evasion responds when the rate changes, and random-audit programs randomize who is audited rather than the rate taxpayers face. We study a revenue-maximizing authority that learns the deterrence response only from its own audits. Any audit rate at which the marginal audit loses money on direct collections is self-confirming, and an authority can remain at a mistaken rate indefinitely. We characterize optimal experimentation across groups of taxpayers. Because information about deterrence is a public good across groups, experiments should be concentrated where information is cheapest rather than where evasion is highest, and decentralized enforcement under-experiments. The optimal experiment is a budget-neutral randomized trial in audit rates around the status quo.
Income-Dependent Penalty Rate for Tax Evasion
with Yulia Kuchumova
This paper examines income-dependent penalties as a mechanism for addressing tax evasion and income inequality. Traditional models focus on fixed or proportional penalties and overlook how income heterogeneity shapes evasion decisions and their distributional consequences. We study the implications of scaling penalties to taxpayers’ income, drawing on countries that use income-based systems for general financial penalties, and evaluate how income-dependent fines affect compliance, evasion, and the equity of the tax system.
When Inflation Taxes the Poor: Measuring Fiscal Drag Across Countries
with Tolga Umut Kuzubaş and Yavuz Selim Uçar