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To Denuclearize or Not To Denuclearize, That is the Question

Maggie Carlson

The United States has a complex, turbulent history with North Korea. It all began in the Korean War, when the U.S sided against the Workers Party of Korea. Ever since North Korea had its first known nuclear test in 2006, there has been growing worry from neighboring nations, and the United States, that North Korea may become a full nuclear state.₉ The worries became prophecy because, today, North Korea has up to 60 nuclear weapons.₂ Over the years there has been much talk about the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. However, as much as North Korea likes to dance around the idea, they will never actually denuclearize because they have more to gain through political concessions. It is a matter of their national security, and our loose restrictions on North Korea give them no incentive to change.

Nuclear weapons not only benefit North Korea’s militarily, but provide the government money along with other things. This is all done through concessions: a concession is when one country yields to the demands of another country. Typically, when one country grants a concession, it is reciprocated. This may be the case on paper with North Korea, but Pyongyang doesn't give up much. It’s no secret that throughout its history, North Korea has been deceitful in negotiations. For example, during the Clinton presidency, a deal called the Agreed Framework was struck. It required North Korea to “scrap two plutonium-based nuclear reactors” while the United States exchanged them for “reactors less capable of producing bomb-making materials, as well as fuel”.₈ In return, North Korea was able to gain significant economic aid from countries such as Japan, the United States, and South Korea. This deal was upheld for eight years until it was discovered that the North Koreans were creating a bomb out of uranium, not plutonium, behind the backs of the nations in the prearranged agreement. The United States left the deal and it further crumbled when North Korea kicked out foreign weapons inspectors in 2002.

A more recent example of North Korea’s tendency to manipulate concession-based diplomacy includes the recent summit negotiations in June of 2018 with the Trump Administration . One surprise component of the deal was Trump’s cancelation of joint military exercises in South Korea. However, North Korea made no promise to lessen its nuclear power. In fact, not long after the summit reports came out that North Korea actually made an “expansion of nuclear facilities and its arsenal”.₇ This action exemplifies North Korea's unwillingness to reciprocate in deals, especially surrounding denuclearization. The Workers Party knows that nuclear weapons are their only bargaining chip on the global table.

Without the concessions granted them due to their nuclear weapons, they would just be an impoverished nation with a human rights crisis. To put this in perspective the “per capita income in the North is estimated to be as little as $1,000 a year”.₁₃ That is fifty times less than the American counterpart. A lot of North Korea's economy depends on economic aid; between the years of 1995 and 2008 the North Korean government received about 1.3 billion dollars in aid from the United States alone.₁₇ Even with aid, “about half of North Korea's population of 24 million”₁₂ are living in absolute poverty. Without their nuclear and military power, North Korea would have no bargaining power at all, especially on the international stage.

Another reason North Korea would never give up their nuclear power is because it’s a matter of their national security. In the past centuries “Korea has been invaded more than 100 times by its powerful neighbors China and Japan,” says Alvaro Longoria, in his film the Propaganda Game that explores the propaganda in the North Korean regime. Because of how prone to invasion the Korean Peninsula has been, the North Korean government is skeptical of all other nations. North Koreans are especially weary of the United States, as they have a different perception on the Korean War. In the Propaganda Game, Colonel Han Il of the Korean People’s army explains that “the intention of the U.S when they occupied South Korea, was to provoke war with North Korea and to keep advancing to the north of the country to rule over all of Asia”.₁₁ This belief strengthens the Workers Party’s distrust of surrounding nations. Hence the need for nuclear power, so that the small nation can defend itself if needed. North Korean tour guide, Kim Ji Hye, illustrates in the film that “Defending [their] country, of course, that matter comes first. Military force is very important, so [they] are enforcing Songun politics even in present times.”₁₁ Songun politics is a military-first ideology that prioritizes a country’s military above all else.

That being said, the Workers Party of Korea believes it cannot have a strong military force without nuclear weapons. With constant worry of the United States, it is a common belief among many North Koreans, including Kim Jong Un, that nuclear weapons act as a “deterrent against American invasion”.₁₄ Kim Jong Un has even gone so far as to say that “‘The days are gone forever when our enemies could blackmail us with nuclear bombs’.₁₄ So now it’s obvious that by having this nuclear strength, Pyongyang believes that nobody will invade or try to threaten the regime.

One example that might strike fear into the heart of the Workers Party when thinking about denuclearization is the Libyan model. On December 19th 2003, Muammar Gaddafi made the shocking announcement that they were ending their nuclear program.₅ The sanctions put on the country were very harsh and much of the Libyan economy is based on trade. As the years went on, Libya’s military might disappeared alongside their nuclear weapons. Weakened, Libya was in a perfect position for a revolution, and that’s exactly what happened. In February 2011, the Libyan revolution began, with armed pro-Gaddafi forces and rebels. Then, like clockwork, Muammar Gaddafi was removed from power with the help of NATO intervention. Finally, Muammar Gaddafi was murdered in the streets and in an extremely heinous way. Events like these only convince states like North Korea to keep their nuclear weapons. Kim Jong Un will look at this example as what happens when countries give into the western agenda. Libyan denuclearization paints the United States as untrustworthy, due to the NATO intervention, at a time where North Koreans are already skeptical of America's intentions. So, when looking at Libya, in the eyes of North Koreans, it reestablishes the idea that denuclearization isn’t in the best interest of the regime and its security.

A final reason that North Korea will not denuclearize is because the “pressure” the U.S and other nations place on the country is weak and offers no incentive for change. Sanctions are actually very hard to enforce because on paper the idea flourishes, however, it’s difficult to enforce while avoiding the inherent loopholes. This is because sanctions are not self-regulating and require constant work from the countries imposing them. Many companies will sell goods to North Korea until they are fined. There’s also a large black market enterprise where goods escape the grasp of inspections. Many of these black market dealers are able to get their products through ports in “Africa, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia”₁ where customs checks are quite loose.

Another reason North Korea is able to survive is its best trading partner, China. Trade between China and North Korea actually makes up “90 percent”₁ of North Korea’s total trade. China continues to trade with North Korea because there’s no political incentive for them to change. It was even publicized that China is the “lead facilitator of black market North Korean trade”₁ and that some companies in China let North Korean banks stay “connected to the global financial system”₁ even after UN sanctions were imposed. As well as weak enforcement, the sanctions in general are often weak because Russia and China, allies of Pyongyang, are able to use their vetoes on the UN security council. Their allies do not want a change in power in North Korea as they want to preserve them as an ally.

As of now, Kim Jong Un is trying a new strategy, one of diplomacy. He had a summit with the President of The United States and there have been rumors of Mr. Kim meeting with other world leaders. People like Putin, the leader of the Russian Federation, and Assad, the president of Syria, are considering meetings with the Workers Party Chairman, Kim Jong Un. Mr. Kim has also made several visits to China in order to affirm the alleviation of Trump's imposed sanctions. By making his diplomatic debut, Kim appears as a smaller threat in the world’s eyes so sanctions may become more relaxed.

Looking through history books and even modern events, a pattern of North Korean behavior becomes apparent. The pattern of using nuclear weapons as an advantage at every front. The North Koreans only toy with the idea of giving up their nuclear power because it appeases the western world. The regime has no intention of actually weakening itself, they simply enjoy the concessions they are given. The current fear for their national security and our “pressure” offer no incentive for change. Donald Trump was too rash when deciding to have a meeting with Kim Jong Un; it lead to a summit where North Korea got what they wanted while the U.S got practically nothing in return. The greatest downfall in relations with North Korea is that we don’t take the country seriously. When we see Kim Jong Un in the news, some of us laugh and think, “crazy man”. However, we severely underestimate their strategic prowess and their cunning abilities to find loopholes. When analyzing the situation, it’s clear that the Workers Party will never willingly give up their weapons. Denuclearizing the Korean peninsula is an essential element of keeping a stable world however, they won't go down without a fight.