A dilemma for dispositional answers to Kripkenstein's challenge.

I argue that Kripkenstein's challenge is often misunderstood and that getting clear about the real nature of the problem is sufficient to see that it cannot be solved by appealing to the speakers' dispositions. The published version is open access on Minds and Machines' website (erratum here). rule-following paradox

Yet another victim of Kripkenstein's monster: dispositions, meaning, and privilege.

I discuss a strangely neglected argument against semantic dispositionalism which revolves around the idea that dispositionalists have no way to justify their privileging certain dispositions over all the others. The published version is open access on Ergo's website. rule-following paradox

Meaning relativism and subjective idealism.

I show, contra John McDowell and others, that even though it entails a form of global relativism, Kripkenstein's relativism about semantic discourse does not lead to subjective idealism. A postprint, and the published version on Synthese's website. rule-following paradox

Yet another skeptical solution.

I put forward a new skeptical solution to Kripkenstein's paradox, which revolves around the idea that communication does not require meaning. A postprint, and the published version. rule-following paradox

Constructivism, intersubjectivity, provability, and triviality.

I show that Sharon Street’s claim that her Darwinian dilemma is sound relative to every possible normative point of view is inconsistent with her own constructivism about epistemic reasons and discuss some consequences of this incompatibility. A postprint, and the published version (erratum here). Darwinian metanormative debunking

Semantic dispositionalism and non-inferential knowledge.

I argue that the standard reading of Kripke's normativity argument against semantic dispositionalism is wrong and that the real point of the argument does not have much to do with normativity (in any sense of the word). A postprint, and the published version. rule-following paradox

Rule-following, ideal conditions and finkish dispositions.

I explain how some outcomes of the debate about the metaphysics of dispositions can be used to build a new argument against certain varieties of semantic dispositionalism. A postprint, and the published version on Philosophical Studies' website. rule-following paradox

Kripke's account of the rule-following considerations.

The first of a series of papers about Kripke's Wittgenstein's rule-following paradox. My views on the topic are now somewhat different and some of the ideas I argue for here are developed more fully in subsequent articles (see especially 'Semantic dispositionalism and non-inferential knowledge', 'Yet another skeptical solution', and 'Meaning relativism and subjective idealism'), but the paper is still worth reading. A postprint, and the published version on the European Journal of Philosophy's website. rule-following paradox