Marine Oil Spill Aspects of the Northern Gateway Project

This report is a critical analysis of the marine oil spill prevention and response aspects of Enbridge’s Northern Gateway project application which was filed with the National Energy Board ( NEB ) and Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency ( CEAA ) on May 27, 2010. It is submitted in fulfillment of the Terms of Reference appended to the contract between Worldocean Consulting Ltd and Living Oceans Society, on behalf of Living Oceans Society and Coastal First Nations Great Bear Initiative, which entered into force on July 28, 2010.

The report consists of a detailed review of the marine oil spill sections from the following volumes of the application:

Volume 7C: Risk Assessment and Management of Spills- Kitimat Terminal;
Volume 8A: Overview and General Information- Marine Transportation;
Volume 8B: Environmental and Socio-Economic Assessment ( ESA )- Marine Transportation; and
Volume 8 C: Risk Assessment and Management of Spills- Marine Transportation.

Marine Component of the Proposed Project

According to the Terms of Reference for the Joint Review Panel ( hereafter referred to as the JRP ), Enbridge’s Northern Gateway project consists of, inter alia: two pipelines ( one westbound for Alberta oil and one eastbound for condensate ); a tank terminal; two marine loading and unloading berths ( one each for oil and condensate ); marine transportation of oil and condensate; plus all related works and activities. [2]

The oil pipeline being proposed will have an initial capacity of 525,000 barrels per day. According to Enbridge, it will be designed to transport conventional light and heavy oil synthetic oil, bitumen blended with condensate and bitumen blended with synthetic oil.[3] The condensate pipeline would have a capacity of 193,000 barrels per day.[4]

The marine transportation component includes the use of various types and sizes of tankers to transport oil out of Kitimat, and condensate into Kitimat and points inland. According to the proponent, between 190 and 250 tankers will visit Kitimat each year, for an average of 220 tanker visits per year. On average, there are expected to be 1.2 transits per day in the Confined Channel Assessment Area ( CCAA ).[5]

A breakdown of the 220 tanker visits by route and type of cargo transported ( condensate or oil ), is summarised here:

The oil and condensate would be transported in Aframax[6], Suezmax[7] and Very Large Crude Carrier ( VLCC )[8] tankers;
70 of the 220 tanker visits to Kitimat will be by condensate tankers and one hundred and fifty by oil tankers[9];
- 50 of these 220 port calls will involve VLCC class tankers, 120 Suezmax class and 50 Aframax class.[10]
The condensate will only be transported in the smaller Aframax and Suezmax tankers, whereas the largest tanker class- the VLCCs, will only carry oil.[11]
The tankers would follow either a northern route, referred to by the proponent as the Northern Approach, or a southern route- the so-called Southern Approach. The Southern Approach actually consists of two routes- one entering and exiting Douglas Channel via Caamaño Sound, and the other via Browning Entrance and Principe Channel. [12]
The Northern Approach, which encompasses Dixon Entrance and parts of Hecate Strait, would be used for tankers arriving from or departing to Asian ports[13].
- The proponent estimates that thirty three percent of the 220 tankers visiting Kitimat will use the Northern Approach [14]; in effect, then, approximately sixty seven tankers will take the northern route.
- We are told that all of the condensate will be imported from Asia ( & the Middle East )[15].
- As mentioned above, in Bullet 2, a total of seventy condensate tankers will be coming to Kitimat each year.[16]
- It is unclear whether the condensate tankers will take the Northern Approach via Dixon Entrance and Browning Entrance.[17]
The Southern Approach would be used for condensate tankers arriving from Asia as well as oil tankers transporting oil to destinations south of Kitimat on the North American west coast[18].
- Sixty seven percent of the tankers will follow the Southern Approach- thirteen percent via the Browning Entrance and Principe Channel option, and fifty four percent via the Caamaño Sound option[19] to and from west coast ports south of Kitimat[20].

Finally, the proponent divides the project area into two components- the CCAA and the Open Water Area ( OWA ). In a nutshell, the CCAA includes everything east of Hecate Strait, whereas the OWA includes everything else within the PNCIMA area, to the outer edge of the 12-mile Territorial Sea of Canada. Fifty percent of tankers will enter the CCAA through Principe Channel from Browning Entrance, while the other fifty percent will enter the CCAA via Caamaño Sound.[21]

Marine Oil Spill Prevention and Response Filing Requirements

Introduction

This section focuses on what the proponent is required to file in support of its application, and in order for the JRP to conduct its assessment of the project. The main documents in which these requirements are set out are: the 15 January, 2010 Agreement between the National Energy Board and the Minister of the Environment Concerning the Joint Review of the Northern Gateway Pipeline Project ( hereafter referred to as the JRPA ); the August 2009 Scope of the Factors [22] document from the Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency ( hereafter CEAA ); and the July 5, 2010 Procedural Direction [23] from the JRP.

The JRPA

The Terms of Reference ( TOR ) annexed to the JRPA outline the scope of the project, the factors to be considered in the course of the review, etc. In terms of the scope of the project, the document states on Page 9 that the project includes the “…construction, operation, decommissioning and abandonment of the following components:” Of particular interest to this review, no mention is made of the potential expansion of the facilities. Thus, it is a moot point whether the panel will include potential expansion of the pipeline in its deliberations.

Under Part II- Factors to be Considered During the Joint Review ( P. 11 ), among the matters the Panel is to consider are “Environmental protection, environmental monitoring, and contingency and emergency response plans.” This requirement has to be viewed in conjunction with a similar ( though by no means identical ) provision in the Scope of the Factors document which will be examined below, and another similar clause from the JRP’s Procedural Direction.

Scope of the Factors Document

Because the NEB’s Filing Manual does not include instructions specific to the marine components of project applications, specific guidance was issued to the proponent in this respect by CEAA in August 2009. This document is referred to as the “Scope of the Factors” document. The Sections in this document which concern us the most are “7.5 Potential Accidents and Malfunctions” and “7.6 Effects of the Environment on the Project”

7.5 Potential Accidents and Malfunctions

Here the proponent is required to, inter alia, “…present a preliminary emergency measures plan and environmental protection plan making it possible to react adequately in the event of an accident”. The document then goes on to list a number of very specific items the plans are supposed to include, including a sample pollution emergency plan to be maintained on board each tanker, “persons in charge, equipment available”, etc. ( P. 14 ). There are several differences between what the afore-mentioned JRPA requires in this respect as compared to the Scope of the Factors document. First, the former requires ‘plans’, whereas the latter requires only “preliminary” plans. However, the latter document also goes into some detail as to the types of information the plans should contain. Later in the report we will deal with the matter as to whether or not the proponent has met the information requirements in respect of contingency planning.

7.6 Effects of the Environment on the Project

Here the proponent is required, inter alia, to consider how severe and extreme weather conditions, such as exceptionally strong winds, may affect the project. This is another issue which we will be dealing with later on, in an effort to determine whether the proponent has submitted sufficient information to fulfill this reporting requirement.

Procedural Direction

The Procedural Direction seeks input from the public regarding the issues the panel should examine, plus “…additional information which Northern Gateway should be required to file;”.[24] etc. A Draft List of Issues is presented in Appendix 1 of the Procedural Direction. The list includes a section on Page 8 entitled “Safety, Mitigation and Prevention”. A total of four questions are included in the draft list:

“What safety measures are in place to protect people and the environment?
What are the consequences of hydrocarbon releases from the project?
Are the proposed risk assessment, mitigation and prevention measures appropriate for the design, construction, operation and abandonment of the proposed facilities?
Are the proposed plans and measures for emergency preparedness and response appropriate?”

Marine Oil Spill Prevention and Response Elements of the Proposal

Introduction

The main features of Enbridge’s Northern Gateway project in terms of its marine oil spill response plan can basically be divided into two types of measures: those intended to prevent a spill from occurring, and those intended to be taken in response to a spill incident. Both types of measures apply to the marine terminal as well as the marine transportation component of the project, with some obvious differences in terms of specifics.

Measures to Prevent a Spill from Occurring

At the Terminal

The proponent is proposing a number of measures to prevent an oil spill from occurring at the marine terminal, including the use of harbor and escort tugs, as well as placing a containment boom around the tanker as it loads. Other measures taken to prevent tanker spills generally should apply equally at the terminal.

On the Water

Numerous measures are planned to prevent marine oil spills from tankers, including:

· Use of ‘modern’, double hull tankers

· A screening process designed to select only safe tankers and weed out those that are unsafe

· Use of trained crews

· Having a pilot on board fully-laden tankers within the CCAA

· Use of harbor and escort tugs at the terminal, and escort tugs within the CCAA

· Use of radar and improvement of navigational aids all along the transportation route

· Safe transit speeds

· Speed limits within CCCA

· Operational safety limits that cover visibility, wind and sea conditions

· Automated Identification System for tracking vessels

Measures To Be Taken In Response to a Spill Incident

The proponent is also pledging to take a number of steps to mitigate the damage if a spill were to occur, including:

· Escort tugs to double as response and firefighting vessels

· First response capability in the region, including the placement of at least four response depots at strategic locations within the project area

· Rapid and effective response to spill incidents

· Compensation for damage

The commitments Enbridge makes in the application with respect to response equipment and personnel can be summarized as follows (from Section 5.5, Equipment and Personnel, Pp. 5-11 – 5-13, Volume 8C):

· Tier 1 ( onsite ) response capability for a Primary Area of Response ( PAR ) designed to exceed Canadian Standards Association ( CSA ) standards by mobilising personnel and equipment immediately and deploying them well before the required six hours. ‘Onsite’ is meant to include resources at the Kitimat Terminal and at Response Organisation ( hereafter RO ) -designated equipment depots.

· Commitment to placing response equipment in caches at 4 locations throughout the CCAA that will provide response times from 6 to 12 hours on water.

The proposed response capacity is depicted by the proponent in the following table:

Table 1 Overview of OSRP Equipment

Source: Reproduced from Table 5-3, Volume 8C, P. 5-12.

*OSRVs = Oil Spill Response Vessels

** The proponent should be asked to define the term “big local boats”.

The response capability Enbridge is proposing, as compared to what the current CCG requirements are, can be summarised in the following table compiled by the Consultant[25]:

Table 2 Comparing Enbridge’s Tiered Response Proposal to Current CCG Requirements for ROs

Source: Worldocean Consulting Ltd, 2010, from the following sources- Volume 8C of the application, P. 5-11, and Response Organizations Standards ( 1995 )- TP12401E: http://www.tc.gc.ca/eng/marinesafety/tp-tp12401-menu-2162.htm. * Using this conversion calculator, One tonne equals approximately 7.9 barrels. Thus, 150 tonnes equals 1185 barrels.

Thus, the response capability Enbridge is proposing for the CCCA exceeds current requirements for ROs within Canada in virtually every respect, whether viewed from a tonnage or a time perspective. For example, where CCG requires a 150 tonne ( 1185 barrel ) response capacity, Enbridge promises ten times that. And where CCG requires a 2500 tonne ( 19,750 barrel ) response capacity within 18 hours, Enbridge is promising that level of response capacity within six to twelve hours. This is not to say that what Enbridge is proposing is either sufficient or meets or exceeds ‘world class’ standards, issues which the JRP will have to consider in the course of its deliberations, and which this report deals with later on.

Enbridge’s application also includes a table which details its proposed hydrocarbon recovery capability for various regions within the CCAA:

Table 3 Proposed Hydrocarbon Recovery Capability

Source: Table 5-4, Volume 8C, P. 5-13. * One cubic meter equals

Thus, Enbridge is proposing a total oil storage capacity of 12,400 m³ ( 77,987 barrels ) for the entire CCAA, or roughly 40,000 barrels less capacity than they are gearing for from a Tier One spill depicted in Table 2 on the previous [age of this report. The question becomes, then- where does Enbridge plan to store the rest of the recovered oil from a Tier One spill, let alone larger spills?

As for the proposed capability for the OWA, Enbridge says the following: “Further planning is in progress to determine the response recommendations for the OWA. Response times will be better than Transport Canada standards”.[26]

A critique of what Enbridge is proposing in terms of response capacity is presented later in this report.

Detailed Review of the Marine Oil Spill Prevention and Response Elements of the Filing

General Comment

In conformity with the TOR for this review, the remainder of this part of the report reviews the application volume by volume, line by line, identifying deficiencies of the following types:

more Information is required from the proponent in order to assess the analysis and conclusions presented, i.e. information is insufficient;
information on certain topics is entirely absent;
information is sufficient but where the assumptions, analysis or conclusions can be challenged, with alternative written evidence and expert opinion being presented that contradicts the findings of the application.

Then, at the end of the report, in the summary section, a complete list of the information that should be submitted by the proponent in order to fill these deficiency gaps is presented.

In terms of the deficiencies themselves, it will be recalled that the Procedural Direction asked for suggestions from the public as to areas where additional information should be supplied by the proponent in its application. One such area is the need for a clear definition of the Project Area, as well as a map clearly delineating that area.

The closest one gets to a description of the Project Area is the following statement on P. 1-4 of Volume 8C: “It is assumed that all areas along the Northern and Southern Approaches are at risk of being oiled in the event of a spill. Areas from the border with Alaska to northern Vancouver Island and out to the Territorial Sea of Canada are included in this volume.”

On P. 13-5 of Volume 8B, the OWA is defined as follows: “The OWA includes marine waters from the Alaskan border to Brooks Peninsula on Vancouver Island and from the continental shelf landward to the northern fjords. The OWA is based on both ecological and administrative boundaries and is similar to the boundaries of the Pacific North Coast Integrated Management Area ( PNCIMA ).”[27]

Figure 1: PNCIMA Area Map

Source: PNCIMA Web Site: http://www.pncima.org/site/what-is-pncima/the-area.html

Requiring the proponent to include a map of the Project Area in the application would graphically depict the 88,000 square kilometre area that could be affected by a marine oil spill incident associated with the marine transportation component of the Northern Gateway project. It could also help to visualise the following items:

· The area for which the proponent must submit detailed project information in the Environmental and Social Impact Statement ( ESA );

· Potential locations for oil spill response depots and equipment;

· The area within which escort, rescue and harbour tugs may be required, and pilot boarding stations located;

· Potential sites for JRP hearings, such as northern Vancouver Island communities, stretching as far south as Campbell River.

Volume 7C- Risk Assessment and Management of Spills- Kitimat Terminal

3 Probability of Hydrocarbon Spills, Pp. 3-1, 3-2

Probability of Spills associated with Trans-shipment of Operations at the Kitimat Terminal, P. 3-2

In the first paragraph it is stated that” …the risk of a spill resulting from a tanker striking the pier during berthing in ( sic ) negligible.”

One deficiency in the application is that there is no mention of the possibility of Bunker C fuel oil spills from a docked tanker. [28] The proponent should take into account the possibility of the vessel’s fuel tanks being ruptured while the vessel is at the terminal. To cite a relatively recent example of such an incident, on August 4, 2006 the general cargo vessel MV Westwood Anette struck a piling at the dock in Squamish, puncturing a fuel tank in the process and releasing a total of 243 barrels of oil into Howe Sound. Information on Bunker C spills is required in order to fully assess the proponent’s conclusion that the risk of an oil spill from this project is low or minimal.

As for the table of ‘returns’ presented for various types of terminal spills[29], no explanation is provided as to how these figures were arrived at. Are they, for instance, based on a projected fifty year lifespan for the project, and how many tanker visits in total are anticipated over the project’s lifespan? Also, is potential expansion of the pipeline factored in? One has no way of knowing these things. Clarification is necessary. Again, without this basic information, it is not possible to reach the conclusion that the risk of a spill is low or minimal.

5 Incident Prevention and Response, P. 5-1

Enbridge, as owner of the pipeline and marine terminal, would be responsible for spills at both these facilities. As for marine transportation, since Enbridge does not plan to own the tankers, it would not, under the current law, be responsible for tanker spills. Nevertheless, Enbridge makes a corporate commitment here to what it calls “extended responsibility” to cover marine transportation activities. While it does not fully define this concept, an indication as to what it has in mind is provided on P. 5-5 of Volume 8C, under a section entitled “Roles and Responsibilities”, which reads as follows: “Although it is not a regulatory requirement, Northern Gateway is committed to ‘extended responsibility’ for a response on the Northern and Southern Approaches and in the OWA through ownership or direction of the certified RO”.

Clarification is required as to what is meant by “…through ownership or direction”. One understands the “ownership” part; however, the “direction” part is unclear.

The term ‘responsibility’ on its own has legal implications, being associated as it is with liability as well as with the term “Responsible Party” or RP. Enbridge seems to envisage a more limited role under this concept or principle of extended responsibility. For instance, on Page 5-7 of this same Section 5 there is the following statement: “The RP for a release of hydrocarbons from a tanker would be the tanker owner; however, through the response plan…, Northern Gateway will take responsibility that the response, management, and implementation of the response operations meet corporate commitments and objectives.”

This seems to fall short of Enbridge committing to paying for cleanup and compensation. On the contrary, Enbridge makes repeated references in the application to the tanker owner being the RP, and as such being responsible for both the response costs and claims.[30]. Under current law, the only way Enbridge would be legally responsible for tanker spills, and their associated cleanup, restoration and compensation costs, would be for it to own the tankers outright.

Enbridge needs to clarify what it means by this term “extended responsibility”, to avoid any confusion.

This matter of ‘extended responsibility’ will be revisited later in the report.

In this same Section 5 the document also makes reference to various marine oil spill response plans which it proposes to provide at a later stage of the approvals process for the facilities. We shall revisit this issue shortly.

5.6 Equipment and Personnel, P. 5-11

Enbridge makes various claims in this section regarding the emergency response capability planned for the Kitimat terminal. Collectively, it claims that the onsite and offsite recovery capacity will, “…provide a level of response that places ( the Kitimat terminal ) within the top terminal-port operations for oil preparedness worldwide”.

Insufficient evidence is presented in the application to substantiate this claim. To fill this gap, the proponent should submit charts and figures which compare what it is proposing to what other terminals, such as the one in Valdez, Prince William Sound in Alaska have on hand, plus the other terminals it profiles on its web site- Mongstad, Norway; Brofjorden, Sweden; and Sullom Voe, United Kingdom. [31] We shall return to this issue later in the report.

5.7.1 Environmental Sensitivity Atlas, P. 5-13

We are informed that a coastal environmental sensitivity atlas has been developed as part of the background studies undertaken in support of the project.

This atlas should be part and parcel of the application, so that it can form part of the evidence if and when a Hearing Order is issued in respect of the project.

5.8 Shoreline Response, P. 5-15

Here there is a brief discussion concerning “remediation endpoints” for shoreline cleanup, and how these will be arrived at.

The proponent should be asked how many meters of shoreline it will be in the position to clean up each day. Currently, Response Organisations ( ROs ) are only required to have the capacity to clean up 500 meters of shoreline per day.[32] Were a similar standard to be applied to the Northern Gateway project, it would undoubtedly fall far short of public expectations in the event of a major spill event in the Queen Charlotte Basin.

9.1 Introduction, P. 9-1

The proponent mentions that there is the potential for spills at the marine terminal due to extreme natural events, human error, vandalism and equipment failure. ( A similar statement is made for marine transportation generally, on P. 2-1 of Volume 8C ). A brief history of such events around the world would be very helpful. The possibility of terrorist attacks on both the terminal and the tankers should also be considered. There have been at least two reported instances of tankers being the target of terrorist attacks in the past decade- the MV Limburg incident off the coast of Yemen in 2002 and the MV M Star incident in the Strait of Hormuz in July, 2010. The incident involving the Limburg resulted in an undetermined amount of oil entering the marine environment.

Another deficiency is that the proponent does not appear to indicate how it intends to prevent and/or respond to large-scale terminal incidents such as the pipeline explosion and resulting oil spill that occurred at a Dalian port in China on July 16, 2010. A spill of this magnitude ( up to 430,000 barrels, according to one expert on the scene ) is not even contemplated in Table 3-1 on Page 3-2 of Volume 7C.

9.3 General Mitigation Measures, P. 9-2

Here it is stated that response equipment will be staged at Kitimat, and that emergency response opportunities have been offered to several First Nations communities, including:

Gitgat
Lax Kw’alaams
Gitxaala
Haisla
Metlakatla
Council of Haida Nation ( including Skidegate, Massett, Kitsaloo and Turning Point ).

Details of these proposals are absent in the application. More information should be provided, including the types and amounts of equipment intended for each depot. It also bears mentioning that some equipment is already located in the region, owned by either Burrard Clean ( BCO ) or CCG. CCG should be asked whether it intends to expand its spill response capacity in the region in the event the project proceeds.

9.4 Selection of Examples Pp. 9-2 through 9-15

Examples of possible spills are presented in this section in connection with the marine terminal at Kitimat. Other examples dealing with potential spills from tankers operating within both the CCAA and OWA are presented in Volume 8C of the application. Issues related to both types of examples are dealt with later on in this report, where Volume 8C is reviewed.

Appendices A, B, C and D

Tables of contents for various contingency plans are provided in Appendices B through D of Volume 7C. Enbridge is proposing to develop various contingency plans at a later stage of the approvals and development process. This falls short of what is required of it. The Scope of the Factors document requires a “preliminary emergency measures plan and environmental protection plan”, as well as a “sample oil pollution emergency plan that would be carried onboard each tanker”.[33] Furthermore, on P. 8 of the Procedural Direction, the JRP is asking for public input as to whether “… the proposed plans and measures for emergency preparedness and response ( are ) appropriate?”

Thus, both the JRP’s TOR and the Scope of the Factors document require more than tables of contents for such plans. Enbridge needs to supply much more detailed information than tables of contents to meet these requirements; it needs to supply the plans themselves.

Volume 8A: Overview and General Information- Marine Transportation

1.1 Overview of Tanker Operations and Environmental Protection, P. 1-1, 1-2

In paragraph one Enbridge says it is “…committed to ensuring that tankers transporting condensate to, and oil from, the marine terminal will be operated as models of world-class safety standards and in an environmentally responsible manner.” There are several points to be made regarding this statement. First, as previously stated, and as Enbridge itself states, the company does not plan to either own or operate the tankers. As such, it will not be directly responsible for the marine transportation component of the project; nor can it be held responsible should an accident occur, since it is not the Responsible Party. On the other hand, as mentioned above, it has said that it will adopt a policy of “extended responsibility” vis a vis the project’s marine transportation component through what it terms “ownership or direction of the certified RO”[34].

So, the question becomes: how does Enbridge intend to honour and implement this commitment, or, put another way, ensure that the tankers and tanker owners respect this pledge? Will this commitment be reflected in some sort of legal document between Enbridge and the tanker owner that would bind the latter in some way? And finally, does Enbridge’s pledge really carry any legal weight, or is it just a statement of corporate policy?

In short, the choice of the wording of “extended responsibility” is confusing, and needs to be clarified by the proponent.

Elsewhere in this section, Enbridge entertains that the safe passage of marine traffic, which it deems “essential”, will be achieved by taking several steps, including, inter alia, using double-hulled tankers and requiring experienced British Columbia coastal pilots during key parts of the voyage. Purpose-built tugs will also escort the tankers, and safe transit speeds will be imposed. Among the many other safety features promise “Operational safety limits will be established to cover visibility, wind and sea conditions”. These operational safety standards should be included in the application.

4.1.3.2 Double Hulls, P. 4-4

The proponent makes repeated references throughout the application to the fact that it will use only double hull ( DH ) tankers. The first thing to be said about this commitment is that as of 2010 double hulls are a requirement for the international tanker trade, which Enbridge’s Northern Gateway project will be a part of. Thus, assuming the Gateway project were to commence by the fourth quarter of 2015, say, there will be no choice but to employ DH tankers.

There has been a spate of serious oil spill incidents involving double hull tankers over the years, as the accompanying table created by the Consultant from publically available information indicates:

Table 4: Notable Marine Oil Spills Involving Double Hulled Tankers, OBOs and/or Tank Barges[35]

Source: Worldocean Consulting Ltd, 2010

What the table above demonstrates is that using only DH tankers does not guarantee that a spill will not occur. In fact, because double hull tankers tend to require more frequent inspection and maintenance than single hull tankers, and because they are harder and more expensive to maintain, they present their own set of challenges. As this quote from the UNEP marine oil spill web site indicates:

“MAINTENANCE & SHIP OWNER RESPONSIBILITY

Ship owners must ensure a high standard of maintenance. No matter how well a ship is designed, built and equipped — unless it is properly maintained, it will sooner or later become a maritime safety risk. The responsibility for regular and good maintenance always rests with the ship owner. It is also worth remembering that also double-hulls have their own inherent problems. Many predict that in a few years’ time there will be massive oil spills from double-hull tankers as the maintenance of a double-hull is more difficult than a single-hull, and there is also a problem with gas build up between the two hulls. This will make regular inspections of the vessels even more important.”

Enbridge should be asked to provide detailed case histories of these and other DH tanker spills, and explain how the DH tankers it plans to use will escape a similar fate.

4.1.3.4 Machinery, P. 4-6

Paragraph one states that most tankers are powered by one diesel engine, although some may have two engines; ensuing paragraphs in this section refer to the redundancy features of modern tankers. The application also notes that currently tankers are required to have redundant steering systems to prevent accidents in the event that the primary system fails[36]. In this connection, the proponent does undertake to ensure that the tankers used on the Northern Gateway project feature redundancy in the essential components of the steering system.[37]

A quote from The Maritime Directory’s Knowledgebase Resources web site, under the heading “Crude oil tankers”, is instructive in this regard. It states: “Some of the latest tanker newbuildings, incorporate other extensive safety features from double hulls, double engine rooms, propulsion and steering equipment.” It is noted in passing that this particular web site is sponsored by Det Norske Veritas ( DNV ), the company which is undertaking the QRA for the marine transportation component of the Enbridge Northern Gateway project.

The question for the proponent becomes: “Will Enbridge require that the tankers used to transport oil from the Kitimat terminal are equipped with double engine rooms, double screws and double rudders and, if not, why not?” Failure to obtain such a commitment would provide grounds to challenge Enbridge’s stated commitment to adopting world class safety standards for the tankers that will eventually be used in connection with the project.

4.1.6 Terminal Regulations for Vessel Acceptance, P. 4-13

Enbridge ‘pledges’ that: “Tankers must be less than 20 years old with respect to the original construction completion date.” Looking at the statistics for the world tanker fleet, as of January 2009, only 12% of the world’s Aframax tanker fleet was older than 20 years, vs. 10% of the Suezmax fleet and 5% of the VLCC fleet. [38] In other words, Enbridge’s pledge not to use tankers older than 20 years will only exclude approximately ten percent of the world tanker fleet from the pool of vessels that could be used to transport Northern Gateway oil by sea. Once again, Enbridge’s plan to use relatively old tankers calls into question its commitment to what it calls ‘world class standards’ for its project.

Enbridge’s plan to use tankers that could be that old could be challenged on the following grounds: there appears to be a correlation between a tanker’s age and its propensity to be involved in a significant oil spill. For one thing, tankers older than ten years tend to have a significantly higher Non-Accidental Structural Failure ( NASF ) frequency rate than younger tankers.[39] In fact, statistics reveal that about 78% of all NASF accidents involve ships older than ten years, with the 11-15 year age group accounting for the largest percentage of NASF accidents ( 33% )[40].

Furthermore, since the average age of the DH fleet is currently about seven years, it can be expected that typical age-dependent accidents ( mainly NASFs ) will start to become a significant occurrence after about 2020, i.e. roughly four years after Enbridge’s Northern Gateway project is scheduled to come on stream.[41]

In light of these somewhat alarming statistics and projections, the proponent should be asked to justify its reliance on tankers that could be as old as two decades, and to explain how it’s vetting process for tankers- what it refers to as the Tanker Acceptance Program, will guarantee that the ‘bad ones’ will be weeded out.

4.2.4, Geographic and Geological Factors, P. 4-19

Under “Climatic and Oceanographic Factors”, one paragraph is devoted to the extremes of weather and sea states that could affect navigation in the project area, and what the proponent proposes to do to mitigate these conditions.

Given the notorious weather that afflicts the region, and the obvious public concerns about the effect of these conditions on tankers transiting the area, far more detail is required on these points. If this kind of data is contained in various TERMPOL reports ( T 3.5, for instance ), then it should be brought forward to this volume ( 8A ) of the NEB/CEAA application.

4.2.10.2 Escort Tug Services, P. 4-28

Enbridge commits itself to the use of escort tugs for all laden tankers within the CCAA. The importance of escort tugs was demonstrated on January 17, 2010 when the MV Sea River Kodiak tanker lost power at the entrance to Prince William Sound in Alaska, and had to be rescued by an escort tug, thereby narrowly averting disaster.

Unfortunately, tugs themselves are prone to breakdown and accidents. As evidence of this, there has been a spate of incidents involving tugs of late, within British Columbia, Washington State and Alaska. For instance:

· On March 19, 2007 the American tugboat Sea Voyager ran aground near Bella Bella, British Columbia;

· On December 23, 2009 the tug Pathfinder ran aground on Bligh Reef in Prince William Sound, the very spot where the Exxon Valdez had run aground twenty years earlier

· On July 28, 2010 the tug-barge Commitment lost power in Juan de Fuca Strait, on the American side of the border.

Thus, while tugs can reduce the risk of a tanker running aground or drifting ashore, they cannot completely eliminate that risk, especially if the tugs themselves are prone to breakdown. The question for the proponent becomes: How can one be certain that the tugboats Enbridge plans to use will not escape a similar fate?[42]

In this same section of the application Enbridge also makes the commitment to have local pilots aboard all incoming and outgoing tankers ( Page 4-28 ), principally within the CCAA[43]. British Columbia coastal pilots have a stellar safety record; in recent years over 99% of voyages in which there was a pilot on board were completed without incident[44]. Nevertheless, the occasional incident does occur. In the case of the previously-mentioned MV Westwood Anette incident in Squamish in 2007, for instance, where oil spilled into Howe Sound, a pilot was apparently on board at the time of the incident. Also, in the case of the MV Petersfield incident in Douglas Channel on September 25, 2009, a pilot was on board the vessel[45]. Further afield, a pilot was aboard the MV Cosco Busan when it rammed a bridge in San Francisco harbour in 2007, spilling 1275 barrels of Heavy Fuel Oil into the Bay in the process; in that particular case, the pilot ended up serving time in prison. What these isolated incidents demonstrate is that while pilots undoubtedly lower the overall risk of a casualty, they cannot entirely eliminate it; mechanical failure and/or human error can still occur. Another example of human error on the bridge, though this one involving neither pilots nor tugs but instead BC Ferries crew with supposedly extensive knowledge of local waters, was the MV Queen of the North incident which occurred on the night of March 22, 2006, when the vessel in question ran aground on Gil Island and subsequently sank in Wright Sound, with the loss of two lives and the spilling of an undetermined amount of diesel fuel into the marine environment.

The Pacific Pilotage Authority, which governs pilotage on the west coast, should be asked whether requiring coastal pilots on board tankers during the course of their entire journey through the Project Area, i.e. both the CCAA and OWA, rather than just through the CCAA, would appreciably lower the risk of an oil spill occurring in the OWA.

4.8.1.2 Marine Shipping Network Analysis and Marine Terminal Incident Analysis, PP. 4-78 – 4-83

In Bullet One of the “Outcomes from the QRA” section on P. 4-82 of Volume 8A, it is stated that weather and sea conditions in the project area are no worse or more unpredictable than other parts of the globe where there are tankers. Examples given are Norway, the UK and the North Sea.

Insufficient data is provided in the application to support this very broad conclusion. Statistics should therefore be presented in a comparative table so that the reader can compare the examples given and draw his or her own conclusions. Conditions at the tanker terminal at Valdez in Prince William Sound, Alaska and the Whiffen Head Transshipment Terminal in Newfoundland should also be included for comparative purposes.

As for Bullet Two on the same page ( 4-82 ), there is a similar lack of hard evidence presented to support the conclusion that there is a higher risk of an incident within the CCAA than the OWA. While it is true that navigation may be trickier within the CCAA than within the OWA, because there are more turns and maneuvers required, and because the channel is narrower, an argument can be made that within the OWA tankers would be more exposed to the elements, and thus more prone to structural failure. And in addition to sea and weather conditions tending to be worse on the open water than in a confined channel such as Douglas Channel, once tankers are outside the CCCA they will, for the most part, not benefit from tanker escort.

Enbridge argues that the provision of tethered escort tugs within the CCAA considerably lowers the risk of an oil spill incident occurring in that area. The question then becomes: how much would the risk be lowered in the OWA if tanker tug escorts were required there as well?

On Page 4-83 of Volume 8A the following statement is made:

“The conclusion of the QRA is that the risk of an oil spill occurring during marine transit or at the terminal can be mitigated to a level comparable with other top tier international tanker and terminal operations where operating practices include tethered and close escort operations during loaded tanker transit and closed loading systems at the marine terminal.”

This statement to the effect that the QRA has reached a conclusion on this matter would seem to be premature, given the fact that the proponent repeatedly advises that said QRA is not yet complete. Furthermore, the public is not privy to the QRA itself- only a summary of it, in the form of Volume 8C of the application. All the more reason, then, for the full, final QRA to be included in the application.

Volume 8B: Environmental and Socio-Economic Assessment ( ESA )- Marine Transportation

2.3 Oil and Condensate Tanker Specifications and Traffic, Pp. 2-2, Page 2--3

Table 2-2 on Page 2-3 indicates the average number of vessels per year expected to visit Kitimat, for each class of tanker. As mentioned previously, the proponent should also indicate how long the project is expected to last. Knowing the project’s lifespan is crucial in calculating risk. Thus, what lifespan is Enbridge anticipating for the project- is it twenty years, or fifty, or something in between? It is important to know.

It should also be made clear whether the expected vessel figures take into account the possible expansion of the pipeline from 525,000 barrels per day to 800,000, as has been reported in the press. Presumably, greater pipeline capacity would mean greater numbers of tankers as well, thereby increasing the environmental risk.

Information presented in part of Table 2-2 also indicates that all three classes of tanker Enbridge proposes to use to transport oil and condensate- VLCC, Suezmax and Aframax, will be fueled by No. 6 Bunker C. With somewhere between 190 and 250 tankers per year visiting Kitimat ( 220 on average ), there is, as mentioned before, a risk of an oil spill involving the Bunker C from these ships. Moreover, whereas the condensate tankers are only laden with cargo on their incoming trips, and the oil tankers are only laden with cargo on their outgoing trips, all the tankers carry Bunker C on both incoming and outgoing trips, which means that 220 tankers on average translates into 440 transits of the Project Area where there is a ( as yet undetermined ) risk of a Bunker C-type incident.

In terms of assessing the severity of that risk, it is noted that as of 2002, of the 450 spills attended by the International Tanker Owners’ Pollution Federation Limited (ITOPF) over the course of the previous quarter century, about 40 per cent of these spills had involved either medium or heavy grades of fuel oil, whether carried as cargo or used by larger vessels as bunker fuel[46]. As an example of this type of casualty, on December 8, 2004 the freighter MV Selendang Ayu ran aground and broke in half off the Aleutian Islands in Alaska, accidentally spilling 7670 barrels of Intermediate Fuel Oil ( IFO ) into the ocean in the process. A more recent incident, this one involving a DH tanker, no less, occurred 40 miles southeast of Galveston, Texas on October 20, 2009, when a collision between a supply vessel and the tanker MV Krymsk punctured the latter’s fuel tanks, resulting in the spillage of 18,000 gallons of bunker fuel into the Gulf of Mexico.[47] Given the frequency of this type of incident, the proponent should be required to calculate the risk of a Bunker C spill occurring over the lifespan of the Northern Gateway project, however long that may be.

Thus, it is not only the tanker’s cargo of crude oil ( or bitumen in this case ) that poses a threat to the environment, but the fuel that runs the vessels as well; and so, both should be factored into any risk calculations for projected tanker traffic. As far as can be determined, the QRA does not currently take these types of spills into account.

The proponent should also be asked to indicate whether a bunkering facility is planned or will be required within the Project Area, so as to refuel the Northern Gateway tankers.

Section 2: Description of Marine Transportation Activities, Pp. 2-2 – 2-9.

As mentioned above, the proponent needs to clear up the confusion as to which route ( northern or southern ) condensate tankers will take.

Also, what determines which of the two Southern Approach routes is taken by a tanker? Is it weather, for instance, or marine mammal migratory patterns, perhaps? And if a seasonal element is at play here, during which season would the northern version of the Southern Approach be used, and during which season the southern version of the Southern Approach?

Several references are made in this section to the proposed use of escort and harbor tugs within the CCAA. The proponent should indicate response times for rescue tugs within the OWA. For instance, if a tanker were to lose power at the outer edges of the OWA, how much time would there be for a rescue tug to arrive before the stricken tanker drifted onto the predominantly rocky coastline, potentially discharging hundreds of thousands, if not millions of barrels of oil from its cargo tanks? Would a rescue tug be able to get there in time to prevent a potential catastrophe? And if escort tugs were required in the OWA ( as opposed to just the CCAA ), would this lower the risk of an incident occurring, and if so by how much?

There is no mention of salvage tugs in the application. The question for the proponent is: If one were ever needed, where would it come from, since there are none stationed anywhere along the British Columbia coast? Would one come from Alaska or Oregon, perhaps, and if so, how long would it take to arrive on scene in the event of an emergency?

3.1.2 Prevailing Climate Conditions, P. 3-2

This section summarises prevailing climate conditions. The CCCA is mentioned five times, but the OWA is not mentioned once. What are the prevailing conditions for the OWA?

3.1.4 Winds, p. 3-3

In paragraph four, it is mentioned that winds in the region can occasionally reach up to 185 km/h.

The application should relate the occurrence of these hurricane-force conditions to the safe navigation of tankers. How do these conditions relate to operational standards for the tankers? Marine scientists from Fisheries and Oceans Canada should also be asked about these sea conditions.

3.1.6 Waves, P. 3-4

Paragraph one mentions that waves of 6 to 8 meters can occur several times each winter within the project area, particularly in Hecate Strait and the Queen Charlotte Basin. These are by no means the maximum winds that can be expected in Hecate Strait, Dixon Entrance or Queen Charlotte Sound. For instance, this is what a book on weather on the British Columbia coast has to say about conditions on the open waters of the North Coast:

“The highest recorded extreme waves are over 30m ( 100 feet ) recorded at both the South Hecate buoy and the East Delwood buoy. A 30 metre wave was also recorded by the drilling rig Sedco 135F working in Queen Charlotte Sound, south of Cape St. James, on 22 October 1968. While these waves are huge, the more dangerous aspect is the rate that they can build from almost nothing to frightening heights. In the 1968 case the seas rose from three metres to 18 metres in just eight hours.”[48]

Under such conditions, how safe will a tanker be, tug escort or no tug escort? Would Enbridge shut down tanker operations during a storm of this force? Would there be enough warning to do so? Would CCG require them to shut down? These are all questions that need to be answered in the operational standards for tankers.

Marine scientists from Fisheries and Oceans Canada should also be asked about these sea conditions.

4.2.3.2 Project Inclusion List, Pp. 4-13 - 4-15

The project inclusion list included in Table 4-2 ( Pp. 4-14, 4-15 ) should include CN’s plan to ship Alberta and Saskatchewan oil to west coast ports, called PipelineonRail. CN claims to have the rail infrastructure in place to transport 200,000 barrels of oil per day or more in its double-hulled rail cars. CN is currently transporting condensate by rail to Alberta from Kitimat. Thus, the question is: how many more tankers would CN’s proposal require, and which route(s) would they take?

13.5.3 Climate and Oceanographic Factors, P. 3-15

Extreme weather conditions and their potential effect on navigation are noted in this section. To mitigate the impacts off these conditions, operational safety limits “… to cover visibility, wind and sea conditions” are promised.

Consider this real life example of the impact weather can have on a large vessel in the OWA. In the early hours of November 23, 2009 BC Ferries’ MV Northern Adventure was buffeted by a severe storm in the middle of Hecate Strait. Waves up to 10 meters in height were reported. The vessel’s captain attempted to ride out the storm for four hours, but eventually gave up and returned to Prince Rupert. Ninety kilometer winds had apparently been forecast for the area, with the ferry crew aware of the storm before the vessel left Prince Rupert en route for Skidegate. However, a BC Ferries spokesperson is quoted as saying that the storm “…did come in faster than what was predicted, and worse than what was predicted.”

In terms of the safety and operational standards we are told are under development, what would the captain of a fully-laden tanker do in a situation similar to the one mentioned above? Would he or she allow the vessel to leave port if a similar weather forecast had been issued? Would the vessel venture out into Hecate Strait under such conditions? If it were buffeted by ten meter waves and winds in excess of 90 kilometers an hour in the middle of the Strait, what would it do?; would it try to maintain its course, ride out the storm, continue on its course through the Strait, seek shelter or a safe harbour, or attempt to return to port? And a propos the matter of safe harbours, where would one of the Northern Gateway tankers go if it had to seek refuge? There is little reference in the application to places of refuge for stricken tankers, other than their inclusion as a heading in the outline of the General Oil Spill Response Plan ( GOSRP ) presented in Vol. 7C, as section B.24- “Places of Refuge”, and a reference to the possible need to ride out, heave to, anchor or drift in “…selected areas” in Volume 8A.[49] This subject matter needs to be fleshed out by the proponent. Where would a tanker go if it broke down en route, or encountered a hurricane, for example? How many safe harbours are there along this rugged coastline? The proponent should supply a list of safe harbours along the project route for stricken tankers.

14.2 Effects of Severe Weather on Marine Transportation, Page 14-1

In this section the potential impacts of extreme weather events on tanker traffic are once again acknowledged, and the promise is again made of “special measures” to mitigate such risks.

However, once again the discussion is limited to the CCCA, with no specific mention of the OWA. As an example of this gap, it is stated that tankers operating within the CCCA can safely operate in wind speeds of 50 knots, with, for instance, the support of tugs. What about the OWA, where, as mentioned above, by the proponent’s own admission wind speeds can occasionally reach 185 kms/hr?

Volume 8C: Risk Assessment and Management of Spills- Marine Transportation

General

As mentioned above, the Quantitative Risk Assessment ( QRA ), which is summarised in this volume, is incomplete. The final version should be included as part of the application.

2 Operational Measures to Prevent Tanker-based Hydrocarbon Spills, P. 2-1

Paragraph two lists potential causes of tanker incidents. As mentioned previously, terrorism should be included in the list, because of two known or suspected incidents of this nature involving tankers on the high seas.

3 Probability of Hydrocarbon Spills, Pp. 3-1 -3-4

Throughout the report, Enbridge characterises the risks of a marine oil spill occurring as ‘minimal’ or ‘extremely low”. Enbridge’s concept of risk appears to be almost entirely related to the statistical probability of an event occurring. Such a restricted view of risk fails to recognize the other side of the risk coin, i.e. the consequences of an unwanted event, in this case an oil spill. By this is meant that a widely-accepted concept of risk, as applied to oil spills, takes into account not only the probability of a spill occurring, but also the consequences if it does occur. Simply put, risk is defined as the probability of a spill occurring, multiplied by the consequences. Employing this risk paradigm, one could envisage an instance in which the perceived threat of a spill was considered high, even though the event had a small chance of occurring, because if it did occur the consequences could be catastrophic and irreversible.

Enbridge should take into account this broader notion of risk, and come up with some scenarios in which it is incorporated. An example would be the total loss through Non-Accidental Structural Failure ( NASF ) of a stricken VLCC in the middle of the OWA.

As mentioned earlier in this report, in Section 7.5 of the Scope of the Factors document, entitled “Potential Accidents and Malfunctions”, as well as in Section 7.6, entitled “Effects of the Environment on the Project”, repeated references are made to the need for information from the proponent as to the risks presented by severe and/or extreme weather conditions or events. On P. 3-1 of Volume 8C, the proponent says that : “Weather and sea conditions [ on the North Coast ] are comparable to or better than other areas around the world that have large amounts of oil tanker traffic”. On Page 3-2 of Volume 8 the role of “environmental forces” in influencing the probability of spills is recognized. Elsewhere ( P. 9-8 of Volume 7C ) the effect of meteorological conditions on the fate of oil on the water is recognized. Finally, operational standards for tankers that take into account weather, sea state, etc. are promised.

However, as stated earlier, there is a paucity of hard data in the application on the actual weather and sea conditions, both here and abroad, to substantiate the claim that conditions within the project area are no worse than elsewhere. This information gap needs to be filled.

In addition, what is invariably overlooked in the application is the obvious point that weather will also tend to impede cleanup operations. The proponent should acknowledge these considerable operational challenges which go hand in hand with operating in such an extreme and often hostile environment as the Queen Charlotte Basin. The proponent should state, for instance, what percentage of the time a credible response operation would not be possible for various times of the year, given typical conditions at sea and the ineffectiveness of boom, skimmers and other types of spill response equipment during suboptimal operating conditions.

Data presented in the QRA, which is summarized in Volume 8C of the application, presents return periods for spills within the project area. They are incomplete, as outlined below. At least one contradiction has to be resolved as well. The apparent contradiction shall be dealt with first.

As mentioned in a previous section of this report, Footnote 1 in Table 3-1, Return Period of a Spill Associated with the Tanker Traffic for the Northern Gateway Project indicates that condensate tankers will not use the Northern Approach, i.e. via Dixon Entrance and Browning Entrance. The exact opposite to this is stated on P. 2-3 of Volume 8B. [50] This discrepancy has to be cleared up by the applicant.

Other than that, there are several problems related to the QRA data and conclusions. As an example of the statistics presented, the return period for an oil spill of any size within Douglas Channel is estimated at 1500 years, but roughly ten times that for spills within Queen Charlotte Sound, Hecate Strait and Dixon Entrance[51]. The return period for a bitumen spill of any size, anywhere, is estimated at 350 years[52]. The predicted return periods for small, medium and large spills ( presented at the bottom of Page 4-82, and also in the second last paragraph on Page 3-2 of Volume 8C ), are 550, 2,800 and 15,000 years respectively.

The first question that comes to mind with respect to these return estimates is: how were they calculated? We are told that a “per voyage” methodology was chosen over a “per volume of oil transported” methodology[53], and that one of the advantages of the “per voyage” methodology is that it takes into account ship size. If ship size was indeed taken into account, then the risks of transporting oil in the various size tankers should be presented- but they are not. It would be instructive to know, for instance, what the risk is of using, say, one VLCC tanker to transport oil vs., say, two Suezmax tankers to transport the same amount of oil overall. In other words, is it less risky from an environmental perspective to have one large tanker instead of two smaller ones, or is there no appreciable difference between the two options from a risk perspective?

As mentioned previously, basic data is also lacking with respect to the project, such as its projected lifespan- is it fifty years, or twenty years perhaps? Also, how many vessel voyages per year were used for the purposes of the return calculation- 220, which represents the average number expected, or 250, which reflects the maximum? Moreover, was the potential expansion of the oil pipeline capacity to 800,000 barrels per day of oil from the current plan for capacity of 525,000 barrels factored into the calculation? In addition, as mentioned above, what about tanker spills involving No. 6 Bunker C fuel oil which we are told the tankers will run on?; is a spill involving this type of oil factored into the risk assessment calculations? In short, there are a lot of unknown variables involved in these return calculations. More information is needed before one can begin to assess their accuracy.

The spill risk statistics provided show the chances of a spill occurring in Hecate Strait being infinitesimally small. The application links the risk of a spill to many things, including “exposure to environmental forces” ( Volume 8C, P. 3-2 ), but the main consideration affecting risk is considered to be “navigational difficulty” ( Ibid. ). According to Enbridge, the risk is lower in straight sections than in sections ( such as Douglas Channel ) that require “ greater navigational input”. As mentioned previously, such a conclusion could be challenged, on the grounds that the risk of a catastrophic oil spill is arguably greater in the OWA than within the CCAA. As indicated below, NASF incidents account for a significant percentage of tanker incidents, as well as tanker incidents involving oil spills. In other words, tankers founder not just because they hit a rock, break apart and then sink; they can simply break in two after being buffeted by storms on the high seas, i.e. in ‘open water’. And while the CCAA may present greater navigational challenges than the OWA, the conditions ( winds and waves ) in the OWA tend to be worse than in most parts of the CCAA, the OWA is more exposed, and because of its remoteness it would take no doubt longer to mount a rescue and response operation there. Moreover, a potentially larger length of coastline could be affected by a spill that happened in the OWA than one in that occurred in the CCAA.

The latest International Tanker Owners Pollution Federation ( ITOPF ) statistics indicate that structural failure, with the tanker breaking in two, occurs not infrequently. For the period from 1970 to 2009, for spills greater than 700 tonnes,

groundings accounted for 36.3% of all spills;
collisions accounted for 29.1%); and
hull failure accounted for 12.4%.[54]

Another study paints a similar picture of hull failure being a significant cause of tanker incidents and spills. According to this particular statistical analysis, between 1990 and 2008 a total of 858 incidents involving large tankers, i.e. tankers greater than 60,000 tonnes ( which means Panamax, Aframax, Suezmax and VLCC class tankers ), were investigated. These accident involved either serious or non-serious consequences. As the following table from the paper in question demonstrates, fully 151 of these incidents, or 18%, involved NASF:

Table 5: Casualty data, covered period 1990-2008 ( without accidents in Shipyards & Dry Docks )

Source: Papanikolaou, A., Eliopoulou, E., Hamann, R., Loer, K., Assessment of Safety of Crude Oil Transport by Tankers, Proc. Annual Main Conference of Schiffbautechnische Gesellschaft (STG2009), Berlin, November, 2009, Table 1, P. 4.

Over that same nineteen year period ( from 1990 to 2008 ) a total of 102 incidents ( serious and non-serious ) were reported that involved an oil spill from a large tanker. Thus, 11.888% of the large tanker incidents over that period involved an oil spill. Significantly, as the following table demonstrates, more than one third of those spills were the result of NASFs.

Table 6: Causes of accidents ( for both single and double hull tankers )

Source: Derived from figures in Papanikolaou, A., Eliopoulou, E., Hamann, R., Loer, K., Assessment of Safety of Crude Oil Transport by Tankers, Proc. Annual Main Conference of Schiffbautechnische Gesellschaft (STG2009), Berlin, November, 2009, Table 2, P. 6.

Furthermore, the average frequency of NASF ( serious and non-serious ) incidents is about eleven per year for the current world tanker fleet ( P. 6 ). One relatively recent example of a tanker casualty involving structural failure was the December 12, 1999 MV Erika incident off the coast of Brittany when the 24 year-old Maltese-registered vessel broke in two and sank, spilling 20,000 tonnes of Heavy Fuel Oil into the North Atlantic in the process. An even more recent example involved the MV Prestige, a Bahamian-registered tanker which broke in two and sank off the Spanish coast on November 19, 2002, spilling an estimated 63,000 tonnes of oil into the ocean off the coast of Galicia in the process.

Thus, the Northern Gateway project application should specifically address the risk of NASF spills occurring in the OWA, rather than concentrating mainly on groundings, collisions and other incidents related to navigational difficulty within the CCAA. The need for this kind of analysis is particularly needed given Enbridge’s statement that tankers that are up to twenty years old could be used on this project. For, as is stated elsewhere in the report, older tankers have a higher chance of being involved in NASF incidents than younger ones.

5.2 Response Approaches and Capabilities, pp. 5-3 – 5-7

Table 5-1, “Typical Sequence of Initial Response Actions”, mentions Tier 1 through 3 response level actions. The various levels should be defined. Action for Tier 4 level and beyond should also be included.

5.5 Equipment and Personnel, Pp. 5-10 -5-13

As mentioned in a previous section of this report ( Marine Oil Spill Prevention and Response Elements of the Proposal ), Enbridge should first of all do what the Consultant does in Table 2 and spell out in the application the actual figures it is proposing, comparing them in the process to what CCG currently requires for ROs. It is not sufficient to say, for instance, as Enbridge does on P. 5-11 of Volume 8C, that capacity in place will be more than 100 times what CCG requires within the 6 hour timeframe required for a PAR ( Primary Area of Response ).

Data is lacking here with respect to the proposed response capability for the OWA. For instance, on P. 5-11 Northern Gateway mentions placing response equipment at four caches located throughout the CCAA. In Volume C ( P. 9-2 ) it had mentioned the possibility of response depots in various other locations outside the CCAA, i.e. within the OWA, including a number of possible locations on Haida Gwaii. Has it now abandoned such plans, and if not, why does it not mention them here?

In Table 5-3 on P. 5-12, the term “big local boats” should be defined.

On Page 5-12 the claim is made that “Collectively, the recovery capacity envisioned for the ROs will provide a level of response that places it within the top terminal-port operations for oil preparedness worldwide.” Presumably the proponent had in mind the following terminals, for which it has produced safety videos available from its web site:

1. Brofjorden, Sweden

2. Mongstad, Norway

3. Sullom Voe, United Kingdom

Noticeably absent from the videos are:

· the Valdez marine terminal in Prince William Sound, USA, site of the Exxon Valdez tanker spill in 1989, and now subjected to one the most stringent oil spill prevention and response regimes in the world; and

· the Newfoundland Transshipment Terminal located at Whiffen Head in Newfoundland, which includes a containment reservoir with a capacity of one million barrels for use in the event of a leak from one or more of the tanks in the tank farm.

When one looks at the specifics as to what Enbridge is proposing, on Page 5-11 it is claimed that there will be “…more than two times the CCG recovery capacity for a Tier 4- 10,000 t situation, available in a maximum of 24 hours depending on distance from local response sites (Transport Canada guidelines indicate within 72 hours)”. In Prince William Sound the response capability requirement is for a 300,000 barrel spill within 72 hours, which is almost double the 158,000 barrel capacity Enbridge is promising. It will also be recalled that the MV Exxon Valdez spilled 41,000 m³of oil, or the equivalent of 257,862 barrels of oil. Thus, not only is Enbridge’s claim to offer a level of response capability that places it within the top tier of terminal-port operations worldwide challengeable- the level of response capability it is proposing for the CCCA would fall approximately 100,000 barrels short of the capacity that would be required to clean up a spill of the magnitude of the MV Exxon Valdez, which, one might add, ‘only’ spilled one fifth of her cargo. Then there is the added question as to where Enbridge plans to store all that recovered oil since, as mentioned earlier in this report, its proposed oil storage capacity falls well short of the upper limit of even a Tier One spill.

In light of the above, it is suggested that the proponent be more specific as to what it means by ‘top tier’ ( and ‘world class’, for that matter ) in respect of response capability, and provide hard evidence to support its claim that what it is proposing matches the world’s highest standards.

For the OWA there is no indication given as to the proposed response capacity. All we are told is that either response depots or caches of equipment will be located within this ‘vast’ area, and that planning for this area is ongoing. ( Presumably this matter is being discussed within the context of the TERMPOL process. ) Were the response capacity to be based on a worst case scenario, i.e. total loss of cargo form a VLCC, then the figure of two million barrels comes to mind.

Two things can be said about the proposed capacity for the Project Area, as outlined in an earlier section of this report. First, all the stockpiled response equipment in the world will not help the situation if the weather conditions are not propitious for its use. So, wind, waves, fog, not to mention short periods of daylight during winter- all work against mounting an effective spill response operation. In other words, just because the resources may be in place to deal with a massive oil spill, such as the total loss of cargo from a VLCC, this does not necessarily mean that the response operation will be effective. Damage could still be catastrophic and irreversible. Second, a relatively small spill can still cause significant damage, whereas a relatively large spill can end up being relatively innocuous. It all depends on when and where the spill occurs, the type of oil involved, the wind and sea conditions, and the speed and efficiency of the response. A case in point is the MV Braer incident which occurred in the Sheltand Isles in 1993, when the tanker of that name lost power and ran aground, spilling its entire cargo ( 85,000 tonnes ) of North Sea crude into the sea. Relatively little environmental damage was caused by this incident, because strong, favourable winds and big waves tended to influence the weathering of the oil, e.g. dispersion, evaporation, etc., and thereby lessen the impact of the spill. And yet the Braer spill is listed as the fourteenth worst spill in history by volume.[55] Compare this with the MV Exxon Valdez incident in Prince William Sound, Alaska in 1989, which caused immeasurable damage and was the costliest tanker spill in history. In spite of its infamous legacy, the Exxon Valdez spill ranks as only the thirty fifth worst tanker spill in history by volume.[56]

There is also the concept of cascading of resources, which Enbridge alludes to in its application[57]. Under this mutual aid system, for a very large spill, or a case where there more than one major spill happens around the same time, equipment and resources would be brought in first from other regions of the country and, as necessary, from abroad, e.g., from the Valdez depot in Alaska, plus the Oil Spill Response Ltd ( OSRL ) depots in Southampton and Singapore, etc.. Thus, if a catastrophic spill were to occur in, say, the OWA, and local capacity to respond was exceeded, the call would no doubt go out to send equipment and trained personnel from around the world. This is standard procedure within the oil spill response sector, and so the main issue becomes: What level of response capacity do you require locally, and how much do you rely on foreign sources of support? Enbridge has specified a local capacity to respond to a 20,000 tonne oil spill in the CCAA area within twenty four hours, but has yet to specify a level of local response capacity for the OWA. This gap obviously needs to be corrected before one can judge the adequacy of the total response package being proposed. Thus, the application is deficient in this significant respect.

Finally, on P. 5-12 it is stated that trained response personnel will be available 24 hours a day. The proponent should specify whether the command centre be open 24 hours a day, 365 days of the year?

10 Mass Balance Examples for Response Planning, PP. 10-1 -10-39

Hypothetical examples of spills are provided at two points in the application: in Section 9 of Volume 8C with respect to the terminal at Kitimat, and in Sections 10 and 11 of Volume 8C in respect of tanker spills within the CCAA and OWA. With respect to hypothetical spills at the Kitimat marine terminal, one example deals with a medium-size diluted bitumen spill ( Volume 7C, Section 9.5, pp. 9-5 – 9-10 ), while the other deals with a medium-size condensate spill ( Volume 7C, Section 9.6, pp. 9-10 – 9-15 ). As for the hypothetical tanker spills, there are a total of five presented in Volume 8C- four involving spills of 10,000 m³ for various types of oil, and one involving a spill of 36,000 m^3.( NB The 36,000 m³spill is described in Section 11 of Vol. 8C, PP. 11-1 –29 ).

The examples of spills of 10,000 m³ include the following:

• Emilia Island (synthetic oil under outflow conditions during winter);

• Principe Channel (diluted bitumen under inflow conditions during summer);

• Ness Rock in Sound (diluted bitumen under typical winter conditions);

• Butterworth Rocks in north Hecate Strait (synthetic oil under typical summer conditions).[58]

These four examples, we are told, represent the “approximate maximum credible volume of a spill due to grounding or collision of a laden double-hulled tanker.”[59]

The 36,000 m³example involves a midsummer collision between a VLCC and another vessel in Wright Sound, resulting in a spill of diluted bitumen[60].

There are several issues with respect to these ‘examples’. For instance, why do the tanker spill examples not include at least one example of an incident involving the Non-Accidental Structural Failure ( NASF ) of a tanker? Were an incident of this nature to be included in the list of ‘scenarios’ provided, it is suggested that the ‘approximate maximum credible volume’ of oil spilled could amount to virtually the entire cargo of oil on board the tanker, i.e. up to two million barrels of oil in the case of a VLCC. The worst tanker spill in history was the MV Atlantic Empress incident off Tobago in 1979, which involved just over two million barrels of oil.[61] Two million barrels would therefore be a better ‘worst case scenario’ figure for an oil spill within the OWA, with the scenario narrative dealing with the challenges inherent in responding to a spill of this magnitude, and how the proponent intends to overcome what are bound to be the many obstacles to successfully responding to such a catastrophic incident.

In terms of visualizing these “examples”, it would certainly help to have maps of oil spill trajectories projected for each scenario, depicting the track of the oil at various timeframes after the incident occurs. A case in point is Example 1 for Emilia Island, where people living in Hartley Bay might be in a position to better appreciate the implications of this scenario if they could see a map displaying synthetic oil washing up their shores after 72 hours.[62] An example of this graphic depiction of potential oil spills is the Oil Spill Model developed by the Living Oceans Society for various types of incidents along British Columbia’s North Coast where medium crude oil is spilled.

In the Introduction Section of Volume 8C, on P. 1-1, it is stated that this volume has been put together in response to public concerns related to tanker traffic. In virtually the same breath, the study refers to what it calls “mass balance” examples of spills. The proponent should explain what it means by “mass balance” examples, as very few members of the public are likely to be familiar with this technical term. The application also claims that oil spill incidents from tankers are unlikely, because of the proponent’s commitment to accident prevention. We shall return to this topic later on.

Enbridge also informs us, on P. 1-3 of Volume 8C, that the mass balance examples it has chosen “…provide realistic descriptions…” of, among other things, “…effective response plans and equipment”. It is suggested here that it is not realistic to assume that a response is going to be effective. Typical encounter rates for oil recovery at sea are between 10 and 15 percent[63] This, then, is a more realistic expectation of the outcome from a spill response operation.

The application goes on to state that small spills from tanker operations, such as ballast or bilge water discharges, are unlikely to occur. As mentioned previously, incidents that involve a tanker’s No. 6 Bunker C fuel oil are entirely within the realm of possibility. Thus, it is suggested that at least one scenario cover the possibility of a tanker’s fuel tanks being ruptured, resulting in a serious spill.

It is also disingenuous for the proponent to say that the examples it presents do not include mitigative measures, i.e. cleanup, and that if cleanup efforts are factored in, the spill impacts would not be as significant as the examples project[64]. Contrary to this rosy forecast, a spill’s impacts are still likely to be serious even if cleanup efforts are factored in, given inherent conditions in the region that are unfavourable to mounting a credible response, such as adverse weather, logistical challenges, remoteness, short periods of daylight during winter, etc. The scenarios provided mention winds/waves only in the sense that they influence weathering of the oil- not the cleanup operation itself.

In a similar vein, we are told that the examples will deal with “…a range of environmental conditions (tide and winds) at the time of an incident that reflects seasons during which effects could be greatest”. It is suggested the scenarios include incidents where not only the effects could be the greatest, but where the conditions extant are most likely to cause an incident, and where the cleanup is most likely to be compromised by those conditions. Thus, while fog in the region tends to occur most often during summer months, winds and waves ( coupled with shorter days ) tend to be at their worst in winter.

We are also informed that the selection of locations for the mass balance examples was based on the existence of potential navigational hazards and environmentally sensitive areas[65]. It is suggested that other scenarios be selected as well, that are perhaps more representative of potential incidents along the entire transport route. Candidate sites for inclusion might be: Gwaii Haanas National Marine Conservation Area Reserve in Haida Gwaii; the Scott Islands off the northern tip of Vancouver island; one of the sponge reef colonies within the Queen Charlotte Basin; or perhaps the sea otter colony near Goose Island off the Central Coast .

Finally, on Page 10-5 of Volume 8C, no weather restrictions are indicated for the OWA. This gap should be filled.

Summary

Explanatory Note

A detailed review of the deficiency gaps in the application has been presented in the body of this report- what is there, what is missing, what the claims are and what can be refuted. Advice is also provided by the Consultant as to what would be required in order for those gaps to be filled. This three-page summary highlights the advice provided by the Consultant as to how the proponent should be required to fill each of those forty three gaps. The recommendations are presented sequentially, in the order in which they appear in the report itself. Information gaps for the OWA are dealt with in a separate table at the end of this summary.

General

Provide a map of the entire 88,000 square kilometer Project Area, being the area potentially affected by a marine oil spill associated with the marine transportation component of the project.

Volume 7C

Include the possibility of Bunker C spills at the marine terminal.

Provide details as to how ‘return’ figures for spills were arrived at. For instance, what is the lifespan of the project? ( Also Volume 8C )

Clarify what is meant by “ownership or direction” or the Response Organisation, as well as the term “extended responsibility”.

Substantiate the claim that the proposed response capacity for Kitimat marine terminal is among the best in the world.

Include the coastal environmental sensitivity atlas as part of the application.

Indicate how many meters of shoreline the proponent will be in a position to clean up each day.

Include terrorist attacks as a potential cause of oil spill incidents at the terminal and on tankers.

Indicate how potential pipeline explosions resulting in marine oil spills will be dealt with.

Provide details of the proposed response depots, including location, equipment, etc.

Canadian Coast Guard should be asked what plans it has, if any, for augmenting its response capacity in the region if the Northern Gateway project goes ahead.

Supply detailed contingency plans, as per the requirements of the JRPA TOR and Scope of the Factors documents.

Volume 8A

Specify by what legal means the proponent intends to ensure that tanker owners operate responsibly.

Include operational safety standards for the tankers as part of the application. ( Also Volume 8B )

Provide case histories of previous double hull tanker spills, and explain how similar incidents are to be avoided on the Northern Gateway project.

Answer the question: “Will Enbridge require double engine rooms, screws and rudders on tankers?”

Justify the use of 20 year old tankers, and how this compares to the promise of ‘world class’ standards.

Amplify the discussion of the effect of extreme weather and sea conditions on the project.

Provide assurances that the tugboats Enbridge plans to use will avoid breakdown/accident issues that have befallen other tugs in the Pacific Northwest in recent years.

Ask the Pacific Pilotage Authority to provide expert advice on the need for coastal pilots aboard tankers within the OWA.

Back up the assertion that weather and sea conditions in the Project Area are no worse than at other terminals around the world.

Provide hard evidence to support the claim that there is a higher risk of a spill within the CCAA than the OWA.

Examine whether requiring escort tugs for tankers within the OWA would lower the spill risk.

Support the conclusion that that spills can be mitigated to a level comparable to other marine terminals.

Submit the final version of the QRA as part of the application.

Volume 8B

As in the case of Volume 7C, provide project details, such as its lifespan, expansion plans, etc., and include Bunker C spills as a possible by-product of the project. Also, specify whether there are any plans for a bunkering facility within the Project Area.

Clarify whether condensate tankers will take the Northern Approach route or not.

Specify the criteria used for determining which of the two Southern Approach routes tankers take.

Specify response times for rescue tugs within the OWA, as well as plans for salvage tugs throughout the Project Area.

Provide a more accurate description of the extreme waves that can be experienced in the OWA, and relate these conditions to operational standards for the tankers.

Include CN’s PipelineonRail project in the project inclusion list.

Include operational safety standards for tankers as part of the application, including safe harbours and places of refuge. ( Also Volume 8A )

Volume 8C

Submit a final version of the Quantitative Risk Assessment ( QRA ).

Include more data on adverse and extreme weather and sea conditions, and relate these not only to the risk of incidents, but also to the effectiveness of cleanup and response operations.

Incorporate a broader concept of risk than one which relies solely on statistical probability.

As in Volume 8B, explain why condensate tankers will not take the Northern Approach route, if that is indeed the case.

Provide details as to how ‘return’ figures for spills were arrived at, taking into account data provided in this report on Non-Accidental Structural Failures ( NASF ), for example.

Justify the claim that the proposed response capacity for the CCAA will be ‘top tier’ and meet the world’s highest standards.

Define the various tier levels for spill response, include Tier 4, and specify plans to deal with spills larger than Tier 4.

Indicate the proposed response capacity for the OWA.

In Table 5-3, define “big local boats”.

Indicate whether the Kitimat command centre will be open twenty four hours per day.

Completely revamp the ‘mass balance’ examples section of the application. In particular, include a ‘worst case scenario’ incident involving the total loss of cargo in, say, the middle of Hecate Strait.

Table 7 Missing Data for the Open Water Area ( OWA )

Source: Worldocean Consulting Ltd, 2010

Annex 1: Major Oil Spills Since 1967, in Tonnes*

Source: Table 3, ITOPF Web Site: http://itopf.com/information-services/data-and-statistics/statistics/#major

* One tonne equals 7.33 barrels.

Bibliography

Agreement between the National Energy Board and the Minister of the Environment Concerning the Joint Review of the Northern Gateway Pipeline Project, January 15, 2010

Enbridge Northern Gateway application, Submitted to NEB/CEAA May 27, 2010:

Volume 7C: Risk Assessment and Management of Spills- Kitimat Terminal;
Volume 8A: Overview and General Information- Marine Transportation;
Volume 8B: Environmental and Socio-Economic Assessment ( ESA )- Marine Transportation; and
Volume 8 C: Risk Assessment and Management of Spills- Marine Transportation.

Intertanko Tanker Facts 2009

ITOPF, Oil Tanker Statistics: 2009

Pacific Pilotage Authority, 2009 Annual Report

Papanikolaou, A., Eliopoulou, E., Hamann, R., Loer, K., Assessment of Safety of Crude Oil Transport by Tankers, Proc. Annual Main Conference of Schiffbautechnische Gesellschaft (STG2009), Berlin, November, 2009,

Procedural Direction, Enbridge Northern Gateway Project, Joint Review Panel, July 5, 2010

Response Organizations Standards ( 1995 )- TP12401E

Scope of the Factors- Northern Gateway Pipeline Project, Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency, August 2009.

The Veil of Chaos- Living with Weather Along the British Columbia Coast, Owen S. Lange, Environment Canada, 2003.

[1] Many other incidents are listed in Table 4 and Annex 1.

[2] Agreement between the National Energy Board and the Minister of the Environment Concerning the Joint Review of the Northern Gateway Pipeline Project, Pp. 9, 10.

[3] Volume 1: Overview and General Information, P. 1-1.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Volume 8B: Environmental and Socio-Economic Assessment ( ESA )- Marine Transportation, P. 2-9.

[6] Aframax tankers are in the 80,000- 119,99 DWT range. Enbridge estimates each Aframax tanker will carry approximately 691,000 barrels of oil per voyage. Table 2-2, Oil and Condensate Tanker Specifications and Traffic, Volume 8B, P. 2-2.

[7] Suezmax tankers are in the 120,000- 199,999 DWT range, and will carry approximately one million barrels of oil per voyage. Ibid.

[8] VLCCs are in the 200,000-320,000 DWT range, and will carry approximately two million barrels of oil per voyage. Ibid. There is a larger size of tanker plying the seas- the Ultra Large Crude Carrier, or ULCC. However, the private port of Kitimat is only approved to receive tankers up to and including the VLCC 320,000 DWT range. Kitimat Arm is apparently not considered wide enough for tankers larger than VLCCs to safely maneuver in and out of a terminal.

[9] Ibid., P. 2-9. On P. 3-2 of Volume 8C, Risk Assessment and Management of Spills- Marine Transportation, slightly different figures are given- 71 condensate vs. 149 oil tankers.

[10] Vol. 8B, P. 2-9.

[11] Table 2-2, Oil and Condensate Tanker Specifications and Traffic, ibid., Pp. 2-2, 2-3.

[12] Figure 1, ibid., P. 2-4.

[13] Ibid., P. 2-3.

[14]Ibid., P. 2-8.

[15] Volume 1, Overview and General Information, P. 1-3.

[16] Ibid., P. 2-9.

[17] Footnote 1, Table 3-1, Return Period of a Spill Associated with the Tanker Traffic for the Northern Gateway Project, Volume 8C: Risk Assessment and Management of Spills- Marine Transportation, P. 3-4 indicates that condensate tankers will not take the Northern Route at all. However, on Page 2-3 of Volume 8B, P. 2-3 the following statement appears: “Tankers arriving from or departing to Asian ports will use the Northern Approach, which passes the Haida Gwaii through Dixon Entrance, and continues through Hecate Strait, Browning Entrance, Principe Channel, etc…” As mentioned above, Enbridge states that all the condensate will be imported from Asian and/or Middle Eastern ports. Thus, there is an apparent contradiction in these two statements.

[18] Volume 8B, P. 2-5. The term ‘ports on the west coast of North America’ is assumed to include ports in California. It is unclear whether the proponent intends to ship the oil to terminals in Puget Sound, or Burrard Inlet, for that matter.

[19] Ibid., P. 2-8.

[20] Ibid., P. 2-5.

[21] Ibid., P. 13-11.

[22] Scope of the Factors- Northern Gateway Pipeline Project, Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency, August 2009.

[23] Procedural Direction, Enbridge Northern Gateway Project, Joint Review Panel, July 5, 2010

[24] Ibid., P. 1. A list of the additional information the proponent should be required to file is provided in a summary at the end of this report.

[25] CCG requirements have been simplified in this table for the sake of brevity. For details, please refer to the original CCG document listed as a source of information.

[26] Volume 8C, P. 5-3.

[27] The PNCIMA boundaries may be “similar” to the Enbridge’s OWA, but they are not identical. For instance, whereas the OWA claims to extend to the outer edge of the 12 mile territorial sea, the PNCIMA map would seem to indicate a boundary that extends well beyond that.

[28] There is, however, a reference to Bunker C fuel in a table in Vol. 8B, on P. 2-3

[29] Table 3-1, Return Period of a Spill from a Tanker at Berth, Volume 7C, P. 3-2.

[30] See, for instance, paragraph one on P. 5-16 of Volume 7C, and Section 5.8, “Financial Responsibility for a Spill Response, on P. 5-16 of Volume 8.

[31] These terminals are featured in a series of videos, under the banner “Marine safety- seeing is believing”. Url: http://www.northerngateway.ca/newsletter/feb2009/Enbridge-Northern-Gateway-Marine-safety-seeing-is-believing.html

[32]Response Organizations Standards ( 1995 )- TP 12401E, Section 4.

[33] Section 7.5, Scope of the Factors document, August 2009, pp. 13, 14.

[34] Volume 8C, P. 5-5.

[35] As mentioned later in this report, another incident involving a DH tanker occurred on October 20, 2009 near Galveston, Texas, when a supply vessel collided with the tanker MV Krymsk. This incident is not included in this chart because the spilled involved bunker fuel from the tanker’s fuel tanks, which were not protected by DHs. Some of the incidents listed in Table 4 did involve spillage of fuel oil, the difference being that each those spills involved puncturing of the vessel’s cargo tanks, which are supposed to be protected by DHs.

[36] Volume 8A, P. 4-6.

[37] Ibid., P. 4-78.

[38] Source: Intertanko Tanker Facts 2009, Chart, labeled “Tanker and combined fleet details as at January 2009 ( above 10,000 dwt ), P. 3.

[39] Ibid., P. 10.

[40] Papanikolaou, A., Eliopoulou, E., Hamann, R., Loer, K., Assessment of Safety of Crude Oil Transport by Tankers, Proc. Annual Main Conference of Schiffbautechnische Gesellschaft (STG2009), Berlin, November, 2009, P. 6.

[41] Ibid.

[42] Yet another tug-barge incident in recent years occurred on August 20, 2007 when a barge owned by Ted Leroy Trucking Ltd tipped its load, which included a loaded fuel truck, into an ecological reserve at Robson Bight in Johnstone Strait. In this case a court of law exonerated the tug owner of any responsibility for the incident. Nevertheless, the incident highlights the inherent risk posed by any and all commercial vessel traffic in BC waters, and the need to be extremely vigilant at all times.

[43] The precise location of the pilot boarding station for the Southern Approach is apparently under discussion with the Pacific Pilotage Authority. Existing stations at Pine Island and Cape Beale are, according to Enbridge, not suitable because of their distance from the Northern and Southern Approaches. Alternative locations under consideration include a site approximately twelve nautical miles seaward of Caamaño Sound, and another location north of Browning Entrance. Volume 8B, P. 2-5.

[44] 2009 Annual Report, Pacific Pilotage Authority, Exhibit 7, P. 12.

[45] This is in no way to suggest that the pilot was responsible for the incident in question.

[46] “Oil spill experts address high-quality density oil spills”, IMO web site: http://www.imo.org/Environment/mainframe.asp?topic_id=345

[47] This incident was brought to the author’s attention through the written comment form submitted to the JRP of Dave Shannon, P. 2.

[48] Owen S. Lange, The Veil of Chaos, Living with Weather Along the British Columbia Coast, Environment Canada, 2003, P. 160.

[49] P. 4-19.

[50] Table 3-1, Return Period of a Spill Associated with the Tanker traffic for the Northern Gateway Project, Volume 8C, P. 3-4.

[51] Ibid.

[52] This figure is repeated on Page 3-2 of Volume 8C, and also included in Table 3-1 of the same document, on Page 3-4.

[53] See Volume 8A, P. 4-79.

[54] From Figure 9: Incidence of Spills > 700 Tonnes By Cause, From 1970 to 2009, ITOPF, Oil Tanker Statistics: 2009, P. 8

[55] See Annex 1, Major Oil Spills Since 1967, in Tonnes.

[56] Ibid.

[57] See P. 5-12 of Volume 8C, for instance, as well as Page 5-11 of Volume 7C.

[58] Volume 8C, P. 10-3.

[59] Ibid., P. 1-3

[60] Ibid., P. 10-5.

[61] See Annex 1 for a list of the worst tanker spills in history.

[62] Ibid., P. 10-7.

[63] In the case of the recent BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, only 5% of the spilled oil was recovered from skimming, for instance, while a further 8% was chemically dispersed and 5% burned. See, NOAA’s August 4, 2010 report on this subject for details.

[64] See, for instance, Paragraph one in Section 10.5.1, entitled “Spill Characteristics”, Volume 8C, P. 10-6.

[65] Volume 8C, 1 Introduction, 1.1 Background, P. 1-1, Paragraph 5.