Research
Book:
Unsettled Thoughts: A Theory of Degrees of Rationality, OUP, 2019.
Read chapter 1 here.
Research articles (published and forthcoming):
“An Improved Argument for Superconditionalization”, article (with Glauber De Bona), Erkenntnis, online first.
“Are Credences Different from Beliefs?”, an exchange in three essays with Roger Clarke, forthcoming in Contemporary Debates in Epistemology Vol. 3, Wiley Blackwell.
“Transitional Attitudes and the Unmooring View of Higher-Order Evidence,” forthcoming in Noûs.
“Probability Without Tears”, forthcoming in Teaching Philosophy.
"Updating Incoherent Credences - Extending the Dutch Strategy Argument for Conditionalization", with Glauber De Bona, forthcoming in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
"Pro Tem Rationality", forthcoming in Philosophical Perspectives.
"Normative Uncertainty and Probabilistic Moral Knowledge", in: Synthese.
"Credences and Suspended Judgments as Transitional Attitudes", in: Philosophical Issues.
"How Do Beliefs Simplify Reasoning?", in: Noûs.
"Why be (approximately) coherent?", with Glauber De Bona, in: Analysis.
"Expressivism, Normative Uncertainty, and Arguments for Probabilism", in: Oxford Studies in Epistemology
"Attitudes in Active Reasoning", in: Reasoning. New Essays on Theoretical and Practical Thinking, OUP, edited by Magdalena Balcerak Jackson and Brendan Balcerak Jackson.
"Should I pretend I'm perfect?", in: Res Philosophica 94 (2), Special Issue "Bridging Formal and Traditional Epistemology."
"Graded Incoherence for Accuracy-Firsters", with Glauber De Bona, in: Philosophy of Science 84 (2), pp. 189-213.
"Beliefs, Buses and Lotteries: Why rational belief can't be stably high credence", in: Philosophical Studies 173 (7), pp. 1721-1734.
"Measuring the Overall Incoherence of Credence Functions", in: Synthese 192 (5), pp. 1467-1493.
"Disagreement and Epistemic Utility-Based Compromise”, in: Journal of Philosophical Logic 44 (3), pp. 273-286.
(The citations in the web version have been updated from the version in JPL)
"Can There be Reasoning with Degrees of Belief?", in: Synthese 190 (16), pp. 3535-3551.
"Reply to Sorensen, ‘Knowledge-Lies’”, in: Analysis 71(2), pp. 300-302
"Binding of Reflexive Pronouns in German”, in: Snippets 12.
Survey Articles, Book Symposia and Reviews (published and forthcoming):
"Subjective Probability and Its Dynamics", with Alan Hájek, invited to appear in the Handbook of Rationality, edited by Markus Knauff and Wolfgang Spohn, MIT Press.
"Bayesian Norms and Non-Ideal Agents", invited to appear in the Routledge Handbook of Evidence, edited by Maria Lasonen-Aarnio and Clayton Littlejohn.
“Bayesian Rationality for Non-Ideal Thinkers”, a summary of the main argument of Unsettled Thoughts, forthcoming in Chinese translation in Philosophical Analysis.
"Review of Errol Lord's The Importance of Being Rational", forthcoming in The Philosophical Review
"Reasons Fundamentalism and Rational Uncertainty - Comments on Errol Lord's The Importance of Being Rational", forthcoming in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
"Three Puzzles about Lotteries", forthcoming in Lotteries, Knowledge, and Rational Belief, edited by Igor Douven, CUP.
"Accuracy for Believers", in: Episteme 14 (1), pp. 39-48, as part of a book symposium on R. Pettigrew's Accuracy and the Laws of Credence.
"Knowledge-Lies and Group Lies", in: Oxford Handbook of Lying, edited by Jörg Meibauer.
Work in progress (email me for a draft):
“Suspension in Inquiry,” article, invited to appear in a special issue of Episteme. (draft available)
Unfinished Business. Examining our Thoughts in Progress. book manuscript, in progress.
Article on teaching how to write research articles in philosophy, invited to appear in a Festschrift for Alan Hájek, in progress.
Article on believing one’s own philosophical views, invited to appear in an edited volume (editor: Sandy Goldberg), in progress.
Unpublished, but no longer in progress:
"Lying, Deceiving, and Degrees of Belief" (presented at the Pacific APA, 2011; longer version of the Analysis paper)
Handouts: