1941 - UK prior knowledge of Pearl Harbor attack; Rusbridger and Nave (1991): “[denial of intelligence from Americans] no accident but the deliberate policy of Churchill himself to achieve his aim of dragging America into the war”

1941- UK prior knowledge of Pearl Harbor attack. From Gideon Polya, “Jane Austen and the Black Hole of British History”, G.M. Polya, Melbourne, 1998, 2008, Chapter 15, now available for free perusal on the web: http://janeaustenand.blogspot.com.au/ : “Churchill’s Secret War - Singapore and Pearl Harbor

Churchill realised that victory against Germany depended upon the entry of the United States into the conflict as an ally of Britain and that this would occur if Japan could be induced to go to war. J. Rusbridger and E. Nave have published a very detailed account of their perception of how Churchill secured American participation in their book Betrayal at Pearl Harbor. How Churchill Lured Roosevelt into World War II. ²² Nave was a Japanese-speaking Australian naval intelligence officer who was on secondment to the British Navy from the end of World War 1 to the end of World War 2. He was intimately involved in decoding Japanese naval signals and further testament to his credentials and responsibility is given by his period of leadership in the Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation (ASIO).

According to the account of Rusbridger and Nave (1991), in November 1940 a German raider under Captain Rogge captured the merchant vessel the Automedon in the Indian Ocean and it was found that the ship’s safe contained a Chiefs of Staff report approved by the British War Cabinet and destined for the Commander at Singapore. Recognizing the importance of the document, Rogge immediately sailed for Japan. After authorization from Hitler, the document was given to the Japanese who thus by the beginning of 1941 realized that the British recognized that Singapore was essentially indefensible (I know that you know that I know ... ). Rogge was awarded a samurai sword of honor by the Emperor - this award having only been made to 2 other Germans, namely Erwin Rommel and Hermann Goering.

The successful torpedo attack on the Italian fleet at Taranto in November 1940 demonstrated the potential for what could be done at Pearl Harbor. The British report revealing the indefensibility of Singapore confirmed the feasibility of attacking the American Pacific fleet without concern for British naval forces at Singapore. Rusbridger and Nave concluded that “the incident remains one of the worst intelligence disasters in history”. These researchers assert that the British knew of the loss of this material but that Churchill did not inform Singapore or the Australians. The Australian Prime Minister, John Curtin, was apprised of the general situation after Pearl Harbor and insisted on bringing Australian soldiers back to Australia from the Middle East. Churchill diverted British forces to Singapore and inevitable capture at the fall of Singapore (January 1942).

Churchill and Pearl Harbor

The Americans had been able to break the machine-based code (“Purple”) that the Japanese used for top secret diplomatic purposes and provided 2 such de-crypting machines to the British early in the war. However the British did not respond in kind and kept mum about details of the Japanese naval code which was code book-based and which the Americans were to subsequently break for themselves. With increasing tension between America and Japan and progressive Japanese intervention in French Indochina, it became obvious that conflict was inevitable. The critical question was when and where the conflict would begin.

The first shots against Britain and her allies may possibly have been fired several weeks before Pearl Harbor off the Australian coast. On November 19 1941 the Australian cruiser HMAS Sydney sank the German raider Kormoran but was hit by a torpedo (possibly not from the Kormoran) and disappeared with all hands. While three quarters of the Germans survived, no Australians lived to tell the tale, and this singularity has led to persistent speculation of a comprehensive massacre perpetrated by the crew of a Japanese submarine. The jury is still out.

The Japanese fleet bound for Hawaii had gathered initially in the north of the Kuriles in early November 1941 but (according to the account of Rusbridger and Nave) British naval intelligence was in a position to detect, decode and interpret messages associated with this initial movement and with the movement of the fleet when it set sail towards Hawaii. Rusbridger and Nave make it clear that the British would have known 2 weeks before the event that a large Japanese force was in the north Pacific and that “one of the most likely targets was Pearl Harbor.” Churchill did not alert the Americans and indeed, on the contrary, at a time when he evidently would have been aware of this likelihood, he sent a message to Roosevelt (November 26 1941) asserting in relation to Japan that “we certainly do not want an additional war”. Even if one discounts the above expert judgement of Nave, who was intimately involved with British naval intelligence at the time, this statement of Churchill’s is manifestly disingenuous in the light of further events and his reaction to them.

According to the British ambassador in Tokyo, Sir Robert Craigie, in his report to Anthony Eden in February 1943 on conclusion of his mission to Japan, peace was still achievable with the Japanese in December 1941. In Craigie’s view the balance of the War, as perceived from Tokyo, had shifted significantly by late 1941: the British and the Russians were shifting to a more offensive rôle, the Americans were assisting with supplies and with an “undeclared” war against German submarines in the Atlantic. The Japanese had presented a pacifying proposal involving their withdrawal from Indo-China and Craigie had strongly urged British acceptance (with some modifications) of this modus vivendi but evidently without success for this proposal was not acceptable to the Americans (November 26 1941). It is likely that the decision to go to war was taken by the Japanese on November 27. ²²

Craigie was conscious of the theory that American participation in the War was so vital for victory that it had to be incurred at the cost of war with Japan. He held a contrary view and felt that American-Japanese conflict could curtail American trans-Atlantic aid. Accordingly Craigie had strongly favoured continuing Japanese neutrality. Churchill had a completely different view in hindsight (and one can also reasonably presume in foresight): he was highly critical of Craigie’s report and asserted: “It was a blessing that Japan attacked the United States and thus brought America wholeheartedly into the war. Greater good fortune has rarely happened to the British empire than this event.” Craigie reflects that the Tripartite Pact between Japan, Germany and Italy may have been regarded in both Washington and London as committing Japan irretrievably to the War as an ally of the Axis powers - a view that he did not personally accept. In relation to the final breakdown of Japanese-American negotiations Craigie makes the critical observation: “there can be no doubt that the absence of any British moderating influence, whether at Washington or at Tokyo, increased the chances of that breakdown which eventually occurred.”

Rusbridger and Nave (1991) refer to a communication of Churchill to Roosevelt on November 26 1941 that is so secret that it cannot be released for the best part of 70 years and one of the American Pearl Harbor inquiries refers to critical (but not revealed) evidence received on November 26 indicating impending Japanese attack against Britain and America. Hawaii was warned in a general, as opposed to a specific sense, of the danger of Japanese attack on the same day that the Americans rejected the final Japanese proposal. 2 weeks later British forces in Malaya were at battle stations when attacked by the Japanese at dawn on December 8 1941, having had prior warning of major Japanese naval movements across the Gulf of Siam several days before. The Americans in Hawaii had no warning of the attack to come, although precise information was available to both British and American naval intelligence people the day before the attack.

A coded message sent to the Japanese Consulate in Melbourne on November 19 was intercepted and decoded. It specified warning messages to be incorporated into Japanese broadcasts in the event of the impending commencement of hostilities. The message indicating an impending outbreak of Japanese-American hostilities was “east wind rain” inserted in the text of a weather report (“west wind clearing” was to mean a Japanese-British crisis). The point of this was to ensure timely destruction of documents in Japanese consulates and embassies. The “east wind rain” radio message - indicating an impending Japanese attack on the Americans - was indeed picked up in Melbourne by the Australian Special Intelligence Organisation officer on December 4 1941. That intelligence was immediately passed on to Nave (who had been seconded to SIO) and thence to higher authority - but not to the Americans. The same message was picked up, correctly interpreted and passed on to higher authority by naval intelligence in Maryland - but according to Rusbridger and Nave, this direct warning of an impending Japanese attack on American forces was not acted upon to ensure the preparedeness of American forces in the Pacific.

The attack on Pearl Harbor on the morning of December 7 1941 caused massive damage to the US Navy and Air Force - 5 battleships and 3 cruisers sunk or severely damaged, 177 aircraft destroyed, 2,343 American servicemen dead, 876 missing and 1,272 injured. At that time Churchill was dining with Roosevelt’s special envoy, Averell Harriman, and the American ambassador, John Winant. The butler brought the news and Churchill phoned Roosevelt immediately to inform him that Britain would declare war on Japan. The conclusion of Rusbridger and Nave (1991) is that denial of British naval intelligence information from the Americans allowed the Pearl Harbor attack to happen, turned a potential Japanese disaster into an American one and was “no accident but the deliberate policy of Churchill himself to achieve his aim of dragging America into the war.” While “revisionists” have sought to implicate Roosevelt in a process of forcing Japan into a corner and thence into war, an analysis of this by Goldstein and Dillon (1982) concluded: “But in a thorough search of more than thirty years, including all documents released up to May 1 1981, we have not discovered one document or one word of sworn testimony that substantiates the revisionist position on Roosevelt and Pearl Harbor.” ²³

Churchill’s Secret War - Singapore and Pearl Harbor

Churchill realised that victory against Germany depended upon the entry of the United States into the conflict as an ally of Britain and that this would occur if Japan could be induced to go to war. J. Rusbridger and E. Nave have published a very detailed account of their perception of how Churchill secured American participation in their book Betrayal at Pearl Harbor. How Churchill Lured Roosevelt into World War II. ²² Nave was a Japanese-speaking Australian naval intelligence officer who was on secondment to the British Navy from the end of World War 1 to the end of World War 2. He was intimately involved in decoding Japanese naval signals and further testament to his credentials and responsibility is given by his period of leadership in the Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation (ASIO).

According to the account of Rusbridger and Nave (1991), in November 1940 a German raider under Captain Rogge captured the merchant vessel the Automedon in the Indian Ocean and it was found that the ship’s safe contained a Chiefs of Staff report approved by the British War Cabinet and destined for the Commander at Singapore. Recognizing the importance of the document, Rogge immediately sailed for Japan. After authorization from Hitler, the document was given to the Japanese who thus by the beginning of 1941 realized that the British recognized that Singapore was essentially indefensible (I know that you know that I know ... ). Rogge was awarded a samurai sword of honor by the Emperor - this award having only been made to 2 other Germans, namely Erwin Rommel and Hermann Goering.

The successful torpedo attack on the Italian fleet at Taranto in November 1940 demonstrated the potential for what could be done at Pearl Harbor. The British report revealing the indefensibility of Singapore confirmed the feasibility of attacking the American Pacific fleet without concern for British naval forces at Singapore. Rusbridger and Nave concluded that “the incident remains one of the worst intelligence disasters in history”. These researchers assert that the British knew of the loss of this material but that Churchill did not inform Singapore or the Australians. The Australian Prime Minister, John Curtin, was apprised of the general situation after Pearl Harbor and insisted on bringing Australian soldiers back to Australia from the Middle East. Churchill diverted British forces to Singapore and inevitable capture at the fall of Singapore (January 1942).

Churchill and Pearl Harbor

The Americans had been able to break the machine-based code (“Purple”) that the Japanese used for top secret diplomatic purposes and provided 2 such de-crypting machines to the British early in the war. However the British did not respond in kind and kept mum about details of the Japanese naval code which was code book-based and which the Americans were to subsequently break for themselves. With increasing tension between America and Japan and progressive Japanese intervention in French Indochina, it became obvious that conflict was inevitable. The critical question was when and where the conflict would begin.

The first shots against Britain and her allies may possibly have been fired several weeks before Pearl Harbor off the Australian coast. On November 19 1941 the Australian cruiser HMAS Sydney sank the German raider Kormoran but was hit by a torpedo (possibly not from the Kormoran) and disappeared with all hands. While three quarters of the Germans survived, no Australians lived to tell the tale, and this singularity has led to persistent speculation of a comprehensive massacre perpetrated by the crew of a Japanese submarine. The jury is still out.

The Japanese fleet bound for Hawaii had gathered initially in the north of the Kuriles in early November 1941 but (according to the account of Rusbridger and Nave) British naval intelligence was in a position to detect, decode and interpret messages associated with this initial movement and with the movement of the fleet when it set sail towards Hawaii. Rusbridger and Nave make it clear that the British would have known 2 weeks before the event that a large Japanese force was in the north Pacific and that “one of the most likely targets was Pearl Harbor.” Churchill did not alert the Americans and indeed, on the contrary, at a time when he evidently would have been aware of this likelihood, he sent a message to Roosevelt (November 26 1941) asserting in relation to Japan that “we certainly do not want an additional war”. Even if one discounts the above expert judgement of Nave, who was intimately involved with British naval intelligence at the time, this statement of Churchill’s is manifestly disingenuous in the light of further events and his reaction to them.

According to the British ambassador in Tokyo, Sir Robert Craigie, in his report to Anthony Eden in February 1943 on conclusion of his mission to Japan, peace was still achievable with the Japanese in December 1941. In Craigie’s view the balance of the War, as perceived from Tokyo, had shifted significantly by late 1941: the British and the Russians were shifting to a more offensive rôle, the Americans were assisting with supplies and with an “undeclared” war against German submarines in the Atlantic. The Japanese had presented a pacifying proposal involving their withdrawal from Indo-China and Craigie had strongly urged British acceptance (with some modifications) of this modus vivendi but evidently without success for this proposal was not acceptable to the Americans (November 26 1941). It is likely that the decision to go to war was taken by the Japanese on November 27. ²²

Craigie was conscious of the theory that American participation in the War was so vital for victory that it had to be incurred at the cost of war with Japan. He held a contrary view and felt that American-Japanese conflict could curtail American trans-Atlantic aid. Accordingly Craigie had strongly favoured continuing Japanese neutrality. Churchill had a completely different view in hindsight (and one can also reasonably presume in foresight): he was highly critical of Craigie’s report and asserted: “It was a blessing that Japan attacked the United States and thus brought America wholeheartedly into the war. Greater good fortune has rarely happened to the British empire than this event.” Craigie reflects that the Tripartite Pact between Japan, Germany and Italy may have been regarded in both Washington and London as committing Japan irretrievably to the War as an ally of the Axis powers - a view that he did not personally accept. In relation to the final breakdown of Japanese-American negotiations Craigie makes the critical observation: “there can be no doubt that the absence of any British moderating influence, whether at Washington or at Tokyo, increased the chances of that breakdown which eventually occurred.”

Rusbridger and Nave (1991) refer to a communication of Churchill to Roosevelt on November 26 1941 that is so secret that it cannot be released for the best part of 70 years and one of the American Pearl Harbor inquiries refers to critical (but not revealed) evidence received on November 26 indicating impending Japanese attack against Britain and America. Hawaii was warned in a general, as opposed to a specific sense, of the danger of Japanese attack on the same day that the Americans rejected the final Japanese proposal. 2 weeks later British forces in Malaya were at battle stations when attacked by the Japanese at dawn on December 8 1941, having had prior warning of major Japanese naval movements across the Gulf of Siam several days before. The Americans in Hawaii had no warning of the attack to come, although precise information was available to both British and American naval intelligence people the day before the attack.

A coded message sent to the Japanese Consulate in Melbourne on November 19 was intercepted and decoded. It specified warning messages to be incorporated into Japanese broadcasts in the event of the impending commencement of hostilities. The message indicating an impending outbreak of Japanese-American hostilities was “east wind rain” inserted in the text of a weather report (“west wind clearing” was to mean a Japanese-British crisis). The point of this was to ensure timely destruction of documents in Japanese consulates and embassies. The “east wind rain” radio message - indicating an impending Japanese attack on the Americans - was indeed picked up in Melbourne by the Australian Special Intelligence Organisation officer on December 4 1941. That intelligence was immediately passed on to Nave (who had been seconded to SIO) and thence to higher authority - but not to the Americans. The same message was picked up, correctly interpreted and passed on to higher authority by naval intelligence in Maryland - but according to Rusbridger and Nave, this direct warning of an impending Japanese attack on American forces was not acted upon to ensure the preparedeness of American forces in the Pacific.

The attack on Pearl Harbor on the morning of December 7 1941 caused massive damage to the US Navy and Air Force - 5 battleships and 3 cruisers sunk or severely damaged, 177 aircraft destroyed, 2,343 American servicemen dead, 876 missing and 1,272 injured. At that time Churchill was dining with Roosevelt’s special envoy, Averell Harriman, and the American ambassador, John Winant. The butler brought the news and Churchill phoned Roosevelt immediately to inform him that Britain would declare war on Japan. The conclusion of Rusbridger and Nave (1991) is that denial of British naval intelligence information from the Americans allowed the Pearl Harbor attack to happen, turned a potential Japanese disaster into an American one and was “no accident but the deliberate policy of Churchill himself to achieve his aim of dragging America into the war.” While “revisionists” have sought to implicate Roosevelt in a process of forcing Japan into a corner and thence into war, an analysis of this by Goldstein and Dillon (1982) concluded: “But in a thorough search of more than thirty years, including all documents released up to May 1 1981, we have not discovered one document or one word of sworn testimony that substantiates the revisionist position on Roosevelt and Pearl Harbor.” ²³

Churchill’s Secret War - Singapore and Pearl Harbor

Churchill realised that victory against Germany depended upon the entry of the United States into the conflict as an ally of Britain and that this would occur if Japan could be induced to go to war. J. Rusbridger and E. Nave have published a very detailed account of their perception of how Churchill secured American participation in their book Betrayal at Pearl Harbor. How Churchill Lured Roosevelt into World War II. ²² Nave was a Japanese-speaking Australian naval intelligence officer who was on secondment to the British Navy from the end of World War 1 to the end of World War 2. He was intimately involved in decoding Japanese naval signals and further testament to his credentials and responsibility is given by his period of leadership in the Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation (ASIO).

According to the account of Rusbridger and Nave (1991), in November 1940 a German raider under Captain Rogge captured the merchant vessel the Automedon in the Indian Ocean and it was found that the ship’s safe contained a Chiefs of Staff report approved by the British War Cabinet and destined for the Commander at Singapore. Recognizing the importance of the document, Rogge immediately sailed for Japan. After authorization from Hitler, the document was given to the Japanese who thus by the beginning of 1941 realized that the British recognized that Singapore was essentially indefensible (I know that you know that I know ... ). Rogge was awarded a samurai sword of honor by the Emperor - this award having only been made to 2 other Germans, namely Erwin Rommel and Hermann Goering.

The successful torpedo attack on the Italian fleet at Taranto in November 1940 demonstrated the potential for what could be done at Pearl Harbor. The British report revealing the indefensibility of Singapore confirmed the feasibility of attacking the American Pacific fleet without concern for British naval forces at Singapore. Rusbridger and Nave concluded that “the incident remains one of the worst intelligence disasters in history”. These researchers assert that the British knew of the loss of this material but that Churchill did not inform Singapore or the Australians. The Australian Prime Minister, John Curtin, was apprised of the general situation after Pearl Harbor and insisted on bringing Australian soldiers back to Australia from the Middle East. Churchill diverted British forces to Singapore and inevitable capture at the fall of Singapore (January 1942).

Churchill and Pearl Harbor

The Americans had been able to break the machine-based code (“Purple”) that the Japanese used for top secret diplomatic purposes and provided 2 such de-crypting machines to the British early in the war. However the British did not respond in kind and kept mum about details of the Japanese naval code which was code book-based and which the Americans were to subsequently break for themselves. With increasing tension between America and Japan and progressive Japanese intervention in French Indochina, it became obvious that conflict was inevitable. The critical question was when and where the conflict would begin.

The first shots against Britain and her allies may possibly have been fired several weeks before Pearl Harbor off the Australian coast. On November 19 1941 the Australian cruiser HMAS Sydney sank the German raider Kormoran but was hit by a torpedo (possibly not from the Kormoran) and disappeared with all hands. While three quarters of the Germans survived, no Australians lived to tell the tale, and this singularity has led to persistent speculation of a comprehensive massacre perpetrated by the crew of a Japanese submarine. The jury is still out.

The Japanese fleet bound for Hawaii had gathered initially in the north of the Kuriles in early November 1941 but (according to the account of Rusbridger and Nave) British naval intelligence was in a position to detect, decode and interpret messages associated with this initial movement and with the movement of the fleet when it set sail towards Hawaii. Rusbridger and Nave make it clear that the British would have known 2 weeks before the event that a large Japanese force was in the north Pacific and that “one of the most likely targets was Pearl Harbor.” Churchill did not alert the Americans and indeed, on the contrary, at a time when he evidently would have been aware of this likelihood, he sent a message to Roosevelt (November 26 1941) asserting in relation to Japan that “we certainly do not want an additional war”. Even if one discounts the above expert judgement of Nave, who was intimately involved with British naval intelligence at the time, this statement of Churchill’s is manifestly disingenuous in the light of further events and his reaction to them.

According to the British ambassador in Tokyo, Sir Robert Craigie, in his report to Anthony Eden in February 1943 on conclusion of his mission to Japan, peace was still achievable with the Japanese in December 1941. In Craigie’s view the balance of the War, as perceived from Tokyo, had shifted significantly by late 1941: the British and the Russians were shifting to a more offensive rôle, the Americans were assisting with supplies and with an “undeclared” war against German submarines in the Atlantic. The Japanese had presented a pacifying proposal involving their withdrawal from Indo-China and Craigie had strongly urged British acceptance (with some modifications) of this modus vivendi but evidently without success for this proposal was not acceptable to the Americans (November 26 1941). It is likely that the decision to go to war was taken by the Japanese on November 27. ²²

Craigie was conscious of the theory that American participation in the War was so vital for victory that it had to be incurred at the cost of war with Japan. He held a contrary view and felt that American-Japanese conflict could curtail American trans-Atlantic aid. Accordingly Craigie had strongly favoured continuing Japanese neutrality. Churchill had a completely different view in hindsight (and one can also reasonably presume in foresight): he was highly critical of Craigie’s report and asserted: “It was a blessing that Japan attacked the United States and thus brought America wholeheartedly into the war. Greater good fortune has rarely happened to the British empire than this event.” Craigie reflects that the Tripartite Pact between Japan, Germany and Italy may have been regarded in both Washington and London as committing Japan irretrievably to the War as an ally of the Axis powers - a view that he did not personally accept. In relation to the final breakdown of Japanese-American negotiations Craigie makes the critical observation: “there can be no doubt that the absence of any British moderating influence, whether at Washington or at Tokyo, increased the chances of that breakdown which eventually occurred.”

Rusbridger and Nave (1991) refer to a communication of Churchill to Roosevelt on November 26 1941 that is so secret that it cannot be released for the best part of 70 years and one of the American Pearl Harbor inquiries refers to critical (but not revealed) evidence received on November 26 indicating impending Japanese attack against Britain and America. Hawaii was warned in a general, as opposed to a specific sense, of the danger of Japanese attack on the same day that the Americans rejected the final Japanese proposal. 2 weeks later British forces in Malaya were at battle stations when attacked by the Japanese at dawn on December 8 1941, having had prior warning of major Japanese naval movements across the Gulf of Siam several days before. The Americans in Hawaii had no warning of the attack to come, although precise information was available to both British and American naval intelligence people the day before the attack.

A coded message sent to the Japanese Consulate in Melbourne on November 19 was intercepted and decoded. It specified warning messages to be incorporated into Japanese broadcasts in the event of the impending commencement of hostilities. The message indicating an impending outbreak of Japanese-American hostilities was “east wind rain” inserted in the text of a weather report (“west wind clearing” was to mean a Japanese-British crisis). The point of this was to ensure timely destruction of documents in Japanese consulates and embassies. The “east wind rain” radio message - indicating an impending Japanese attack on the Americans - was indeed picked up in Melbourne by the Australian Special Intelligence Organisation officer on December 4 1941. That intelligence was immediately passed on to Nave (who had been seconded to SIO) and thence to higher authority - but not to the Americans. The same message was picked up, correctly interpreted and passed on to higher authority by naval intelligence in Maryland - but according to Rusbridger and Nave, this direct warning of an impending Japanese attack on American forces was not acted upon to ensure the preparedeness of American forces in the Pacific.

The attack on Pearl Harbor on the morning of December 7 1941 caused massive damage to the US Navy and Air Force - 5 battleships and 3 cruisers sunk or severely damaged, 177 aircraft destroyed, 2,343 American servicemen dead, 876 missing and 1,272 injured. At that time Churchill was dining with Roosevelt’s special envoy, Averell Harriman, and the American ambassador, John Winant. The butler brought the news and Churchill phoned Roosevelt immediately to inform him that Britain would declare war on Japan. The conclusion of Rusbridger and Nave (1991) is that denial of British naval intelligence information from the Americans allowed the Pearl Harbor attack to happen, turned a potential Japanese disaster into an American one and was “no accident but the deliberate policy of Churchill himself to achieve his aim of dragging America into the war.” While “revisionists” have sought to implicate Roosevelt in a process of forcing Japan into a corner and thence into war, an analysis of this by Goldstein and Dillon (1982) concluded: “But in a thorough search of more than thirty years, including all documents released up to May 1 1981, we have not discovered one document or one word of sworn testimony that substantiates the revisionist position on Roosevelt and Pearl Harbor.” ²³