Master's Thesis Abstract
Bertrand Russell is one of the grandmasters of 20th Century Analytic Philosophy. It is surprising, then, that his work fell out of fashion later in his career. As a result, very little has been discussed concerning Russell’s work from the period of 1927 – 59. This thesis provides an analysis of Russell’s philosophical work from this era. Our attention here is on Russell’s theory of perception and the underlying metaphysical structure that is developed as a result of his scientific outlook, as Russell’s philosophy during this time focused almost exclusively on perception, knowledge, and the epistemic relationship humans have with the world according to science. And because Russell’s system is in many ways prescient with regards to recent advances made in perception, mind and matter, and knowledge more generally, we also apply his theory to developments in the philosophy of perception since that time.
Our initial discussion – Chapters 1 and 2 – is most concerned with an accurate explication of the concepts germane to and conclusions formed from Russell’s theory of perception. Included in these considerations are Russell’s ontological commitments—most specifically a four-dimensional event ontology facilitated by Neutral Monism. From this ontology we further discuss Russell’s distinction of the two types of spaces found in perception: physical and perceptual (psychological). The notion of perceptual space, coupled with a causal story, enables Russell to conclude that all perception is in one’s mind; that is, all one ever perceives is one’s own brain. Furthermore, we discover that on Russell’s view, since perceptions are only of one’s own brain, our access to the physical space is limited to structural representations. We cannot infer anything beyond the structure of the external world from the basis of perception.
Following the discussion on the physical and metaphysical components of perception, our focus in Chapter 3 turns to Russell’s epistemic conclusions concerning perceptual knowledge. Involved in this section is an analysis of Russell’s notion of “knowledge” and its shortcomings. In addition to the conceptual analysis of knowledge, we also discuss two further epistemic wings as developed by Russell: belief formation and justification. In the former, we are presented with the steps that are taken in the development of knowledge from primitive perception to inferential scientific knowledge, all of which are based on animal habits and naturalised belief formation. Concerning justification, Russell approaches this topic from probability logic, ultimately concluding that there is no satisfactory way to get absolute knowledge, but that we can get close by employing a foundational-coherentist model of justification. Here Russell likens knowledge-development to a bridge, wherein the foundations are the piers holding the bridge upright; the strength of the justification, however, is found in the interconnected girders – coherence – connecting the piers. The bridge ultimately rests on non-demonstrative principles of inference. By themselves the piers do not accomplish much, but taken as a whole, the bridge is solid. Following this discussion, we engage in a minor criticism of Russell’s notion of knowledge.
In the final two chapters we bring Russell’s theory of knowledge and perception into focus using other positions to juxtapose with Russell’s. These include the epistemic considerations found in representationalism, phenomenalism, and direct realism. We conclude this part with an interpretation of Russell’s external world epistemology, one I label ‘Russellian Realism’, which, again, suggests a structural and scientific form of realism.
Finally, we discuss some demarcating principles of a theory of perception and the ultimate “problem of perception,” giving a Russellian response to the issues found therein. Involved in this project are a number of issues, foremost of which is how a theory perception can deal with the apparent openness to the world we experience in perception, while also admitting the potential for illusions and hallucinations. Furthermore, what is it like, or how does it seem when one is having a perceptual experience? These are some of the problems any theory of perception faces. We therefore set out to discover how Russell’s theory responds to some of these problems.
Ultimately we should realize that Russell’s perceptual and epistemic projects are philosophically motivated but scientifically driven. It is this logically based scientific outlook that provides Russell with a consistent framework from which to begin his project. It is a project that has been virtually ignored, yet is ripe with insights .We thus find that Russell’s theory of perception is relevant in many ways to current concerns within the philosophy of perception generally and scientific epistemology more specifically.