Inference to the Best Explanation
Contrary to the way Van Fraassen sets up his positoon, there is more to the relation of theory and evidence than mere consistency (ie that their joint truth is not logically ruled out). We can infer from observable evidence to what best explains it. On this view, explanation is, again, key to science.Whilst Van Fraassen expliclty anticipates a response to his position using Inference to the Best Explanation and argues that it will not do, other philosophers such as Boyd and McMullin do think that it can help argue for realism.
Peter Lipton, who did more work on inference to the best explanation than anyone else, is more modest. But he helps set out the its nature within science independently of its possible further application to science as a whole.
McMullin, E. (1987) ‘Explanatory success and the truth of theory’ in Rescher, N. (ed) Scientific Inquiry in Philosophical Perspective, New York: University Press of America pp51-73 (especially pp51-61 and pp65- bottom of 68)
Lipton, P. (2004) Inference to the Best Explanation, London: Routledge chapters 4 (especially pp55-64) and 9 (especially pp142-8)
Secondary and background reading
Bird, A. (1998) Philosophy of Science London: UCL Press pp85-94, 144-160
Boyd, R. (1999) ‘On the current status of scientific realism’ in Boyd, R., Gasker, P. and Trout, J.D. (eds) The Philosophy of Science, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press especially pp207-210.
This session's slides are here.
Remarks on Inference to the Best Explanation.
