The Cold War started in mid to late 1945 and ended in 1991. Its inception began when relations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States started to deteriorate and as their relationship began to be filled with suspicion and resentment. Both countries were vying to be global superpowers in order to secure their survival in a potential World War. The growth of each then led the other to gain suspicion, which led to a falling out and the start of the Cold War. From this, the controversy of the more responsible party in the Cold War between the United States and the USSR emerges. The historiography on this subject consists of pro-Soviet accounts, which blame the west, the United States, for the war, traditionalist accounts, which accuse the USSR’s aggressive nature in trying to convert its surrounding countries to communism, imposing their ways of life, and the post-revisionist view in that it only occurred due to a common misunderstanding between both sides. All three of these views will be further explored in order to deduce who was at fault for the war. Through investigation, it is made clear that the Cold War only occurred due to a common misconception between both superpowers. With further scrutinization of all views, it is seen that the best explanation belongs to that of the post-revisionists. The foundation of this perspective being that the Cold War was already inevitable meaning that it was not the fault of the United States, or the USSR, but was instead a direct result of post-World War II land grabs.

As previously mentioned, pro-Soviet historians discreetly blame the United States of America for the war. Joseph Stalin, the leader of the USSR, believed if the world was divided into two camps, imperialism and capitalism would be in one and communism and all other progressive forms of government would be in the other (Cold War: Soviet Perspectives, 2013). Along with Stalin, but to a lesser extent, many historians, like Pechatnov, held a similar belief. “ For American and British planners the Soviet Union with its hostile ideology and huge military capability became the next logical candidate after Nazi Germany for the role of Eurasian hegemonic power an emergence of which the U.S. and its allies tried to prevent in two world wars” (Pechatnov, 2010). By presenting it this way, Pechatnov highlights the United States aim to eradicate communism to be motivated by self-interest. Any global hegemonic power, especially communist, threatened the United States capitalist economy as it could potentially complicate the current U.S. markets. The United States only sought to destroy the USSR to make certain that they would be able to get their products and goods into foreign markets, which would not be allowed with communism’s global establishment. This selfish cause led the United States to pass the Communist Control Act in 1954, serving as a justification to act on current tensions that were in place between the two countries and allow conflict with the opposing power to begin.

In contrast to the belief of the pro-Soviet historians, traditionalist(orthodox) historians thought the USSR directly caused the conflict. Those in western countries held this view, especially in the United States. Similar to how Nazi Germany’s continual expansion was viewed, Western Nations depicted the continual expansion of the Soviet as obsessive and recognized this expansion as the USSR acting in compliance with their doctrine of Marxist-Leninism (Haynes 12). This doctrine read of how it was the Soviet’s obligation to combine the whole known world into one collective communist nation through the means of an international revolution (Cold War: Soviet Perspectives, 2013). Meaning that their expansion was the start of an attempt on potential world domination. Along with this, traditionalists were outraged that the USSR had stayed in Poland past the amount of time that they said they were going to stay, which was until a communist leader was elected. Traditionalists hold this as a violation of the post-world war Yalta Agreement of 1945, which let the USSR stay in Poland, temporarily occupying it with troops to stabilize the country. As the Soviets stayed longer than what was agreed upon, they were therefore breaking the agreement. Traditionalists also believe the agreement by Roosevelt to be too generous towards the Soviets and, “accuse him of ‘handing over’ Eastern Europe and Northeast Asia to the Soviet Union at Yalta despite the fact that the Soviets did make many substantial concessions” (The Yalta Conference, U.S. Department of State). This is where traditionalist historians, like Haynes, are convinced all relations dissolved and the Cold War began to commence.

Taking into account both sides of this argument, a third perspective was born to give a better explanation. Historians with this perspective are labeled Post-Revisionists. These historians identified the perspectives of traditionalist and pro-Soviet historians as extreme, so they took views from each side, and along with time for reflection, understood each side’s struggles and could see the war from a middle ground (Gaddis, “The Emerging Post-Revisionist Synthesis” 10). John Lewis Gaddis was the pioneer of this school of thought. “Both the United States and the Soviet Union had been born in revolution. Both embraced ideologies with global aspirations: what worked at home, their leaders assumed, would also do so for the rest of the world” (Gaddis, The Cold War: a New History 7). He saw them both as global superpowers, trying to protect their own securities and interests. Their reality worked so well for them that they assumed it would work well for everyone else and decided it was high time to change it. Aware that communism and capitalism could not fully function on a small scale, this war of ideologies was inevitable. Unlike the other perspectives, post-revisionist historians believe both sides are in the wrong. These historians are confident that Stalin was not a revolutionary, but instead an opportunist and the United States at the time was not driven to protect foreign policy, but instead by economic ideals.

It is obvious why the pro-Soviet and traditionalist historians believe in what they do, though many of these viewpoints are biased toward the environment the historians were raised in. The majority of the historians that were researched, that were born in western countries, take up a traditionalist viewpoint, while those raised in Russia have pro-Soviet views. Each side blamed the opposite party and had plenty of grounds to do so. From this, the post-revisionist viewpoint is most supported of the three. There is a wealth of evidence supporting either side and there is a required ignorance to accept that the Cold War is the fault of purely one side, as the other side’s evidence would have to be disregarded. Both parties were at fault and the situation they were in made the war inevitable.