"Robust Pricing for Quality Disclosure"

joint with Tan Gan (SSRN; arXiv; Slides)

A platform charges a producer for disclosing hard evidence of product quality to a consumer before trading. To tackle strategic uncertainty, the platform offers the producer quality-dependent and disclosure probability-dependent prices to maximize its revenue guarantee across all equilibria. The optimal design constructs off-path price options to incentivize each producer type to "conquer herself" by deviating continually to full disclosure, yielding strictly convex advertising price functions of disclosure probability. Moreover, the platform prioritizes attracting higher types into service, and offers them higher rents despite the absence of adverse selection. Comparative statics demonstrate more informative hard evidence increases platform revenue guarantee.

Presentations: SEA 2023, SITE 2024, ACM EC 2024, the 35th Stony Brook conference, GAMES 2024, Yale, UCL, UBC, Warwick

"Multiplayer War of Attrition with Asymmetric Private Information"

joint with Jialu Zhang (Bachelor Thesis; arXiv)

This paper studies a war of attrition game in the setting of public good provision that combines three elements: (i) multiple players, (ii) incomplete information, and (iii) ex-ante asymmetry. In the unique equilibrium, asymmetry leads to a stratified behavior pattern where one player provides the public good instantly with a positive probability while each of the other players has a player-specific strict waiting time, before which even his highest type will not provide the good. Comparative statics show that a player with less patience, lower cost of provision, and higher reputation in value (expressed in a form of hazard rate) provides the good type-wise uniformly faster. In large societies, the cost of delay is mainly determined by the highest type of the instant-exit player.

"Robust Contracts with Career Concern"

joint with Tan Gan

"Contracting with Indirect Externalities"

joint with Tan Gan