In 2020, we introduced this new section in our bimonthly newsletter, where we imagine we have a podcast with thousands of worldwide listeners. Our show, SEARG Scripts, invites guests (of course, SEARG members) to help us make sense of current issues and events in Southeast Asia.
The global Covid-19 pandemic has radically transformed the way we socially interact, do business, and live our lives. At SEARG, we adapted to this environment by attempting to make ourselves more felt and relevant through a regular newsletter that primarily celebrates the successes and expertise of our student-members (we are, after all, a student organization). It was also tough to program activities, but somehow SEARG was able to pull off one of its most productive years. We thank everybody who has supported us along the way.
The pandemic also painfully puts in front of our faces the sorry state of Southeast Asia and the broken promises of 21st century development. It is jarring, almost inhumane, to realize that most of us are privileged to be here at UW–Madison, trying to survive so we could continue to study the region, while the people we study are dying at a record pace. This pandemic has, thus, sensitized us to go beyond our research and be more active in our service to Southeast Asian communities. UW–Madison has the reputation for marrying scholarship and activism, and a big part of that has been carried by its students.
This final SEARG Scripts for the academic year asks the big question: How can SEARG better contribute to scholarly activism? Our next leaders—Grace Simbulan, Napakadol “Ik” Kittisenee, and Rodlyn-mae Banting—answer this by giving us a preview of the issues they deeply care about and sharing their thoughts on how students like them can find ways to address issues lingering in Southeast Asia. Gleaning from their answers, it is safe to say that SEARG will be up for a cultural reset next academic year.
SEARG:
Hello Grace, Ik and Rodlyn! We’d like to start with this question to get to know you more. What issue in Southeast Asia are you currently passionate about or following?
Rodlyn:
Through the organizing group Malaya Movement-New York Chapter (where I’m originally from), I have recently joined a research team that looks into the historical and ongoing relationships between the Philippine National Police (PNP) and the New York Police Department (NYPD). American police forces have a long history of colluding with the law enforcement of the Philippines, largely without the Filipino people’s wellbeing in mind. Throughout the COVID crisis, the NYPD (and the U.S. in general) has poured billions of dollars into military and defense aid to the Philippines—all money that could have been better used to alleviate the economic and medical stressors of the pandemic (with much of relief being taken into the hands of the people, as Grace talked about above). Collecting current data on this sinister, centuries-long partnership between the NYPD and the PNP is hopefully one step closer to holding the proper authority figures accountable and terminate the transnational aid going into these sectors.
Grace:
As a member of the University of the Philippines-Mountaineers I've been closely following the news about Patricia "Patreng" Non, a colleague who initiated a movement called “community pantry.” She has become the recent target of harassment and "red-tagging" by government agencies in the Philippines (i.e. National Task Force to End Local Communist Armed Conflict (NTF-ELCAC). The community pantry, whose first "branch" in Quezon City, aims to help fight food insecurity during the pandemic through the provision of fresh produce, canned goods, and other necessities to those in need. It's infuriating to learn how Duterte and his allies have focused much of their energies (and people's taxes) on bullying citizens who are just trying to fill the gaps overlooked by the national and local governments. They went so far as to ask several pantries to stop their operations because they were accused of being "communists" or of spreading communist propaganda.
Ik:
The third surge of COVID-19 is now an emergency issue of Thailand, Laos and Cambodia. This is worrisome, given the fact that the vaccine rollout in these countries are very limited--let alone other resources and the scarcity of essential workers to meet this immediate need.
SEARG:
How do these issues affect people or citizens outside of that country? Like how are these considered transnational?
Ik:
We have friends, family members and fellow human beings here and there. The infection rate that grows exponentially this time is a big hit on the mental health of both sides of the globe. The world is truly divided by the access to immunization. The pandemic clearly emphasizes this global asymmetry. As a citizen of this planet, now living in a territory where scheduling for a jab can be done online at the wink of an eye plus several choices of vaccine available, I acknowledge at the same moment people are dying because of desperate conditions in another time zone.
Grace:
This is a transnational issue, as the effects of the pandemic have led to dramatic increases in global food insecurity. Conversations surrounding access to food are also linked to climate change, trade, transnational justice, and economic instability within a broader capitalist system. Not only that, access to food taps into intersecting issues of race, gender, class, etc.
Countries like the Philippines are often pressured to change agricultural practices to cater to the demands of the Global North, which leads to internal food insecurity. It is also crucial to highlight that the roots of food insecurity in the Philippines can be traced back to the country’s colonial past. Hegemonic powers like the U.S. and China have continued to reimpose and reinstitute their control over the Philippines through neocolonial policies (often concerning agricultural systems), which greatly impacts Filipinos’ access to food.
Rodlyn:
As abolitionist work continues to gain traction beyond organizing circles and into the general public in the U.S., we must not forget that the fight for abolition includes the termination of transnational conspiracies that work to bolster other nations’ law enforcement, which inflict heightened surveillance, violence, and fear on their people. In this specific situation, New Yorkers, and Americans more broadly, must understand that a portion of our tax dollars are directly funding the murder of the Filipino poor as carried out by Duterte’s War on Drugs.
SEARG:
Finally, how do you think students, like SEARG members, can help address issues like these, even if we are far from where it is happening?
Rodlyn:
Malaya Movement NY has recently worked to pass the Philippine Human Rights Bill in order to create pressure on the U.S. government regarding this situation. The bill essentially calls for the suspension of all U.S. aid to the Philippine government and police until the proper authorities are held accountable for the various atrocities being enacted on the Filipino people amidst the concurrent crises of COVID-19 and the War on Drugs, among others. Grassroots organizing fueled by the people’s power is often one of the most effective ways to enact change and stand firm in transnational solidarity. Folks can read about the full bill here (HR 8313) and look into joining regional organizing groups based here in the Midwest.
Grace:
Being in Madison has somehow made me feel disconnected and insulated from the social realities in the Philippines. I've made efforts to talk to people back home, read the news, and attend webinars to inform myself of what's currently happening. As students doing research on SEA, citizens of countries of SEA, and as members of SEARG, we can reach out to various organizations from one of the countries in SEA to ask how we can be of help to their advocacies (financially, in kind, or intellectually), and to inform ourselves of the situations in these areas, after all, awareness is the first step to action.
Ik:
We are more fortunate than the people in the previous global pandemic that we have advanced technology of communication that allows us to connect and collaborate with people across the continents. We can provide access to resources, disseminate the reliable information, collaborate with working task forces and help support those in need. Many people suffer mentally not from the virus itself but due to overloading information consumption. I help support several groups of essential workers and help set up a database for learning about the pandemic in Southeast Asia, hoping that in the future we can benefit from this resource whenever we face the unprecedented circumstances. I would like to encourage the members of SEARG to reach out to the people in the countries of your attention and help support them at your capacity. These on-going challenges need cooperation rather than division and isolation.
Singapore is known for its meticulous planning and implementation processes. Take, for example, its urban planning that started more than 50 years ago. Or its politics, which carefully plans a succession timeline since 1959. Note that the city-state so far has only three prime ministers (PM): Lee Kuan Yew or LKY (1959–1990), Goh Chok Tong (1990–2004) and currently Lee Hsien Loong, LKY’s eldest son.
After being chosen by the People's Action Party (PAP) to succeed PM Lee Hsien Loong possibly next year, Deputy PM Heng Swee Keat announced last week that he was stepping aside as leader of PAP’s fourth-generation (4G) team, a rank he currently earns as "first among equals.”
DPM Heng's stepping aside is unlikely to have a major influence on diplomacy and relations with other countries though. Political observers say it should not matter who was appointed to be PM, as the PAP had repeatedly stressed that it was a collective 4G leadership that worked as a team, even though there's not enough transparency with the selection process. Some also say that even Sino-Singapore ties are also unlikely to be affected by the unexpected turn of events.
In this SEARG Scripts episode, we invited Swee Kiat “SK” Tay, a doctoral candidate in mass communication, to shed some light on this current event.
SEARG:
Hi, SK! First of all, could you give us a brief background of DPM Heng Swee Keat?
SK:
DPM Heng entered Singapore politics during the 2011 general elections and a few weeks later, was appointed to the Cabinet as the Minister of Education. In 2015, he switched portfolios and was appointed the Minister of Finance, a role he still holds today but will be relinquishing in about two weeks' time. He was appointed DPM in 2019 in anticipation of his taking over the reins as prime minister.
Prior to his entry into politics, DPM Heng served four years (1997-2001) as the principal private secretary to the late Lee Kuan Yew, the founding prime minister of Singapore. The former PM had described DPM Heng as "one of the finest minds among the civil servants I have worked with" in his book "One Man's View of the World." His intellect and competence never in question due to his excellent track record, DPM Heng was seen as a "safe pair of hands", with a more collaborative style of approach, but he was also seen to be too cautious, and lacking in stature and charisma.
SEARG:
Aside from his age, which was a major decision for his withdrawal (he’s turning 60 this year), some say his decision came at the heels of his recent setbacks. Could you elaborate more on this?
SK:
DPM Heng suffered a stroke and collapsed during a Cabinet meeting on 12 May, 2016. He was admitted to hospital and discharged six weeks later. He resumed his work duties after three months of recovery. However, citing health as a reason comes as somewhat of a surprise. Afterall, his stroke (and subsequent recovery) took place before he was chosen by the 4G team, and he had also reiterated that he "would not have taken up this appointment [as PAP's first assistant secretary-general] if I do not have the confidence that my health allows me to do it." The appointment is generally seen as a precursor to the PM succession.
There were also suggestions that DPM Heng's poor showing in the 2020 general elections could be a contributing factor. Barely two weeks before the elections, in a surprising move by the PAP, DPM Heng was moved from his homeground of Tampines GRC in the previous two elections, to East Coast GRC. The PAP team for East Coast GRC received 53.39% of the popular vote - as compared to 60.73% in the previous election in 2015. However, it's not clear whether the drop in votes percentage is a reflection of his shift, or a sign of growing resentment against the PAP in general.
SEARG:
You mentioned the 4G leaders of the PAP. How important is this group in the succession planning process? Who is also poised to take over the PM post from 4G?
SK:
The importance of the PAP's 4G team in Singapore's succession planning is without doubt - afterall, the next prime minister is slated to come from this team. The 4G team had responded that the unexpected news is a setback for their succession planning, and that they will need more time to select another leader among themselves. The 4G team has also asked PM Lee to stay on as PM until a suitable leader is chosen and ready to take over. PM Lee, who had originally planned to retire by the time he is 70, has agreed, but still plans to retire before the next general elections that will take place by 2025.
The front-runners to take over DPM Heng are all in the mid-forties to early fifties: Chan Chun Sing, 51; Lawrence Wong, 48; Ong Ye Kung, 51; and Desmond Lee, 44. They will all have a "longer runway" than DPM Heng.
SEARG:
Singapore's mass media landscape is known for being tightly controlled yet highly developed, and it seems that it would remain this way despite the transition to a new leadership. What do you foresee are the trends or movements of Singapore's mass media in the coming years?
SK:
My personal view is that there's unlikely to be many changes in the mass media landscape in Singapore. Singapore's mainstream media has been relatively stable for a long time, with the same dominant players in the industry (Singapore Press Holdings and its flagship newspaper The Straits Times, and Mediacorp with its newspaper Today, broadcaster ChannelNewsAsia, and radio news stations). Despite the growing importance of non-mainstream news websites and civilian journalism/blogs globally, these alternative channels have largely struggled in Singapore, partly due to lack of demand/readership, and partly due to actual and threats of legal lawsuits by the ruling government.
I view the mainstream media in Singapore as being more of a megaphone than a watchdog. It helps to amplify the voice and reach of the government to the people of Singapore, and this can be a really important function in times of crisis and uncertainty, such as the early independence days, and the recent Covid-19 situation. But it's much less effective as a watchdog of the government, seldom seriously calling out the government unless the issue is already bubbling over among the Singapore populace. I think this is largely due to two factors. Firstly, there are invisible out-of-bound (OB) markers in the journalism industry, making journalists afraid to step on other people's toes, especially where politics is concerned. But journalism has always worked within such OB markers, whether political, economic or social, so it's not that unusual of a situation. Secondly, I think journalism in Singapore might be in a comfort zone, where they are too used to the same way of doing things. So rather than changing the status quo, there's a lack of motivation to suddenly adopt an adversarial stance against the government - why rock the boat when you don't have to?
SEARG:
Finally, your current research broadly looks at how the media shape Singaporeans' identity and attitude towards the environment. Could you talk more about this and how it possibly relates to Singapore's political ecology?
SK:
My interest is on media psychology in a broad way, and I've been jumping from topic to topic during my studies, such as religion versus science, videogames, and environmental issues. My dissertation focuses on environmental identity and whether it can be utilized as a way to promote water conservation among people. My research doesn't really have a lot to do with politics, although water issues do have some political significance in Singapore: we've had to buy water from our neighboring countries due to our small geographical size (too small to just rely on collecting rainwater), and self-sustenance of water has always been a matter of national concern for Singapore as a way to maintain sovereignty and independence.
The panel discussion for A is for Agustin on March 19 generated a lively discussion about Agustin, the film’s main character, who viewers may perceive as not fitting the “typical mold” of an Aeta, let alone an indigenous person. It was short of saying that Agustin is not black enough, his hair not curly enough, to be considered an Aeta—the earliest inhabitants of the Philippines. One of the panel’s discussants, Sheila Zamar, illuminated this issue by drawing attendees to the larger problems of indigeneity and how non-indigenous people and sociopolitical institutions tend to control the narrative of being indigenous.
In this special issue of SEARG Scripts, we transcribe the critical insights shared to us by Sheila, who is currently a doctoral candidate at the Asian Languages and Cultures department and Filipino language teacher here at UW-Madison. SEARG’s questions below were edited for brevity, while Sheila’s answers were transcribed verbatim but slightly edited only for grammar and flow. You can watch more clips from the panel discussion by visiting this site: https://sites.google.com/wisc.edu/agustin
SEARG:
How are indigenous people identified in the Philippines?
Sheila:
In the Philippines, there’s a technical definition based on the Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act (IPRA). It’s a very specific definition: someone who belongs, by self-ascription or by others' ascription to them, to a community that has a culture that remained intact over a long period of time. They never were colonized or did not convert into a different religion. They kept most of their culture intact, and they have their own social practices, their own language, and their own cultures and expressions. So that’s how it’s defined, but of course on the ground we need to operationalize that definition. What do we look for? In reality, most people interpret that as something that they can see with their own eyes. So indigenous people have to, for example, speak a language that’s not part of the mainstream, they need to have songs and dances that are different from the mainstream Philippine cultural songs and dances. Or they need to have a different economic system. For example, for Aeta communities, often most people look for a nomadic lifestyle, or a slash-and-burn type of agriculture or economy. That’s what most people look for in indigenous communities.
Like what we saw in Grace’s film, it’s very different. For most (indigenous) people, they have no choice but to join in what’s happening around them. They have to go to school to find opportunities, they have to learn a different language, they have to interact with people who don’t necessarily share their cultural practices. They have to learn other types of cultural practices, because they’re part of the bigger community outside their own community. So it’s very hard to define what is indigenous in the Philippines.
Prior to IPRA, I think in the literature, Filipinos are all indigenous. Where did we all come from? We were right there, our ancestors have been in the Philippines for a long time. But now, indigeneity has been defined to only include people who are not part of the mainstream, not Christians, who live mostly in the mountains, who don’t participate in most social and political life in the bigger communities outside their own. That’s, I think, what people are looking for. I think we need to be aware that they (indigenous people) don’t remain constant, even if the definition requires them to sort of be a static culture, like they don’t change. But of course, that doesn’t happen. No culture in the world remains the same over time, and it’s true for these communities. It’s true for our own communities. And to expect that they need to be able to show us proof of indigeneity by performing what we imagine as part of an indigenous culture, I think, is not a realistic way of looking for indigeneity in our communities.
SEARG:
So if the scope of the definition is problematic, then proving indigeneity also then becomes problematic.
Sheila:
My problem with the “indigenous” label is that even the NCIP (National Commission on Indigenous Peoples) in the Philippines don’t really know how many indigenous communities there are in the Philippines. Proving your indigeneity is problematic in the Philippines. It’s almost like you have to perform your indigeneity in order for the government to acknowledge your membership to an indigenous community or your being indigenous.
I, for example, am a speaker of a minority language in the Philippines, but I cannot claim indigeneity because I’m Christian, I have gone to school, and so now I’m not considered indigenous. But only less than 10 percent of Philippine languages are spoken by the majority of Filipinos. One hundred seventy of the 180 languages are minority languages, so speakers of these languages belong to ethnolinguistic groups that could be considered indigenous. But they are not all “indigenous.” You have to apply or tell the government, “You have to recognize us as indigenous, and this is our ancestral domain.”
SEARG:
How would you connect A is for Agustin with your research interest on linguistic historiography and language endangerment issues in the Philippines?
Sheila:
What resonated with me most is that Agustin shares the story of many other Filipinos who belong to communities, not just the Aeta communities, not just indigenous communities, but communities that are mired in poverty. They don’t have access to education, many of them don’t finish sixth grade or don’t even go to high school. The statistics over time, since the 1960s up to the last big evaluation of the educational system, remain constant that around 30 percent don’t finish sixth grade, and less than 50 percent finish high school. That’s the reality on the ground, so Agustin’s story is not only a story of people in indigenous communities, it’s a story of people who belong to poverty-stricken communities. But of course, the achievement gap is worse in indigenous communities, because there are added burdens and barriers to them accessing services, like education, healthcare, etc.
In my own work, Agustin shows us the perfect member of the community who is actually multilingual. In the film, he speaks Tagalog, Ilocano and his own native language, Sambal. To me, it’s so beautiful that Grace captured it. He was interacting with this person who is an Ilocano speaker, who was advising him about what he should talk to his boss about and how he should deal with the community outside. In the classroom, he speaks Tagalog and with his family too, except when it's a very intimate discussion with his wife or with some family members when he would go back to Sambal. That was beautifully captured by Grace’s film, which I’ve never seen before. To me, it’s groundbreaking that it’s able to show us a real story, a face to the person that most people only see as a statistic in educational achievement gaps, in literacy percentages, and things like that.
People who are not literate are multilingual. They’re not literate in the technical sense of the word, in the old definition of literacy, but they’re highly literate in so many other things. Like he learned to play the guitar, he can join different social events, so he reads the world perfectly and literately, but he may not have access to how we read ABCs. But eventually he did.
I noticed also that Grace’s film had a frame where there’s a book that’s written in Sambal, like the story of the Aetas in Sambal. I think that’s a great frame, because it tells us that this is where we are right now. In 2016, we started the Mother Tongue-Based Multilingual Education. Now, it’s supposed to be accessible to everyone in their own native language. The idea is, in research, it shows that you can easily transfer literacy skills to other languages if you learn it in your first language. So that was a great frame for me to see there’s a book that they actually read in Sambal in their community.
On Friday, March 19, SEARG and the Filipinx-American Student Organization (FASO) will screen the movie A is for Agustin, a critically acclaimed documentary hailed as one of the best Filipino films of 2019. Eight years in the making, this film follows the life of an illiterate indigenous man in the Philippines who decides to go back to school at the age of 40.
A is for Agustin is the debut film of Grace Pimentel Simbulan, currently a graduate student here at UW-Madison. It is so rare for a professional Southeast Asian filmmaker to be affiliated not just with our university but also with SEARG. And Grace has graciously (pun intended) lent to us her film for this online screening event, which is supported by the Center for the Humanities, the School of Education’s Global Engagement Office and the Department of Asian Languages and Cultures.
In this episode of SEARG Scripts, we talk with Grace to know more about her as a filmmaker and discuss the power of films in spotlighting issues experienced by marginalized and indigenous communities, thus putting humans in the humanities.
SEARG:
How did you become interested in filmmaking?
Grace:
In college, I took up Behavioral Sciences and my brother was doing film. He involved me in a lot of his film projects. I enjoyed the process so much that I transferred to film school the following year. After film school, I started as an apprentice for editors and directors and then I worked for a while in advertising, before focusing on films. After making commercials, short films and other projects I realized that making documentaries was much more fulfilling than all the other forms and that's when I started to make more (short and mid-length documentaries) and recently, my first feature.
SEARG:
Your first feature-length film, A is for Agustin, has been critically acclaimed. This is eight years in the making, which in a sense is ethnographic in nature, as you have to immerse yourself with the indigenous community. Could you tell us briefly about how you came to know of this community, which eventually led to you documenting Agustin’s story?
Grace:
In 2011, I was commissioned by the European Union (EU) as part of their project titled “In Defense of Land and Life: Addressing Human Rights Concerns of Indigenous Peoples in Resource Conflict Areas” to produce a mid-length film documenting the impact of the entry of mining corporations in Cabangan, Zambales and examine how it affected the lives (mentally, emotionally) of the Aeta people. One of the issues I examined in the documentary was on education and so I visited the elementary school in the community where I met Agustin. When I finished the project with EU, I continued to visit Agustin’s area as I’ve developed deep ties to him and his community.
After a couple of months, the Aeta chieftain told me that the project we made about his community has somehow pressured the local government to put an end to the mining company’s operations. This news made me realize the power of media in creating movements for social impact. It also encouraged me to continue what I was filming––so much so that it took me eight years to finish it.
SEARG:
You also recently published a chapter in an edited volume that focuses on the Obo-Manobo, another tribe in the Philippines. Could you also tell us briefly about this study?
Grace:
The book is titled Indigenous Futures and Learnings Taking Place, and the contributors are Indigenous women, women of Indigenous backgrounds, Black, Red, and Brown women, and women whose scholarship is committed to Indigenous matters across spaces and times. Gioconda Coello (book editor) and Nicole Tu-Maung, who used to be with SEARG, are also contributors in this book. The book highlights how Indigenous perspectives and stories open spaces for new forms of sociality and relationships with knowledge, time, and landscapes. It argues that the “knowledge for the future” offers various points of departure to (hi)story educational futures more responsive to lives in what has not yet become.
My chapter focuses on Bo-i, an Obo-Manobo leader, and her story of resistance against private corporations and various Philippine administrations that have encroached on Obo-Manobo land threatening their past, present, and future(s). Bo-i was one of the few members of her clan who opposed bloodshed and resisted through the establishment of the cultural regeneration movement. A key part of this movement was the reincorporation of dreams and its communal interpretation as a part of Obo-Manobo community life.
SEARG:
Finally, apart from A is for Agustin, what are some films that you would highly recommend that deal with issues of indigenous communities or tribal people?
Grace:
Off the top of my head, and these are all Filipino documentary films:
Walang Rape sa Bontok (There is No Rape in Bontok, 2014) is about the search of two women, who were both victims of sexual abuse, to find a place in the Philippines where women are free from sexual assault/violence. They connect with June Prill-Brett, a renowned anthropologist, who points them towards the Cordilleras where the Bontok people have lived for a long period without a concept, nor incidence, of rape.
Sabangan (1983) is about the opposition of the Remontados of Tanay, Rizal to the construction of the Kaliwa-Kanan Dam, a project of the Marcoses funded by the World Bank.
Panicupan (2015) explores a barangay in Pikit, North Cotabato, where Moro, Lumad, and Christian settlers have established a safe space where they can all co-exist and live harmoniously amid the conflict between the government forces and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front.
SEARG:
Thank you so much, Grace, and good luck with your future projects. For those interested to watch the film on Friday, the online screening will start at 5:30 pm. A Q&A session will follow at 7:00 pm with Grace, Sheila Zamar of the Asian Languages and Cultures department, and Benito Bautista, one of the film’s co-producers. Visit the event page for more information: https://www.eventbrite.com/e/a-is-for-agustin-online-film-screening-tickets-144886217577.
As of press time, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is trying to resolve the crisis in Myanmar after Indonesia-led efforts appeared to falter. The military’s appointed foreign minister flew to Thailand on Wednesday, February 24, to discuss diplomatic efforts by ASEAN.
The country saw one of the largest protests on Monday, February 22, dubbed as the “22222 uprising.” It involved not only activists but also students, government workers and teachers. On the same day, however, teachers in Rakhine State, the epicenter of the Rohingya conflicts, were instructed to go back to work to prepare for class reopening. Most schools have been closed since early 2020, which in effect obliterated the 2020-2021 academic year.
Myanmar’s education system has lagged ever since the military ruled in 1962. Ethnic minorities were even more affected due to the policy of “Burmanisation,” which prohibited them from practicing their culture due to the imposition of the Burman way of life. In this week’s episode, we delve deeper into the interrelationship between this policy and educational outcomes among ethnic minorities. Our guest is Ei (Eve) Thin Zar, a doctoral candidate in curriculum and instruction at the School of Education.
SEARG:
Hello, Eve! Thank you for being our guest. For those who don’t know, you actually have firsthand experience in running a school. Could you tell us how it started and your motivation for doing it?
Eve:
To make the long story short, I started my boarding school because I experienced the power of education myself. Education literally provided me food, shelter, and clothing. I was convinced that if I wanted my people to have their basic needs met, then teaching would be the best profession for me. However, I could not get any teaching job in government schools, so this led me to start my own school. It was a non-profit boarding school, established in 2010 and closed in 2013. It was at a house I rented in Mawlamyine. Every year, we had about 30 students living with me. Some can pay, but some can’t. Later, I ran the school together with my former students. My students are the best things that happened in my life.
SEARG:
With the current situation right now in your country, how are schools affected?
Eve:
With the COVID situation, schools have not been opened yet, but 1% of the population who can send their children to private schools with online teaching is still continuing their education. After the February 1 military coup, most public school teachers joined the civil disobedience movement, which means they don’t want to work for the military government. However, schools might be pushed to reopen soon. This not only makes it more difficult for teachers to join the civil disobedience movement, it also makes them more at-risk from Covid infection because of lack of protective measures.
SEARG:
Your research focuses on how the education of ethnic minorities is affected by the nationalization of language due to "Burmanisation." Could you give us a brief background on this issue?
Eve:
Burma is composed of 135 officially recognized ethnic tribes belonging to eight major ethnic groups. Burman is the majority ethnic group, comprising about 70% of the population. “Burmanisation” is a term and ideology that emerged in the 1920s under British colonial rule as a form to resist Christianity, the English language, and colonial administration. After the country’s independence in 1948, Burmanisation transformed into a dominant force towards other ethnic minorities living at the borders of Burma, with the nationalization of Burmese language and education system playing a central role. In contemporary Burma, the Burman majority interprets the term “Burmanisation” as “adapting into the Burman culture”, but this is thought of as “Burman supremacy” by ethnic minorities. If language is the umbilical cord of a cultural group, then rejecting one’s language weakens identity formation and leads to further conflicts, rather than peace. My research focuses on the historical formation and transformation of Burmanisation, their manifestations in languages in the public education system, as well as the inflection in the ethnic-national education systems.
SEARG:
Finally, what advice can you give to grad students, especially those like you who are from departments where Southeast Asia is not particularly a strong area of interest but who want to pursue a very unique and focused research related to Southeast Asia?
Eve:
For now, I think, I would say just do what is meaningful for you. Every move counts, every voice counts. At least, that’s what I tell myself.
Editors: Omar Dumdum, Akarath Soukhaphon, and Philip Cerepak
As we celebrate Black History Month, the academia is again put on the spotlight for being too white and too male. On social media, Black scholars use #BlackInTheIvory to share their experiences as victims of institutional racism. We also hear similar stories of white privilege seeping in different fields — sciences, history, economics, communication, international relations, anthropology. An underlying cause seems to point to the lack of diverse representation. Last year, a group of political science grad students at UW-Madison found that their department has never employed more than one Black faculty at a given time from 1970 to 2020. Despite their liberal progressive stance, universities have not been a safe haven for conversations about race and racism.
Which brings us to the question: Is Southeast Asian studies also too white? We may not have definite answers to this. Indeed, there are theoretical strides equipping scholars to resist Western colonial ideas, as well as other types of racial privileges, that may provide condescending or romanticized views of Southeast Asia, its people, culture and arts. (Emphasis on “theoretical,” as it might just be on paper.)
One area where postcolonialism is ripe is in literary studies. In this episode, we talk with Jacqulyn Teoh, a doctoral candidate at the English department, in looking at possible links of whiteness or anti-Blackness in Southeast Asian literature. As you could infer from our conversation, and as befits the topic of literature, we leave every rhetoric to your imagination and soul.
SEARG:
Hello Jackie! Thanks so much for visiting our show. Let’s start with this mammoth of a question. "Postcolonialism" is a big term in academia that has become overused or loaded. Could you first give us a brief explanation of what postcolonialism means, and how it is used particularly in your field in literary studies?
Jackie:
You're right that "postcolonialism" is a "big" term. Some may say it's superannuated. Others insist that it still retains critical power. I'm going to leave it to someone whose career has been built on this very term to define it — watch: What is Postcolonialism.
SEARG:
So how does one use theories or concepts of postcolonialism to examine Southeast Asian literature?
Jackie:
This depends on how you define postcolonialism in the first place, and the extent to which such theories of postcolonialism are adaptable to or challenged by SEAsian literature. But what is SEAsian literature anyway?
SEARG:
Well, for one, there is of course an intersection between postcolonialism and race. What do you think is the role of "whiteness" in Southeast Asian literature, and would you say there are traces of "anti-Blackness" in this field of arts?
Jackie:
I've not come across traces of "anti-Blackness" in Southeast Asian literature. That said, the Malaysian author Tash Aw has written an NYTimes op-ed about the way Africans tend to be treated in Malaysia. You can imagine it's not pretty. I'd say watch his future work for more on this angle. Another text which comes to mind that is not so much about anti-Blackness as it is about a Black person being in SEAsia is Richard Wright's The Color Curtain, which is basically his account of his attendance at the 1955 Bandung Conference. See also Indonesian Notebook.
As for "whiteness" (I refuse to capitalize the w, sorry) — just as a starting point, take a look at Joseph Conrad's Malay-world works. I also highly recommend a delightful bizarre little novella by Balzac titled Voyage de Paris à Java. But if you're thinking more contemporary — I mean, let's think about how white-adjacent Kevin Kwan's Crazy Rich Asians enterprise is.
(Editors’ note: We agree in lowercasing the term “white” in racial, ethnic, and cultural senses.)
SEARG:
What do you think are some practical approaches for artists in general, or literary authors in particular, to address the critical issues surfaced by postcolonialism?
Jackie:
No idea; I'm definitely not an artist or an author! If this question were taken seriously, the discussion would probably circle fruitlessly around the extent to which art is political and can still be called art, etc.
SEARG:
Before we let you go, can you tell us more about what you’re working on for your dissertation?
Jackie:
My dissertation explores how the concept of the "niche" can be useful for rethinking several paradigms of transnational literary interaction, with a focus on texts about Southeast Asia and by Southeast Asian/Southeast Asian American authors.
SEARG:
Thanks, Jackie, and all the best in your dissertation!
The Philippines used to pride itself as the freest democracy in Southeast Asia. But a lot has changed since president Duterte came to power in 2016 that underlined the fragility of the country’s democratic institutions: a sitting senator was jailed, the Supreme Court chief justice was removed, a prominent journalist was found guilty of “cyberlibel,” the largest broadcast network was shut down.
The latest blow involves the University of the Philippines (UP), the country’s bastion of academic freedom and political dissent. On January 18, the Department of National Defense informed UP that it is terminating its 1989 accord that prohibits the police and military from entering UP campuses without prior notification. It said that UP is a breeding ground for terrorists, and the 1989 accord hinders the implementation of the new anti-terrorism law. UP, which was not consulted on the decision, countered that the accord could not be unilaterally terminated. All these, as the country commemorates the 50th anniversary of the “Diliman Commune,” a week-long uprising at UP’s flagship campus against the Marcos regime on February 1–9, 1971.
In this podcast, we look at this issue more carefully and discuss how this might affect even the state of higher education internationally. We sit down with Omar Dumdum, a doctoral candidate in mass communication, UP alumni and past lecturer at UP–Diliman.
SEARG:
Omar, thank you for gracing our show. First of all, why is UP being singled out?
Omar:
As the country’s national university, UP enjoys a lot of institutional privileges. It is a state university with an independent charter. It is an elite institution for scientists, artists and scholars, with highly selective student admissions. Yet, its sprawling campus in Diliman comprises not just academic buildings but also a community of neighborhoods (including informal settlers), churches, shopping mall, and its own transport system, political ward (barangay) and law enforcement group. Hence, UP is branded as the “Diliman Republic”—an independent microcosm of the Philippines.
Then there’s that 1989 accord that makes UP a safe haven for political dissenters. Before that, there was the 1981 agreement that protected UP campuses from military intrusion even during the Marcos regime. Note that Marcos was a UP alumni, so to some extent the dictator still had some bit of respect for UP.
SEARG:
What is the new anti-terror law, and how is this related to the termination of the 1989 accord?
Omar:
The anti-terrorism law signed last year is being challenged in the Supreme Court because of its many controversial provisions. Two stand out: it is unclear what forms of dissent are considered as inciting to terrorism, and suspected terrorists can be arrested without warrant by the military. Because UP is a protected space for political activism, the campus continues to host mass protests even during this current pandemic. The 1989 accord perhaps makes UP the final frontier of political opposition, and this last domino needs to fall for any form of dissent to be clamped down. And like other authoritarians, Duterte wants to especially use the military to silence UP.
SEARG:
This is clearly a national concern, but how do you think this becomes a transnational issue?
Omar:
Civil–military relations always have an international dimension, but I’d like to narrow down to its potential impact in Southeast Asian studies. UP attracts international scholars and students because of its academic reputation. This issue has a chilling effect on foreigners who want to study Philippine society, arts and sciences in UP and other Philippine universities, especially those who might have a politically critical stance. On the reverse side, top Filipino faculty and graduates might rather work abroad, further contributing to brain drain that is an ongoing concern in ASEAN. The loss of eminent scholars in the Philippines would lead to the declining quality of field data and scholarship that researchers abroad need. Thus, restricting academic freedom in the Philippines affects the productivity of Philippine studies internationally.
SEARG:
Finally, how does this issue relate to your research?
Omar:
While my primary areas are journalism and multilateral institutions, I have recently been drawn to comparative politics, particularly civil–military relations, at the prodding of my political science colleagues. We just finished a book chapter on populist leaders’ commitment problems in the militarization of “drug wars” in Latin America and Asia. It’s for a volume on democracy and security, so hopefully it goes out this year. Militarization of the police is another area I'm collaborating with PoliSci professors here and in another university. We're still in the very early stages of a very cool experiment investigating the role of religion in the Philippines' “drug war.” Hoping that it also turns out well this year.
On the sidelines of the 37th ASEAN Summit in Hanoi two weeks ago, 10 Southeast Asian countries virtually signed a pact with Australia, China, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea to form the world's largest free trade bloc. In the history of mankind. Ever. (Brace for more superlatives.)
So how big is the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP)? For one, the 15 member-countries comprise almost a third of the world's population and global economy. RCEP is also the first free-trade agreement (FTA) between powerhouses China, Japan and South Korea. While China has several bilateral trade agreements, it is the country's first multilateral trade agreement. Ever.
The RCEP is not yet immediately effective, as some countries still need to ratify it domestically. Still, the trade pact is so significant that, once effective, it would eliminate as much as 90% of import tariffs among signatories within 20 years, and create a unified rules of origin for easier movement of goods.
We know that economics hasn't been the forte of SEARG, so we are grateful to have Nguyen Dinh Tuan Vuong, our new member and doctoral student in development economics, to help us tease out the issues surrounding the RCEP.
SEARG:
Welcome to our podcast, Nguyen. Before we delve into the RCEP, please give us first some brief explainers about free-trade agreements (FTAs). Some say that there are always "winners" and "losers" in trade. Generally speaking, what types of economies benefit the most and least in FTAs?
Nguyen:
I'll start by saying that trade is not a zero-sum game, and a country has to use its comparative advantage to benefit from it as well as FTAs. In other words, its resource, namely labor force and capital, should be allocated strategically. A perfectly competitive market would do the job. Unfortunately, we are not living in a perfect world, as there are a lot of frictions that reduce the mobilities of labor and capital. The size of these frictions decides whether a country mobilizes resources to focus on its comparative advantage. Additionally, even though trade theories suggest that all countries gain from trade in terms of total welfare, there are "winners" and "losers" within a country. For instance, winners could be export-oriented industries, whereas losers are those that traditionally focus on the domestic market and now face more competition from foreign firms because of FTAs.
SEARG:
Analysts say that the RCEP will mostly benefit China geopolitically, as well as Japan and South Korea economically. How would RCEP benefit low- or middle-income ASEAN countries?
Nguyen:
ASEAN already signed separate FTAs with South Korea, Japan, and China in the 2000s, so RCEP would not have any negative impact on ASEAN countries. What RCEP does is to unify the set of regulations on ASEAN's exporting products, thus reducing a great amount of unnecessary paperwork as well as the associated cost on exporting firms. Theoretically, it shifts the supply curve in the commodity market to the right, meaning that those industries are expanding, and thus labor demand increases. Eventually, it ends up with higher employment and higher wage in the labor market.
Another thing, the rule of product origins would increase foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows to ASEAN countries. The rule requires at least 40% of a product that is produced within RCEP countries to be considered RCEP-made, which is probably the most lenient rule among major FTAs. Given that, it encourages non-RCEP firms to move part of their supply chain to RCEP countries. It creates a similar effect on the commodity market, then the labor demand increases. With the advantage of cheap labor, low- and middle-income ASEAN countries benefit from RCEP through this channel. Also, the downward movement of the supply curve in the commodity market would lead to lower prices, which benefit households in these countries.
SEARG:
India withdrew from RCEP negotiations last year over concerns of potential dumping of cheap Chinese imports and dairy products from Australia and New Zealand (ANZ). How should ASEAN countries "counter" such negative consequences?
Nguyen:
Again, ASEAN economies have already signed bilateral FTAs with China. Practically, we don't need to worry about countering such negative consequences from "cheap Chinese imports," as ASEAN economies have been doing okay in the past decade. But since China is losing its advantage of cheap labor and shifting their production to a different and upscale set of products, ASEAN economies have seem to start producing these "cheap imports."
ANZ have a relatively different set of agricultural products to ASEAN economies. Given the regular diet in Southeast Asian cultures and since the dairy industry in ASEAN economies is relatively small, an "invasion" of ANZ's dairy products should not be a concern. But the competition would be tough in the husbandry industry, as beef from Australia is cheaper. However, since we do not have a comparative advantage in raising cows, shifting our focus to other products would be more fruitful in the long term.
SEARG:
Critics point out that the RCEP lacks provisions on labor and environmental regulations. More generally, why are such regulations important in any FTA?
Nguyen:
Environmental issues and increasing income inequality are a few examples of market failure. Low-income countries are facing the trade-off between economic growth and environmental protection. With a sustainable path of economic development, a certain amount of damage to the environment is allowed. However, due to many political reasons, some governments could relax their environmental regulation in the name of economic growth, which creates a negative externality. The 2016 Vietnam marine life disaster that I studied is one typical example. Similarly, governments of poorer countries also have an incentive to alter their labor code to be less protective towards the labor force. But a good set of rules in any FTA could at least minimize these market failures. That is also the biggest contrast between RCEP and the current form of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which focused a lot more on labor rights, environmental protection, and intellectual property.
SEARG:
Finally, could you talk more about how your research intersects with all these issues?
Nguyen:
My research focuses on environmental issues and the labor market in Vietnam. Since Vietnam changed dramatically in the last three decades from a command-and-control economy, trade liberalization and FTAs are important events that have significant impacts on the environment and the labor market. A better understanding of these impacts provides a more reliable set of policy recommendations to the governments of developing countries, including Vietnam.
SEARG:
Nguyen, thank you so much for gracing us with your presence this episode. Our listeners now feel more erudite on trade and economics. For those wanting to know more about international trade, we turn you over to our correspondent who'll guide you through the alphabet soup of trade deals.
Unbeknownst to many (we just love sprinkling old English), Burma/Myanmar also held a hotly contested election this month. As of press time, the incumbent ruling party already got majority of parliamentary seats, implying that Aung San Suu Kyi would continue to be the country's de facto head. A former political prisoner and Nobel Peace Prize winner, she is now internationally disgraced for her inaction of the ongoing Rohingya genocide.
(Unbeknownst to many, Facebook had a "determining role" in the genocide. Further unbeknownst is that Burmese refugees are now the top arriving refugee group in Wisconsin.)
In this podcast, we invited Khine Thant Su, a doctoral candidate in history, to help us understand more about the recent elections in this Southeast Asian country.
SEARG:
Hello, Khine! Thank you so much for visiting us here in our fancy studio. Let's first talk about Aung San Suu Kyi. Despite international criticisms, she continues to be very popular domestically. Why is this so?
Khine:
I think there are two main reasons for Aung San Suu Kyi’s popularity in Myanmar: the predominance of the cult of personality in Burmese politics, and the relationship between a leader’s perceived moral standing and the legitimacy of their government. In addition to being the daughter of the national hero Aung San, Aung San Suu Kyi has displayed personal sacrifices through her political career such as leaving her family in England to enter the political scene in Myanmar, and choosing to remain under house arrest by the military junta for 15 years without leaving the country for good to return to her family in England. These actions humanized her and helped her gain tremendous respect and sympathy among people in Myanmar. For her supporters, she has become an antithetical figure to the oppressive and patriarchal military dictatorship.
SEARG:
The military continues to be a powerful institution, despite the dissolution of the military junta in 2011. Could you describe the military's involvement in current politics, specifically their participation in this election?
Khine:
The 2008 constitution ensures continued military dominance in managing national security ministries and military autonomy in managing its own affairs. The 2008 constitution also allows the military to control 25 percent of legislative seats, enough to prevent any constitutional changes. In the 2020 elections, the military’s participation and influence have been indirect. While not in charge of setting up polling stations (which was managed instead by the Union Election Commission), the military has created social and political instabilities that had dictated the circumstances under which the elections happened, such as canceled polling in Rakhine, Shan, and Kachin states, which resulted in disenfranchisement of many ethnic voters.
SEARG:
You mentioned about ethnic minorities not being able to vote in their areas. This does not only pertain to Muslim Rohingyas, but also ethnic Buddhists in Rakhine state, where there is an ongoing insurgency. What are the underlying reasons behind this insurgency?
Khine:
A fundamental reason behind continued conflict in the Rakhine state is the clash between the Burmese state using military force to bring ethnic areas under its control and ethnic communities seeking self-rule. Since the end of the British colonialism and establishment of national borders between Burma and East Bengal, there have been insurgencies in the Rakhine state led by Muslim separatists. In recent years, the Arakan Army (AA) has become a major threat for the Burmese government with attacks on police posts and abduction of candidates from the National League for Democracy (NLD). The Burmese government’s use of “clearance operations” in retaliation has only contributed to the instabilities in the region, leading to death and displacement of Rohingya communities who are caught in the crossfire between the Burmese military and the insurgent groups.
SEARG:
Finally, how do all of these issues intersect with your research interests?
Khine:
My research explores the ways in which Buddhist and Marxist thought have mutually constructed each other in colonial and postwar Burma (Myanmar). I look at the multiple ways to be “Buddhist” in colonial and postwar Burma and how each person’s Buddhist worldview orients them differently toward understandings of freedom and justice. Exploring the dynamic interactions between Burmese understandings of Buddhism and foreign forms of thought like Marxism, my research highlights that there does not exist a monolithic, “militant” Buddhism in Myanmar. Instead political actors in Myanmar through different historical periods have selectively referred to elements of Buddhist thought to make sense of their reality.
SEARG:
Again, thank you so much, Khine, for sharing us your knowledge. Now, let's hear from our field correspondent in Rakhine state... Oh wait, she seems to be encountering difficulties in reporting live... Sorry about that. Thanks for listening to SEARG Scripts. Until next time.
We are introducing this new section, where we imagine we have a podcast with thousands of worldwide listeners. Our show invites guests (of course, SEARG members) to help us make sense of current issues and events in Southeast Asia. In this inaugural episode, we talk about the ongoing protests in Thailand. Our guest is Sajirat "Bright" Palakarn, a first-year doctoral student in Asian Languages and Cultures.
SEARG (imagine Omar's voice):
Hello, Bright! Thank you so much for joining us in our first podcast. So our first question is: What do you think are the underlying causes of the protesters' grievances in Thailand?
Bright:
The overriding issue for the protestors in Thailand right now is the apparent hopelessness for the future and their ability to live a good life. While the problems of the patron-client system and social inequality had been a major issue in Thailand since mid-2000, COVID-19 and the obvious disregard by the military-bureaucratic-monarchic cartels made it clear to the people—and especially high school and college students—that they have to fight for their future in the streets.
SEARG:
How is this current social movement unique from, say, previous protests in Thailand?
Bright:
I would say that the targeting of the monarchy as the major source of social malaise in Thailand is a remarkable development compared to the past. Even in 1932, when the first Khana Ratsadorn revolted and instituted the constitutional monarchy, the denouncement of the monarchy never found sustained support like today’s protest. Even more remarkable is that the first people to focus their protest on the monarchy includes high school students who protested the haircut regulation.
SEARG:
Wow, that's super interesting! Are there other key insights that you think we should know from the ongoing protests?
Bright:
I mostly follow Thai media, so I cannot comment too much on the American or other news outlets. However, one thing I do not see being talked about in the United States is how economically beneficial the protests are for small street vendors. Although the protests forced giant malls and their luxury store chains to close, street food vendors and itinerant merchants—who were disproportionately impacted by COVID-19 due to the lack of capital to sustain their businesses during the lockdown—are making a lot of profits as well as supporting the protestors. They even have social network channels that disseminate news and information to the public faster than the police.
SEARG:
I'm guessing this has something to do with your interest. More generally, how are social movements related to your research?
Bright:
My research interest is on liminal space—such as highways and footpaths—and its role in shaping everyday life. My current fascination, with regards to the protest in Thailand, is how “spatial” social movements tend to characterize their grievances and goals. For instance, the major evidence for the protestors of Thailand’s status as a failed state is the dilapidated state of footpath all over Bangkok. For them, democratization and radical reforms of the monarchy-military-bureaucracy triumvirate is a necessary step for Thailand to have good footpaths.
SEARG:
That is really interesting, Bright! Unfortunately, we're running out of time. Thank you once again for being our guest this episode. For our listeners who want to know more about the ongoing Thai protests, our correspondent Tyrell Haberkorn has a recently published article in Dissent magazine, which you can read. Thank you so much for listening to SEARG Scripts.