Introduction: What are we talking about?
1. What is Philosophy of Literature? (September 3)
What distinguishes a philosophical inquiry into literature from literary criticism or literary theory? What’s the difference between philosophy of literature and philosophy in literature? Lamarque lays out the terrain. We’ll use the Carver story to introduce some of the key questions discussed in this course.
Peter Lamarque, The Philosophy of Literature, pp. 1-12 (2009)
Raymond Carver, “Cathedral” (1981)
Recommended if you haven’t taken a philosophy class before:
Helena de Bres, “The Pink Guide to Philosophy”
2. What is literature? (September 6)
Intuitively, not just any kind of writing counts as literature. But it’s difficult to define the concept in a satisfying way. Lyas argues against the view that what makes something literary is possession of a high level of implicit meaning. Davies lays out a range of other possible answers to the question.
David Davies, Aesthetics and Literature, Chapter 1: “What is Literature?” (2007)
Colin Lyas, “The Semantic Definition of Literature”, Journal of Philosophy (1969)
3. Anti-racism in Philosophy of Literature / Literature (September 10)
Both philosophy of literature and the American literary scene foreground the work of white writers. This class meeting alerts us to that fact, near the beginning of our course, so we can discuss ways to counteract it in our work together in and outside the classroom. Salesses argues that the norms governing creative writing workshops in MFA programs are biased in favor of cishet white men. De Leon and Harris report on the problem of writers of color being both under-represented and underpaid in the publishing industry.
Matthew Salesses, Craft in the Real World: Rethinking Fiction Writing and Workshopping, pp. xiii-xxiii, 3-39 (2021)
Concepcion de Leon and Elizabeth A. Harris "#PublishingPaidMe and a Day of Action Reveal Industry Reckoning", The New York Times (2020)
Knowledge
4. Knowledge of propositions (September 13)
The next couple of sections of the course discuss what the point of reading literature is / what kind(s) of value literary works might have. The first general answer concerns knowledge.
Writers, readers and critics often claim that (literary) fiction gives us access to a certain kind of truth. Given that fiction is, well, fiction, how could this be? One possibility is that fiction is a fertile source of true propositions, for instance about human nature or the human condition. Gaitskill’s reflection on Tolstoy provides an example of the kinds of propositions we might point to. Stolnitz and Currie agree that fiction might contain propositions about human psychology, but Stolnitz argues that the propositions in question are trivial and Currie argues that they’re likely to be false.
Mary Gaitskill on Anna Karenina, The Atlantic (2015)
Jerome Stolnitz, “On the Cognitive Triviality of Art”, British Journal of Aesthetics (1992)
Gregory Currie, “Let’s Pretend: Literature and the Psychology Lab”, Times Literary Supplement (2011)
5. Knowledge of “what it's like” (September 17)
Most defenders of the idea that fiction is a route to truth probably have something other than the acquisition of true beliefs in mind. Instead they’re likely to claim that novels, plays and short stories can help us “see” the world in a new way. Lamarque distinguishes three different versions of this idea. Stecker endorses it.
Peter Lamarque, The Philosophy of Literature, pp. 239-248 (2009)
Robert Stecker, “Cognitive Value of (Literary) Fiction” in Ananta Ch. Sukla (ed.), Fiction and Art: Explorations in Contemporary Theory (2015)
Robert Stecker, pp. 97-103, 105-106 of “The Aesthetic Experience of Literature and Its Cognitive Value,” in Ananta Ch. Sukla (ed.), Art and Experience (2003)
6. Fiction as Mind-training (September 20)
What if reading fiction doesn’t just feed new propositions or visions into our minds, but actually change the way our minds work? Landy argues that some works of fiction are mainly valuable, cognitively, not for their informational but for their formative function: they offer “spiritual exercises” or “training-grounds” for fine-tuning our mental capacities.
Joshua Landy, How To Do Things With Fictions, "Introduction" and "Mark" (2012)
Aesthetics and Ethics
7. Beauty and Ugliness (September 24)
Many reasons for reading literature are aesthetic: we appreciate the beauty, subtlety and virtuosity of literary works, the wonder and pleasure they provide. Riggle argues that this aesthetic value is deeply significant for our lives, by means of an analogy with food. Callard argues that art, including literature, is best at revealing not life's beauty but its ugliness, and that this is hugely important for us too.
Nick Riggle, "Aesthetic Lives: Individuality, Freedom and Community" (2022)
Agnes Callard, "Art is For Seeing Evil" (2022)
8. Does reading fiction make you a morally better person? (1) Yes! (September 27)
We clearly read literature for its aesthetic value, but might we read it for its moral value too? Nussbaum argues that literary fiction improves our capacities of moral imagination and perception, providing clarity, insight and guidance on ethical questions. Kaplan and Dovey discuss recent empirical research connecting reading fiction to increased empathy for others.
Martha Nussbaum, “Finely Aware and Richly Responsible” in Love’s Knowledge (1990)
Sarah Kaplan, “Does Reading Fiction Make You A Better Person?”, The Washington Post (2016)
Ceridwen Dovey, “Can Reading Make You Happier?”, The New Yorker (2015)
9. Does reading fiction make you a morally better person? (2) No! (October 1)
The claim that literature provides moral edification and improvement has been strongly criticized. Currie pushes back on the empirical research. Goffin and Friend argue that literature might actually make us morally worse.
Gregory Currie, “Does Great Literature Make Us Better?”, The New York Times (2013)
Kris Goffin and Stacie Friend, "Learning Implicit Biases from Fiction" (2022)
10. Is immoral literature bad as literature? (October 4)
Many literary works contain ethically abhorrent claims or assumptions. That might make them morally bad, but does it make them bad as works of art? (Do moral flaws translate into aesthetic flaws?) Gaut and Carroll answer yes, for different reasons.
Berys Gaut, “The Ethical Criticism of Art” in Jerrold Levinson (ed.), Aesthetics and Ethics: Essays at the Intersection (1998)
Noel Carroll, “Moderate Moralism Versus Moderate Autonomism”, British Journal of Aesthetics (1998)
Memoir
11. What is memoir? (October 8)
We're now moving on to a set of questions specific to particular literary genres, starting with memoir. De Bres--that's me, pals!--provides an introduction to the genre, discusses what distinguishes it from other forms of literature, and offers some reasons why writers and readers value it. Chee's personal essay about race and drag offers an example.
Helena de Bres, Artful Truths: pp. 1-14 of Chapter 1 (“What is Memoir?”) and pp. 177-188 of Chapter 5 ("Why Write a Memoir?"
Alexander Chee, "Girl" (2015)
12. No Class (October 11)
I'll be at a workshop in Vienna. Watch the Polley documentary on your own time: it raises a bunch of questions about truth in memoir that we'll be discussing in our next few classes.
Sarah Polley, Stories We Tell (2012)
13. Is memoir really just fiction? (October 18)
Some have argued that because there's no such thing as a unified and stable self to write about, or because memory is highly fallible, or because all narratives are constructions, memoir is really just another branch of fiction. De Bres defends memoirists against these charges.
Helena de Bres, Artful Truths: Chapter 2 (“Is All Memoir Really Fiction?”)
14. Should memoirists aim to tell the truth? (October 22)
If memoir is different from fiction, that’ll be because it succeeds at making true rather than false claims about the self and the world. But what kind of truth are we talking about here and why should a memoirist aim for it? De Bres offers some answers to those questions. D’Agata and Fingal document the detailed fact checking that precedes the publication of a piece of contemporary creative nonfiction and argue over its merits.
Helena de Bres, Artful Truths: Chapter 3 (“Should Memoirists Aim to Tell the Truth?”)
John D’Agata and Jim Fingal, The Lifespan of A Fact (2012), pp. 103-123
—note: No need to read all of this one in detail: if you're pressed for time, just skim the comments that D’Agata and Fingal have inserted in the margins, to get a general sense of what’s going on in the book.
15. The ethics of writing about real people (October 25)
It’s almost impossible to write memoir without including sensitive personal material about one’s family, friends, lovers, colleagues or acquaintances. This raises the possibility of wrongfully injuring others by writing about them. De Bres discusses how duties of avoiding harm, protecting privacy and not exploiting others might apply here. Doty's personal essay narrates how he negotiated these questions during the writing and publication of his own memoir.
Helena de Bres, Artful Truths: pp. 105-140 of Chapter 4 “What Do Memoirists Owe the People They Write About?”
Mark Doty, "Return to Sender", in The Touchstone Anthology of Creative Nonfiction (2005)
Fiction
16. Do fictional characters exist? (November 1)
Certain claims about fictional characters seem true ("Wilbur is a pig") and others false ("Romeo is a Capulet"). This suggests that fictional characters are, in some sense, real. But wait—surely not?! Lamarque discusses attempts to resolve this and related puzzles. Whether or not fictional characters are real, should we avoid treating them as such when doing literary criticism? Moi discusses the history of this scholarly taboo and questions it.
Peter Lamarque, The Philosophy of Literature, pp. 186-196 (2009)
Toril Moi, "Real Characters: Literary Criticism and the Existential Turn", The Point (2020)
17. Do emotional responses to fiction make sense? (November 5)
We know when reading a work of fiction that the people depicted in it have never existed, at least in the everyday sense that we do. And yet we experience strong emotions in response to those people and their “lives”, emotions that only seem to make sense on the assumption that the people in question do or did once exist, just like us. Radford argues that this phenomenon points to a deep irrationality in readers. Walton tries to absolve us by arguing that we don’t experience actual emotions, but only “quasi-emotions” when reading fiction.
Colin Radford, “How Can We Be Moved by the Fate of Anna Karenina?”, Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume (1975)
Kendall Walton, “Fearing Fictionality” from Mimesis as Make-Believe (1990)
18. Philosophy of/in genre fiction (November 8)
Philosophers tend to focus on critically acclaimed literary fiction when making their arguments about literature. But works of "genre fiction" (such as sci-fi, fantasy, crime, horror, romance, graphic novels/memoir and YA) can be philosophically rich too, and it's pretty snobby to ignore them. This class aims to give some of these popular genres the philosophical credit they deserve.
Ross P. Cameron, "Improve your thought experiments overnight with speculative fiction!", Midwest Studies in Philosophy (2015)
“Introduction”, Peter R. Costello (ed.), Philosophy in Children’s Literature, xiii-xix (2012)
Claudia Mills, "Slave Morality in The Rainbow Fish", in Peter R. Costello (ed.), Philosophy in Children’s Literature (2012)
Optional resource: Eric Schwitzgebel, "Philosophers' Science Fiction": an annotated list of recommendations by contemporary philosophers of philosophically rich sci-fi stories
19. The ethics of writing for/as others (November 12)
Is it morally problematic for a non-minority novelist to write from the perspective of members of minority groups? Oluo offers a set of arguments against cultural appropriation in general. Young and Haley argue that, although some such concerns are appropriate, others are misplaced. Menkedick discusses the recent controversy over white author Jeanine Cummin's novel American Dirt, which many have criticized for its portrayal of Mexicans.
Ijeoma Oluo, So You Want to Talk About Race, pp. 142-152 (2019)
James O. Young and Susan Haley, “Nothing Comes from Nowhere: Reflections on Cultural Appropriation as the Representation of Other Cultures” in The Ethics of Cultural Appropriation (2009)
Sarah Menkedick, "American Dirt: A Bridge to Nowhere", Longreads (2020)
Poetry
20. Philosophy of/in Poetry (November 15)
Most work in the philosophy of literature has discussed fiction (in particular, novels). However, in the past decade, several philosophers have turned their attention to poetry, which Gibson calls the “last great unexplored frontier in contemporary analytic aesthetics.” Lamarque critiques the idea that the sort of abstract thought we associate with philosophy is somehow antithetical to poetry. Koethe, who is both a well-known philosopher and a well-known poet, discusses the different ways in which the notion of truth figures in his two vocations.
John Gibson, “Introduction”, in John Gibson (ed.), The Philosophy of Poetry (2015)
Peter Lamarque, “Poetry and Abstract Thought”, Midwest Studies in Philosophy (2009)
John Koethe, “Poetry and Truth”, Midwest Studies in Philosophy (2009)
Literary Criticism
21. Anti-intentionalism (November 19)
Philosophers of literature don't just discuss literary works, but also the practice of literary criticism. One big debate here is about the role of authors' intentions in interpreting or evaluating their work. Wimsatt and Beardsley’s highly influential article claims that is isn't appropriate to appeal to authorial intention when doing literary criticism.
Peter Lamarque, The Philosophy of Literature, pp. 115-122 (2009)
W.K. Wimsatt Jr. and Monroe C. Beardsley, “The Intentional Fallacy”, The Sewanee Review (1946)
22. Intentionalism (November 22)
Although anti-intentionalism became the standard view in literary criticism after Wimsatt and Beardsley’s article, philosophers have had their doubts. Lamarque lays out some of the key responses. Carroll argues that anti-intentionalism is inconsistent with the communicative aims of art.
Peter Lamarque, The Philosophy of Literature, pp. 122-130 (2009)
Noel Carroll, “Art, Intention and Conversation” in Gary Iseminger (ed.), Intention and Interpretation (1992)
23. Monism vs. Pluralism (November 26)
Monists argue that there is one and only one correct interpretation of a literary work; pluralists argue that there are several. Pettersson argues that you can agree that literary criticism aims at establishing objective facts while denying that monism is true.
Peter Lamarque, The Philosophy of Literature, pp. 160-168 (2009)
Torsten Pettersson, “The Literary Work as a Pliable Entity: Combining Realism and Pluralism” in Michael Krausz (ed.), Is There A Single Right Interpretation? (2002)
24. Are some books better than others? (December 3)
Literary critics—and readers in general—often make value judgments, attributing merits and flaws to the works they discuss and comparing works favorably or unfavorably to others. Is there any objective basis for these claims? Carey argues that all literary evaluations are purely subjective: there is no genuine difference in aesthetic value between, say, Harry Potter and A la Récherche du Temps Perdu. Conolly disagrees.
John Carey, “Is ‘high’ art superior?” in What Good Are The Arts? (2006)
Oliver Conolly, “Are literary judgments subjective?”, Prospect Magazine (2016)
Philosophy as Literature
25. Does philosophy count as literature? (December 6)
While some historical philosophers have written with style and panache, most of us wouldn’t consider contemporary philosophical articles instances of literature, understood as art. But is there a principled distinction between the two? Holt argues that even the more technical branches of philosophy can count as literature. Jenkins argues that the attempt to cleanly demarcate philosophy from literature is often grounded in sexist assumptions. Lang argues that we should take the literary features of philosophical writing more seriously than we tend to: a philosopher’s writing style has philosophical significance.
Jim Holt, “Is Philosophy Literature?”, The New York Times (2012)
Carrie Jenkins, "Do gender norms enforce a divide between literature and philosophy?", The New Statesman (2021)
Berel Lang, "Literary Philosophy: The Anatomy of Philosophical Style", Colby Quarterly (1988)
Conclusion: What have we been talking about?
26. Summing up (December 10)