"Sanctions in directed trade networks " (with S. Joshi, A. Mahmud and S. Sarangi) Review of International Economics
In a post land reform environment, violence and redistribution are substitutes for an opportunistic incumbent attempting industrialization. We setup a theoretical model to explore this relationship for individual and group level violence across two types of policy driven post land-reform industrialization (PLRI) --- small and large-scale, in the Indian state of West Bengal. We find strong evidence for our theoretical prediction of an inverse relationship between land redistribution and both types of violence during the period of small scale industrialization after an industrial policy was announced in 1994-95 by the incumbent. This relationship however breaks down for individual level violence during attempts at large-scale industrialization between 2006-2011, even though both types of violence increase in this phase.
An online platform generates per-user revenue through two plans --- advertisements from a generic basic plan, and subscription fees from an exclusive premium plan --- the latter being higher. The utility of an user from either plan depends on whether other users they are connected with in their social network, are also using the same plan. A social connection from user a to b reflects b's influence on a and alternatively, a's susceptibility towards b. Given this directional feature of social connections, the platform endogenously chooses exclusive content to attract users on the premium plan by leveraging on users' social network information. We find exclusive content rises (falls) with user's influence (susceptibility) in their network. Influence and susceptibility are shown to induce conformity effects to push users to basic or premium plan depending on the specific feature of the social network like symmetry and regularity.