Research

Publications:

"Sanctions in directed trade networks " (with S. Joshi, A. Mahmud and S. Sarangi) Review of International Economics 

 Working Papers:


Spatial media competition under multi-homing (Job Market Paper) under review

 This article characterizes a reader-perception measure of a media outlet’s report based on its investment and spinning choices to acquire and reveal information respectively. The measure highlights perception differences between single and multi-homing readers (who read multiple outlets’ reports) and shows multi-homer’s perception varies with the sequence of reading reports. These results help analyze how two spatially competing outlets report a state under multi-homing. Under certain states, the proportion of multi-homers and their sequence of reading reports encourage outlets towards preemptive investment and increased spin. In other states, outlets become more cautious to not acquire or reveal unfavorable information.


Land-redistribution and coercive violence (with Rohan Gudibande and Vatsalya Srivastava) under review link 

In a post land reform environment, violence and redistribution are substitutes for an opportunistic incumbent attempting industrialization. We setup a theoretical model to explore this relationship for individual and group level violence across two types of policy driven post land-reform industrialization (PLRI) --- small and large-scale, in the Indian state of West Bengal. We find strong evidence for our theoretical prediction of an inverse relationship between land redistribution and both types of violence during the period of small scale industrialization after an industrial policy was announced in 1994-95 by the incumbent. This relationship however breaks down for individual level violence during attempts at large-scale industrialization between 2006-2011, even though both types of violence increase in this phase.


Optimal segregation in an online platform (with Ratul Das Chaudhury) (link) 

An online platform generates per-user revenue through two plans --- advertisements from a generic basic plan and subscription from an exclusive premium plan --- the latter being higher. The platform endogenously chooses exclusive content to attract users on the premium plan by leveraging social network information where users' utility rise if they are on the same plan as their neighbors. We find exclusive content rises (falls) with user's influence (susceptibility) in their network. Influence and susceptibility are shown to induce conformity effects to push users to basic or premium plan depending on the network's symmetry and regularity. 


Monopoly pricing under wishful thinking (draft coming soon)

This paper examines a monopoly pricing model over two periods in presence of buyers who repeat purchase and are Wishful Thinkers(WT). It is shown that the presence of buyers who are WT, the monopolist engages in more extreme first and second period pricing than when buyers are not WT. I further compare this outcome when the economy consists of:  (i) naïve buyers (who separately maximize each period payoff) (ii) sophisticated buyers (maximize two period discounted payoff) (iii) both naïve and sophisticated buyers (iv) a monopolist who is WT.

 Work in progress:

A model of crime reporting in Post-Schengen Geneva (with Rohan Gudibande)