I am working as a Senior Lecturer in the Faculty of Business and Law at the University of Northampton. In 2019, I also achieved the Associate Fellowship of the Higher Education Academy (commended application). I am currently working towards the full Fellowship.
I have taught the following modules,
Introduction to Economics for Business
Behavioral Economics
Game Theory
Quantitative Economics
Mathematical Methods in Economics
Methods of Economic Analysis
Advanced Applied Microeconomics
Economic Dissertation
Analysing Real-World Economic Statistics (Using R)
Research Papers
An Experimental Study on the Role of Social Norms For Tax Compliance (JMP)
Incentives for whistle-blowing: An Experiment
Abstract: We conducted a lab experiment to evaluate the effectiveness of financial rewards in increasing whistle-blowing of corrupt activities. Our experiment consists of a variant of the dictator game, a bribery game and a post-experiment questionnaire. Corruption, in our experiment, arises when a participant in the role of a public official asks a citizen to pay a bribe. The citizen can refuse the bribe, pay the bribe, or pay the bribe and report it. Reporting is costly and citizen is rewarded if the official’s guilt gets established. It is also possible for the citizen to report the official even if no bribe was asked. Hence, our design allows for false reporting. The results from our experiment have shown that the underlying judicial environment influences the impact of financial rewards on bribe incidence and whistle-blowing. The percentage of officials who ask for a bribe, as well as the average bribe asked, is higher under low judicial accuracy than under high judicial accuracy. We find a significant decrease in false reporting by citizens under a higher evidence threshold. Whistle-blowing is optimal when a high evidence threshold is accompanied by improved judicial accuracy.
Diverse Committees (with Friederike Mengel and Niall Hughes)
Abstract: We investigate the potential of diversity to influence committee decision-making. We present a model in which committee members receive private information on the state of the world, deliberate and vote. Committee members belong to one of two groups which may differ along two dimensions: (a) their preferences and (b) their information structures. Diverse committees are optimal when information structures are correlated within groups. At the same time, homogeneous committees make fewer mistakes when there is no informational correlation within groups, but there is heterogeneity of preferences across groups. We test the model’s key predictions in a laboratory experiment. The model’s predictions are largely borne out - diverse committees outperform homogeneous committees when information structures are correlated. This occurs despite subjects revealing more information than theory predicts and updating imperfectly.
I have also worked as a referee for the following journals,
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization (JEBO)
European Economic Review (EER)