RESEARCH

PUBLICATIONS

Debtor Income Manipulation in Consumer Credit Contracts (with Slava Mikhed, Sahil Raina, Barry Scholnick)

Journal of Financial Economics, 2024.

- We show that forcing insolvent consumer debtors to repay a larger fraction of debt causes them to strategically manipulate the data they report to creditors.

PAPERS UNDER REVIEW

Do Saving Tax Incentives Work? Evidence from Home Equity Accumulation and Consumption Responses (with Sumit Agarwal, Souphala Chomsisengphet, Pulak Ghosh, Tianyue Ruan and Changcheng Song)

Revise and Resubmit under Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis

Cumulative consumption

- Using high-frequency transaction data in India, We find that income tax incentive increases voluntary saving (i.e. home equity accumulation) through reduction in consumption. Our estimates imply that 34-68% of additional voluntary savings through home equity accumulation are funded by reductions in consumption.

When the Opportunity Presents: Female Labor Reaction to Gender Quota on Boards (with Jing Li)

Revise and Resubmit under Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis

- California’s board gender quota increased women’s investment in leadership-oriented human capital, particularly MBA enrollment, suggesting that affirmative action can help expand the pipeline of future female corporate leaders.

MBA enrollment rate

MBA enrollment

WORKING PAPERS

Changing Gender Norms through Financial Incentives: Evidence from Female Homeownership in India (with Sumit Agarwal, Abhiman Das, Pulak Ghosh and Anand Srinivasan)

- We find that a nudge of 5 basis point concession on interest rate increase female mortgage borrower by 25% in India within one year. Our study suggests that a nudge can enhance women’s financial bargaining power and the quality of household's financial decision-making.

Percentage of female mortgage loans

Percentage of loans with missing repayment
during COVID-19 moratorium period

The Labor Market Consequences of an Increased Default Penalty (with Sumit Agarwal, Vyacheslav Mikhed, Sahil Raina and Barry Scholnick)

- We find that higher default penalties reduce default hazards by 11%. To avoid default, debtors trade off job match quality for reduced unemployment risk.

Default rate

Number of jobs

Average wage earnings

Overweighting Product Quality Information from a Single Unrepresentattive Peer (with Sumit Agarwal, Souphala Chomsisengphet, Sahil Raina and Barry Scholnick)

-We find that consumers reduce durable good consumption of a brand after the peer has had a negative quality experience with that brand.

Consumption of claimed brand

Treatment effect by distance to affected region

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