Research

Publications

• Reciprocity and the tragedies of maintaining and providing the commons: a replication and an extension to income inequality (With Michalis Drouvelis) Economic Inquiry (2025). [Link] 

Abstract: Social cooperation often requires individuals to exhibit restraint for the greater good, incurring costs for maintaining public goods or establishing them through generosity. Will cooperative behaviors differ between maintenance and provision dilemmas? We replicate findings showing that low cooperation is more likely in maintenance than provision scenarios among a non-student sample with reciprocity being the main reason behind cooperative differences. A separate experiment reports similar effects in the case of income inequality, also suggesting dilemma-specific reciprocity is vital in averting the 'tragedy of the commons'. Our findings reinforce and broaden previous conclusions in the literature. 

• Luck-based versus merit-based income shifts fairness perceptions and promotes cooperation in a public goods game  (With Michalis Drouvelis, Conditionally accepted at Oxford Economic Papers).

Abstract: We experimentally study the impact of merit- and luck-based inequalities on cooperative behaviour and fairness perceptions. Using a sample from non-student populations (N=542), we examine behaviour in one-shot public good games in treatments where individuals’ income is randomly allocated (“Luck”) or performance dependent (“Merit”). In line with our theoretical framework, we find that groups with merit-based inequality contribute less to the public goods than groups with luck-based inequality. To explore the underlying mechanism, we elicit fairness judgments from the perspective of a neutral, uninvolved arbitrator. Individuals in groups with merit-based inequality perceive it fairer to cooperate less, and these fairness perceptions account for their lower contributions. The effect on cooperation and fairness perceptions is driven primarily by rich individuals in merit-based societies. Our findings provide causal evidence that the source of inequality shapes cooperation through perceived fairness, with important implications for policy making targeted at promoting public good contributions.

Working Papers

• Transparency and whistleblowing in public goods provision with rent-extracting administrators (With Michalis Drouvelis and Johannes Lohse, JMP). [Link]

 Abstract: This paper investigates how transparency and whistleblowing influence public goods provision in the presence of administrators who may engage in rent extraction. Using a repeated public trust game experiment, we find that both institutions increase voluntary contributions by approximately 40% compared to a baseline where contributors cannot distinguish between rent extraction and low contributions. However, they operate through distinct behavioural channels. Transparency reduces the roundwise decline of contributions, while whistleblowing triggers an early boost in contributions. To distinguish these mechanisms, we estimate a structural panel vector autoregressive model (PVAR). Results from this model confirm that whistleblowing operates predominantly through an assurance mechanism, with little evidence of deterrence, as actual whistleblowing occurs infrequently and administrators’ rent extraction is largely unaffected. Our results highlight that whistleblowing, despite being costly, can be an effective substitute for full transparency, especially when full transparency is difficult or costly to implement. 

• Income inequality, group identification in public good games (With Michalis Drouvelis).

• The effect of induced emotion on leading-by-example (With Michalis Drouvelis). [Link] (R&R)

• Intelligence and the dynamics of free riding in public good experiments (With Michalis Drouvelis and Rati Mekvabishvili) 

Working in Progress

• Cooperation and income inequality: a cross-cultural experiment   (With Michalis Drouvelis) Writing-up stage.

• Dishonesty across non-WEIRD societies (With Michalis Drouvelis) Writing-up stage.

• Voices over facts (With Michalis Drouvelis and Francesco Maria Esposito).