Research 

Why do we regulate accounting methods? If a common method introduces a "one-size-fits-all" problem, is it socially optimal to mandate a common method, rather than let firms choose their own preferred methods? 


Information asymmetry among short-horizon investors can reduce the price's ability to aggregate private information and lead to multiple equilibria. Can public information change this? 


Prior research shows that the feedback effect (Edmans et al. 2015) has an asymmetric effect on traders' incentives and refrains them from trading on bad news. Can we design firms' reporting policies to improve price informativeness and investment efficiency? Our analysis provides an alternative economic explanation for asymmetric timeliness in accounting disclosure.


Does recognition as part of net income matter? We build a parsimonious model to study the market's reaction and firm's investment in financial assets when some investors are inattentive. We also test our predictions with a recent accounting rule change. 


How will a manager design the reporting system if investors can later acquire costly information? 


“Strategic Disclosure and Investor Loss Aversion”, with Chloe Xie and Joseph Piotroski

Transparency is a hotly debated issue in banking. And yet, whether depositors – banks’ most important claim holders – are affected by transparency is an open empirical question. This study addresses this question. 


Depositors’ withdrawal decisions are not driven purely by fundamentals but reflect an element of panic. We study how liquidity mismatch makes uninsured deposit flows more sensitive to banks' performance - and this effect is more pronounced when the aggregate conditions in the banking system deteriorate.