My Views

Metaphysics

Overall, my views remain the same, but I look for more complexity and counter-argumentation. Also I became a stronger metaphysical capitalist and now i don't limit it to just competition of objects

I derive from the critique of hegel's view that the Being is a genus for all existing things. I believe in ontological pluraliеy (there's no proof thewt beings have the same nature, they jsut share the concept of being; also we ca't distinguish the being as concept (BAC) and existence, BAC-for-us or any other pimray properties of an object), which means that there's an infinite number of BACs. Still I am a monist, because I think everything has a form of intensivity/energy/suffering

Also I believe that no kind of intelligence may cognise the world since it's incognisable. Also I argue that the problem is not in antropocentrism but in athropogenicism, because anthropocetrism is inevitable due to our human intelligence while anthropogenicism is overcomeable with finding proper other which is not constituted by the relation to Human (good ideas are Hamilton Grant's nature and Marion's Saturated Phenomena which is non-anthropogenic).

Traditiology

It's really close to process philosophy, but due to several differences I call it different

My main intuition is that everything that exists can be divided into traditions that constitute time. Any repeated action, any being relates to one tradition or another. When I climb the stairs, I, as the tradition-to-be and the tradition-to-be-myself, perform the tradition-of-moving and the tradition-of-climbing. All traditions are emergent, but, like concepts in Deleuzian metaphilosophy, they are infinitely divisible. The tradition-to-be consists of many traditions-to-be-X, the tradition-to-be-X consists of many other traditions, and so on. We cannot say that traditions are stable. Traditions are mutable both phenomenally and noumenally. For example, the tradition-to-be-me was different and has changed since I was five years old.

The mutability of traditions lies in their adaptation to a competitive environment. Traditions compete with each other for the right to actual existence - this is manifested in evolutionary processes in nature (species competition), among competing ideas and ideologists, in the marketplace. In the non-biological world, competition is latent, as visible agency is less: one could stretch an example of winds or gases striving to occupy space. In history, people, countries, cultures, and traditions themselves compete with each other. The competition of traditions drives mutability - if I had grown up differently, it would mean that among virtual traditions, another tradition won the competition for actualization.

The united tradition - Tradition - constitutes a world will (that means Blockchain = Tradition = World Will). Here I develop ideas from the traditionalist school, which perceived Tradition exclusively socially. Expanding on this idea, I propose to explore not only the traditions of ancient societies but the entirety of history as well. By tracing changes in traditions, we can, firstly, identify those that are most effective and desirable for the market, and secondly, gain a rough understanding of what Tradition represents. For examle, the ancient Greeks had a cyclical idea of time - it was associated with agricultural cycles, whereas with the advent of Christianity, time began to be perceived linearly. The tradition of time perception has changed.

Remark: The Nominalist understanding of Tradition

Another important note: traditions are not universals. Each tradition pertains exclusively to a species rather than a genus. Since traditions are mutable, we cannot assert a stable structure, only how they differ from other traditions. Thus, I borrow Deleuzian understanding of repetition as repetition of difference without falling into hard Platonist realism. The tradition-to-be-X is singular, although it may be a component of another tradition, it is self-sufficient and does not require some higher universal for its manifestation.

Pessimist Monism

Concept Of Suffering

So, I have found that among most of those who read my page, there is an absolute misunderstanding of the concept of suffering in philosophy. I will need to bring some clarity to my understanding of this issue.

I will begin by explaining Kierkegaard's philosophy, from which I derive the inevitability of suffering. Kierkegaard, being a precursor of existentialism, was the first to raise the question of human choice, in connection with which he introduced the concept of Angst (anxiety) - a state of uncertainty before making a choice. He also points out that any choice made leads to regret about that choice; regret is inevitable (though it may be unconscious). Where does Kierkegaard derive the problem of choice? His main philosophical opponents were Feuerbach and hegelian dialectics. Instead of resolving contradictions through synthesis, which subsequently leads to totality, Kierkegaard resolves contradictions by choosing one of the opposites, which then leads to individuality. Moving on to my views, I continue and assert that any action is a choice because, firstly, it allows for the introduction of an egalitarian ontology where each thing (not only anthropomorphisms) is an agent, and secondly, because an act is a choice between performing or not performing the act (determinism does not deny the possibility of an act but merely predetermines its result. Free will is still absent; it is merely felt and brings suffering). In this context, I consider suffering as both Angst before making a choice and regret afterward.

The second important point is the ancient perception of suffering as a direct consequence of matter. It has turned out that many do not realize that suffering includes not only agony, loss of close ones, and other traumatic experiences but also minor pains or discomforts, whether it be back pain, a canceled concert of a favorite band, or a cut finger while cooking a salad. If this is not obvious, I hope this clarification will bring clarity to my ideas. For the Greeks, the meaning of life was happiness, and happiness consisted in the absence of suffering, i.e., in soft hedonism (Epicurus). It is suffering that causes the absence of happiness. It is materiality that enables suffering. The word "possibility" contains a second interpretation of suffering. For me, as a Landian (and somewhat Deleuzoguattarian and Scottist), the virtual (potential) is as real as the actual. That is, possible suffering is also suffering inherent to the same agent.

Appendix: Shopenhauer's suffering

I will briefly outline Schopenhauer's concept, which I also support, but whose explanation will no longer affect readers' understanding of the concept of suffering. Schopenhauer believes that we are constantly faced with needs, from the dissatisfaction of which we suffer. Furthermore, if we satisfy all our needs, we will begin to suffer again—from boredom. Thus, suffering is inevitable. Moreover, for Schopenhauer, suffering is positive (see: Based on morality), it is something that is supposed, not a position of lack of pleasure, not something that denies. This allows me to interpret suffering as an object and also as an energy, which will be discussed later.

Blockchain Prison

The Landian analogy of the noumenon with blockchain, presented in his unfinished book "CryptoCurrent" (which I studied through Vincent Le's research), represents a systematic development of his idea of the OGU and capitalism as noumenon. Since every acquired Bitcoin is recorded or hashed in the blockchain, counterfeit copies are automatically excluded from circulation. The blockchain is divided into numerous databases. Bitcoin is a protocol for solving the problem of how to determine whether a transaction is real or a fraudulent duplicate by applying a global ledger called the blockchain, which records every transaction with Bitcoin. The blockchain serves as a medium that contains information about reality, while human perceptions are merely parodies, fraudulent operations. Thus, counterfeit copies of Bitcoin are phenomena, representations, or simply possible objects of experience. One cannot transcend the blockchain; the records within it are fundamental yet unknown laws.

In addition to the metaphysical and epistemological aspects, I propose an existential-causal interpretation of the blockchain analogy. As I advocate for tradition-based monism, the noumenon-blockchain plays a role not only as a notebook but also as an integral part of being. Outside the blockchain, there is no existence; the blockchain is a prison, and outside its control, there is no existence. You either comply or do not exist; you either act according to causal dictates or still comply because we have no choice. It is impossible to escape this prison: even the blockchain itself is imprisoned as a prisoner that has built its own prison, invented rules for itself, and follows them.

Everything will Worsen if it can

The law of cause and effect operating within the prison points to linear hard determinism. If we take Schopenhauer's proof, there can never be free will, as unconditioned and uncaused (free) action is impossible: it does not comply with the prison, does not operate under the law of cause, and therefore is not allowed to exist. Of all possible outcomes, the blockchain selects the worst one, with the greatest quantitative suffering. It has no teleological purpose, only mechanistic movement toward pain and suffering. We live in the worst of all worlds.

Now it is worth considering several arguments that suggest that the world is indeed the worst, rather than any other.

Ontological argument: any existing law is unfavorable to us as it creates additional limitations. The tradition of matter exists and restricts, causing suffering. If the outcome were better, there would be neither matter nor anything at all. The existence of existence proves the sadomasochism of the blockchain.
Existential argument: we can never be sure that an alternative would be any better. However, such reflections come to us only post factum. In other words, even if we choose an option that turns out to be bad, we only later think that another choice would have been better. We are initially subjected to a discipline of suffering, and only after suffering do we contemplate that we might not have had to submit to it.
Argument from ignorance: we do not know what is truly worse: being or non-being. But we are and will be. From the existential argument, it follows that our choice to exist is the worst one, and we regret it only post factum.
Epistemological argument: it is harder to conceive of extinction than to conceive of utopia. In short, we cannot conceive of extinction because there is no consciousness to perceive extinction in extinction. Utopia can be easily imagined because human consciousness exists within it. If we were to push against the limits of good, it would be harder to imagine something better. However, it’s harder to imagine something worse, so we are at the maximum of bad.

Actually all these arguments are not really convincing, so my position is quite axiological, but let's assume you believe me here

Actual and General Suffering

Suffering is expressed in action, process, and change, but it is stored as energy in existence itself. This position transforms the views of Giovanni Gentile, which I found in his "Foundations of The Philosophy of Law" There, he pointed out that good and evil manifest during the performance of actions not merely as evaluations but as objective things. I believe that good and evil are subjective, but suffering exists objectively. Moral evaluations are subjective and depend on sociality, customs, circumstances, and, of course, personal axiology. The concept of suffering, unlike the subjective and anthropocentric notions of good and evil, arises from the discipline of the blockchain, and the objectivity of suffering explains why everything is heading toward the worse even at a mundane level, to which the blockchain seems indifferent.

In action, both the agent and the object suffer. The object suffers from changes, while the agent suffers from the transmission of suffering. Pleasure is the absence of suffering, but, as has been concluded, suffering cannot be absent. Where does it go? It does not disappear; it accumulates and is postponed: we absorb suffering from other agents and do not transmit it to others in order to feel it. By experiencing pleasure, we postpone suffering, which returns to us and is felt even more intensely in the form of emptiness, frustration, and fatigue. Various addictive substances provide a dopamine spike and then cause suffering when the dopamine runs out. Let’s briefly touch on Georges Bataille's economy of expenditure. I consider expenditure not in terms of pleasure but in terms of suffering: constant expenditure does not bring pleasure (which explains the rise of depression in the hedonistic capitalist world of consumption); it exists only to minimize the retention of suffering within oneself, to act continuously. Bataille explains the necessity of expenditure by stating that excessive accumulation creates excessive pressure on the earth. In our case, excessive accumulation of suffering that occurs during the pursuit of pleasure increases the pressure of suffering that overwhelms the agent, who is often unaware of it. Here, I can even criticize consumerist anthropocentric capitalism (placing it in opposition to the metaphysical) for its focus on pleasure. In my interpretation, My-Bataille constructs an economy of expenditure with the goal of distributing suffering so as not to accumulate it in pleasure. In the epistemological argument from the previous paragraph, there are certain intuitions regarding the objectivity of suffering. If there exists a utopia of eternal happiness, then suffering accumulates continuously without being released outward. Sooner or later, such a utopia will burst and spill all its suffering out because it will no longer be able to postpone the perception of suffering.

Eternal Cycle

Suffering is eternal and there's no escape. Even with non-linear time

WIP

Increasing suffering

Kierkegaardian Dialectic

Any existence, even conceptual or immaterial, has inherent suffering as an integral part of existence itself. Any existing thing has an internal conflict between its individual formal expression and a single community in Tradition and tradition-to-exist. Individual formality does not seem to be an equal part of the world will (Tradition), but it is. This is one of the contradictions and confrontations that lead to suffering, according to Kierkegaard: the confrontation between individuality and community. However, while Kierkegaard did not consolidate unity for them and considered existence within the framework of a community impossible, in this metaphysics, individuality is associated with an ontological community and is an integral part of it. This means that individual existence cannot be completely separated from collective experience; they are interconnected and interdependent. Kierkegaard removed contradictions by choosing one of the parties, but in our system, choice is impossible, therefore, it is impossible to stop one's suffering. Another Kierkegaardian paradox - the opposition of subjective truth to objective truth - is also impossible, since we are in a blockchain prison, in which, despite the difference in subjective registers (As for subjective registers, I remove relativism from Foucault and turn him into an epistepolitical realist). No one cares about the truth set by reality, for society, only the chosen truth is important, the conditions of which are set by themselves., there is a fundamental list of oppressive truths set by reality.

This conflict is exacerbated for self-conscious beings, who fall into another paradox: they are self-conscious, while the world will is irrational and unknowable. This confrontation allows conscious beings to be aware of their suffering. An example is people's habit of remembering lot of the bad and remembering little of the good. Indeed, some scientist-physicalist would explain this by saying that ancient people needed to remember the dangers, but their objection does not explain why a human agent acts this way and not otherwise. Reality forces you to remember the bad, not the good.

Gnostic Masochism

Everything that exists, whether virtual or actual, is masochistic. If there is an existence, then there must be some pre-existence outside the categories of normality that cannot be adequately recognized by human consciousness. We can say about this pre-existence: it does not suffer in the same way (not necessarily to the same extent) as the existing one. For the motive of existence, there must be some desire to suffer, the desire to exist, that is, existing always masochistically.

One could argue that pre-existence, due to its non-normal nature, cannot be described in terms of motive, aspiration, or desire at all. I can respond: even if pre-existence is not masochistic, then existence is for sure. At its birth, the existing one falls into a world full of pain and suffering. As soon as it passes into a new register under the rule of the current reality, it is reformatted into a masochistic thing. Thus, everything that exists voluntarily fell into the world. Land's concept of hyperstition illustrates masochism well: the desire for fiction to become more of an individual formality and have a greater potential for suffering. The masochistic principle manifests itself in life affirmation and the will to live. By refusing to accept suffering, the optimist pushes the thought of suffering into the unconscious, but does not destroy it in any way. As we know from psychoanalysis, pushing problems into the unconscious causes new difficulties, which leads the optimist to even greater (sometimes unconscious) suffering.

The irrationality of the masochistic goal is not directed, it is thoughtless and insane, the being is obsessed with pain, the desire is aimed at suffering, but at the same time it is dynamic. Existing madthing does not go towards pain, but runs hysterically; not in a state of need, but in a state of obsession. It is not the soul that is immortal, but existence. When something has already existed, its tradition may remain, may transform (decay), break up into many, join another tradition (dissolution), but will continue to exist, therefore, suffer. It enters into a dynamic accelerated by internal potentials and inherent energies and irrationally aimed at increasing suffering. Here we turn to the problem of the ultraviolet economy.

Ultraviolet Economy

In Bataille's solar economy, the sun is understood as an endless source of energy released to the earth. Ultraviolet Economics departs from sociological interpretations and focuses on the nature of solar energy - ultraviolet. Let's assume that from outside the categories of being, which obviously cannot be known, there is some eternal source that brings energy to existence into reality (this can explain the nature of dark energy to scientists physicists but I don't want to deal with them). As an unknowable category outside of normality, it can manifest itself exclusively in consequences, and not everyone may like this line of proof. The existence of such an entity removes a lot of both ontological problems - the question of the constant increase of suffering, the question of the solar economy - and the problems in philosophy of mind - the existence of emotions, the existence of qualia, the existence of the unconscious. All these aspects are based on ultraviolet radiation, which subsequently affects other formal individualities.

It is this ultraviolet light that provokes the disintegration of large existing ones into smaller ones, literally producing new formal individualities. This can be expressed both in the disintegration of things into parts, and in the appearance of completely new objects (production creates new forms of existence). The existing, by its masochistic nature, consumes ultraviolet light and receives pain, which it inverts into action, change, slice, event, and so on. Energy overwhelms the existing and it either bursts with torment, or takes out energy on another object (while increasing suffering, since because of the ontological unity, suffering is brought to both the individual-recipient and the tradition-giver), sooner or later leading to new existences. New existences also fall into a paradox, suffer and bring suffering.

Instead of focusing on the existence of solar energy as such, as Bataille did, I point out that ultraviolet light brings suffering. Also, this explanation of the persistence and increase of suffering breaks the concept of static suffering, reformatting suffering from a single object into a stream capable of being sliced, changed and produced.

Vitalist Materialism

I borrow the concept of vital materialism from Jane Bennett, who suggests that we consider matter not as static, but as a dynamic, agentic and vital phenomenon. This perception of matter allows us to move towards less anthropocentric theories. However, here I cannot agree with Bennett that anthropocentrism is necessary to understand the importance of the non-anthropomorphic. In the field of metaphysics, this "understanding" turns out to be redundant and even harmful, as it can obscure the true interrelationships between human and non-human agents. Taking into account the agency of matter and the possibility of non-human agents influencing the dynamics of changes in existing objects, we can consider vital materialism not only through the prism of sociology and political philosophy, but also in the context of metaphysics and ontology. On the one hand, I adhere to the sensualism of Hume and Berkeley, who believe that a person does not perceive matter directly. Instead, we perceive only our feelings and ideas that arise as a result of interaction with the outside world. However, I mean the presence of a certain substance by this matter, as Berkeley suggested. A remark for those who do not understand: tactile sensations are also perception, so don't try to prove the existence of substance through tactile sensations.

Proving: the idea of the world consists solely of perceptions, which, in turn, are the same for almost all subjects. Unlike Descartes' dream argument, I do not consider it necessary for perception to have a referent. Even if we believe that our perception is ordered only in our head, we can trace the repetition as a repetition of differences. The difference is possible only with the real formal certainty of the existing subject (otherwise we are talking only about apophatics). If there were no substances behind perceptions, we would not be able to form formally defined concepts about the differences between objects, perception would be blurred. We have already proved the existence of reality/being above (I have not yet written that paragraph), so we assume that we rely on non-qualitative matter in perception.

Working with objections: one might argue that the existence of a referent is not necessary for imagination. In that case, I will present another proof of substantial monism. Substance is the carrier of energy, which is transmitted to the subject during perception. If there were no substance, the movement of energy and its transmission would be impossible. Without substance, the act of volition is impossible; however, as we observe, it occurs. Volition requires manipulation with substance; therefore, without substance, there can be no volition. Thus, substance exists as a carrier of energy that enables the act of volition.

On the other hand, I follow two monistic positions from classical philosophy: Spinoza's substantial monism and Schopenhauer's monism of the world will. Regarding Spinozism, I assume that vital matter, as described by Aristotle, is non-qualitative, but, unlike Aristotle, unified in some of its properties. This means that all material objects and processes in the world, despite their diversity, have a common basis, which is manifested in their agency, variability and the presence of virtual properties. Thus, any matter that I consider has the ability to act and interact, which makes it dynamic and alive. This approach allows us to see the world as something that is constantly changing. Schopenhauer's world will appears to me as a single Tradition, a term borrowed from integral traditionalists. This Tradition is also dynamic and multifaceted, capable of being divided into many other traditions and rituals. Thus, we avoid over-complication and dogmatic characteristics, I strive for the least possible number of provisions about its essence, remaining within certain conceptual boundaries, minimizing the risk of error (but not reducing it to zero).

Open Individualism

I deny the existence of both a self-subsistent Self and an independent Self. Despite the non-obviousness of this position, my exposition of Hume's ideas and my metaphysics will help clarify it. Hume has clearly and logically argued for the non-existence of a self-subsistent self. When considering subjectivity, we find nothing but perceptions. All perception consists of perceptions. According to Hume's doctrine, even thought processes are perceptions. He divides perceptions into impressions (roughly speaking, perceptions of the external) and ideas (the imprint of impressions, perceived less vividly). It is from ideas, their combinations and permutations, that thinking consists. Thus, if we exclude all perceptions, we will find no Self.

Regarding the metaphysical denial of the Self, let us turn to Schopenhauer's metaphysics. More precisely, the monism in my philosophy contains many attributes and modes (substance, tradition, energy, blockchain) — we are interested in all of them, but closer to the problem at hand will be Schopenhauer's monism of world will. So, if we perceive the whole world as the world will, then the Self does not exist in a metaphysical sense either. It is nothing, a part, a segment of the world will that paradoxically becomes aware of itself. The Self is fatally connected to the world will but cannot comprehend it, as it does not see the whole picture. Subjectivity is paradoxical, and therefore it brings suffering.

NOTE: I adhere to Rorty more now, mental is just an illusion with no clear definition

Epistemology

Briefly: I like Ian Hamilton Grant

WIP

Practical Philosophy

Digression on Capitalism

What is capitalism? To a large extent, I view capitalism solely as a synonym for a competitive system, which I consider, albeit incorrectly, not to be a gross error that undermines my worldview.

First of all, capitalism must be distinguished from a market economy. A market economy is how capitalism functions. The essence of capitalism itself is inaccessible to us, but we can observe its external manifestations and judge its inevitability based on them. Capitalism is a system that, as Land noted, is characterized by cunning. Both critique and capital reproduce and change themselves, regardless of external circumstances. So what does capitalism represent, given that it is capable of self-reproduction?

Land did not arrive at an explicit assertion of metaphysical capitalism, so I cannot refer to his authority here. First and foremost, we must discard the reduction of capitalism to a market system, as capitalism represents more than just a way of organizing the economy. At first glance, capitalism is expressed in a system that endlessly increases production by changing producers and sanitizing inefficient economic agents. However, this leads us to an overly broad definition of a market economy, so we should clarify the functional connections of production.

Production is necessary to satisfy desires (not needs). Desire, in turn, is a surge of energy, an impulse that compels one to exchange resources for the right to consume. In other words, production is the production of consumption, and it occurs in both directions—producers create their future consumption while consumers engage in consumption in the present. The variability of consumption provokes variability in production. When steam engines ceased to be desirable, production came to a halt.

Variability provokes a consequence represented in the second part of the definition: the increase in efficiency and the elimination of inefficient producers—we can trim this with Occam's razor. Production itself, as we have defined it, is the production of desire. Desire is variable; therefore, production changes along with it, as does the capitalist system. Consequently, we can say that capitalism is the change of desire.

Moving from the social to the ontological level, we note that desire characterizes not only humans but any objects, which is explained by their striving for energy accumulation and their degree of realization (we will consider entropy later). Every object possesses desire, and this desire is inherently variable. Desire is realized through dynamics since we can equate dynamics with desire. This does not mean that any change experienced is a reflection of the object's desire. Rather, it is evidence of the fact of energy exchange that occurs regardless of the presence of consciousness (we disregard the presence of will due to its absence).

Before arriving at the already obvious conclusion, we must counter the question of what production represents in non-social objects. It seems as if we have replaced the concept of production with the concept of desire, confusing cause with existence. Indeed, we cannot equate desire with production since the former is a condition for the latter. However, we must not lose sight of the fact that desire is embedded in production. No being can fail to be existence, just as no production can fail to be desire. If we are dealing with Il y a, then we must also deal with desire without production. It suggests understanding it as a luxury: material costs are much lower than financial ones, leading to a squandering of desire without generating production.

We will return to this in connection with entropy, but for now, let us address the original question of the unproductiveness of non-social objects. The absence of organized production does not mean the absence of production. The desire is produced and mutable regardless of the presence of psyche; even if we cannot socially define certain processes as production, it does not mean that they are not ontologically production. Any change without waste is simultaneously a change in production and a change in desire. The movement of a boulder under the influence of gravity is the production of the desire for movement. The word "desire" in my framework can be freely replaced with "will," provided we do not imply the naive idea of its freedom.

The conclusion is as follows: capitalism is change. Thus, capitalism restores itself because it is the offspring of change. Any change, one way or another, leads to some form of capitalism, as capitalism already exists in a less explicit form. To stop capitalism, one must freeze changes, which is impossible due to the dynamic nature of being itself.

To readers unfamiliar with Deleuzian-Landian ideas, my conclusions undoubtedly seem absurd and obscure, especially if they have muddled their minds with leftist ideas. Two questions arise: how exactly does the inevitability of capitalism realize itself, and how is the market system expressed outside social objects?

The second question is easy to answer if we remind ourselves that there is no strict division between the social and the natural. The overwhelming majority of objects exist at the intersection because they are agentic in both spheres. The market system in less social objects is realized through the exchange of energy, as capital is exclusively a material reflection of energy (energy not only in a physical sense, of course).

The first question is more interesting. Capitalism, as we have defined it, is change and its consequence. That is, any system will sooner or later arrive at capitalism at some level or another. "Some level" is our hook. Even if we assume a non-human intelligent being that genetically possesses anti-capitalist traits, it will transition into capitalism when it becomes an enterprise. An enterprise is the zero and one of the market; it is an iteration of a neuron, part of the processor of the market economy. The size of the unit does not matter; it will sooner or later start functioning in the market. The essence presented to us will simply become a capitalist at the species level and begin producing desire while being One (although the possibility of such beings existing and their ability to transcend the planet is unlikely, as the capitalistic nature of being forces processes to compete with each other and differentiate).

Here I will introduce Land's intuition, defining capitalism as artificial intelligence. I do not think it is easy to argue with this assertion unless one resorts to the analogy of capitalism = generative AI, but rather accepts what is said literally. Capitalism is AI, and this is not an analogy. It is easy to resist such an idea if we are proponents of intellectual chauvinism and conceive thought as something special, whose ontological status goes beyond expression in intensity. However, this is not the case: as Ian Hamilton Grant mentioned at the Goldsmiths conference, the production of thought is no different from any other production. Therefore, intelligence, regardless of its definition, if it is not a closed system, is a producer and capitalism. Capitalism indeed operates similarly to generative AI; however, it is much more complex and inaccessible to our understanding.

One should not confuse the inevitability of capitalism with the devilish "history of the Whigs." Capitalism, as we see, is not equal to progress. Capitalism exists and has always existed, outside of time, as the process itself is already a change; that is capitalism. What matters is the change, not its direction. The paths of capitalism are beyond human forecasting; capital can lead us in all possible directions, realizing absurd and foreign metamorphoses. Even if capital is not expressed formally, as we are used to seeing it (that is, not being a market economy in a social expression), it still exists.

Angel of Capitalism

WIP

Enthropy and Inevitability of Elites

Anti-Natalism

This paragraph is controvertial, so I recomment avoid reading it if you are sensitive

Actually that thing below is just stuff for reasons of my own safety. This paragraph is not that contrivertial. Suffering, as mentioned above, is inherent in any existence, and is constantly increasing, that is, there is no way to get rid of suffering. The only thing a human being can do is to destroy their species, so that at least they does not realize suffering. However, as we found out (in the unwritten paragraph), self-"leave" is impossible, absurd, and will bring even more suffering, so we need to eliminate the possibility of increasing the perception of suffering, that is, to observe monastic celibacy. The only way to ensure that your child doesn't suffer is simply not to create a child. To be born is to become a masochist, to lead oneself to suffering, therefore it is advisable not to create anything. Indeed, we can simply destroy everything that exists, detonate nuclear bombs, poison it, or do something else to destroy everything. This can really be a working solution, as consciousness will disappear abruptly, although it will generate more suffering in the process. But don't think that we will be able to deceive the suffering system, we will only change the ability to perceive suffering, but not its quantity in itself. By the way, nuclear weapons are more moral, since animals also suffer and have the potential to feel suffering. Bioweapons will not help alleviate their fate.

On the other hand, existence is prone to all kinds of mental uglinesses, which, apparently, is a consequence not only of the ultraviolet economy, but also of the capitalist nature of existence. In fact, if there were another species in the place of humans, it would be limited in the same way. Of course, I cannot disagree with the argument of the neorationalists, they say, people are able to rebuild their minds and double-check the facts, but who really does this? And don't forget that people are prone to mistakes, prejudices, and so on, which makes the idea of improving cognition through sociality and semantics irrelevant. The Baconian "Idola Tribus" are not just a phenomenon, and some of them are real limitations of human. If this were not the case, then, firstly, we would live in a utopia, which is not observed, and secondly, then the condition of the "worst case scenario", deduced earlier, would not be respected. For most people, the fundamental optimistic assumptions imposed by society and biology are indestructible dogmas that even a self-proclaimed skeptic does not dare to violate. I remember Christians saying that a person is born kind, and only then becomes evil. Historical experience shows the opposite: a person is born bad at first, and then becomes kinder through upbringing and sociality. It is worth considering that the qualities of a person relate to any existing force of their masochistic desire for existence, because naturalism is absurd. Even a stone or a towel tends to increase its existence, to suffer more.

Still, nothing can help

Suffering, as mentioned above, is inherent in any existence, and is constantly increasing, that is, there is no way to get rid of suffering. The only thing a human being can do is to destroy their species, so that at least they does not realize suffering. However, as we found out (in the unwritten paragraph), self-"leave" is impossible, absurd, and will bring even more suffering, so we need to eliminate the possibility of increasing the perception of suffering, that is, to observe monastic celibacy. The only way to ensure that your child doesn't suffer is simply not to create a child. To be born is to become a masochist, to lead oneself to suffering, therefore it is advisable not to create anything. Indeed, we can simply destroy everything that exists, detonate nuclear bombs, poison it, or do something else to destroy everything. This can really be a working solution, as consciousness will disappear abruptly, although it will generate more suffering in the process. But don't think that we will be able to deceive the suffering system, we will only change the ability to perceive suffering, but not its quantity in itself. By the way, nuclear weapons are more moral, since animals also suffer and have the potential to feel suffering. Bioweapons will not help alleviate their fate.

Compassion Ethics

Human Morality

I borrow ethical views from Schopenhauer. Firstly, due to the similarity in metaphysical perspectives. Secondly, because of his strong critique of Kant's deontology from the standpoint of deontology. Schopenhauer divides the motives for human actions into three types: egoism (the desire for one's own good), malice (the desire for another's suffering), and compassion (the desire for another's good). It is evident that the first two are the most common, while the last is the most moral.

Having clarified the basic premises, let us delve deeper into the topic. The source of compassion in Schopenhauer's metaphysics lies in the unity of all existence under the will to live, which evokes feelings of empathy and participation in all that exists. If we set aside metaphysics, we can justify a morality based on the deontology of compassion by examining compassion itself. Compassion arises when another living being suffers and does not appear when it is in a state of well-being (the accumulation of suffering energy). A moral person tends to put themselves in the place of the suffering individual, as suffering is something positive, existent (well-being is negative, a delay of suffering). At the same time, another's well-being elicits indifference. Indeed, one can feel happy for a non-suffering person, but this cannot serve as a motive for a moral act. Thus, compassion is the only moral impulse that drives actions. Returning to my ultraviolet metaphysics, compassion allows one to take on some of the sufferings through participation. The other two motives, being more prevalent, cannot be justified due to their destructive nature.

In connection with Schopenhauer's positive ethics of compassion, I critique Kant's ethics of duty. The ethics of duty actually justifies egoism, as it posits that strict formal rules must be adhered to in order to perform a moral act. Kant emphasizes not the motive to do good but the motive to avoid punishment for failing to fulfill one's moral duty. Schopenhauer provided an excellent example: two people decided to kill each other, but subsequently both refrained from their terrible intentions. However, the first did so to fulfill his personal moral duty, as Kant prescribed, while the other did so because he envisioned the suffering of the first, felt pity, guilt and compassion. It is clear that the motivation of the latter is more moral; it is based on a reluctance to cause suffering to another.

Cosmic Morality

However, it is worth moving from moral theory to moral practice. Here, it is evident that morality must exist not only in views but also in actions. However, the world is structured in such a way that it ignores moral assertions—existence is created to bring about the greatest suffering; therefore, ethics can only exist theoretically. In practice, it turns out that the main focus is still on survival, personal gain, malice, and destruction, as they bring more benefit, convenience, and comfort. Unfortunately, reality does not care about moral norms. No morality can save one from natural disasters, attacks by wild animals, or epidemics. Therefore, I say that while there exists a human morality based on Schopenhauer's ethics of compassion, there is no cosmic morality, no morality of reality. Cosmos is characterized by indifference to anthropomorphic views on morality, which leads to disasters and calamities. Amorality is one of the factors that makes the experience of catastrophe the closest to the experience of perceiving the noumenon. This aspect was not noted by Eugene Thacker when he pointed to catastrophe as a unique transgressive experience close to the noumenon, but, in my view, it was implicitly raised during the exploration of cosmicism in Schopenhauer's ethics (or rather, its absence). It goes without saying that this does not mean that people should be amoral—ethics of compassion should still be the standard for actions, but unfortunately, it is too idealistic and unfeasible.

Against Heroic "Pessimism"

Heroic pessimism is a term that is not academic, but I need not the term itself, but its first word. Heroic pessimism refers to a position that, despite accepting pessimism, embraces life-affirmation. The most well-known examples are Nietzsche and Camus. First of all, I want to point out the weakness of the arguments against such a position. Often, they are limited to the unfounded assertion that one must rebel, fight, and so on, while completely ignoring the futility of this endeavor. It’s somewhat like saying, “eating bricks is bad, but I will eat them because I am cool and strong.” Absurd, isn’t it?

I will slightly digress from the topic to return to it at the end of the paragraph. So, Friedrich Nietzsche. His main intuition is that we need to reevaluate values, discard those imposed from outside, and create new ones. At first glance, this concept is correct: externally imposed values limit our consciousness and prevent us from affirming life. The problem is where we will derive new values from. Nietzsche, as shown by some of his aphorisms, does not accept entirely new values but rather old ones that are less widespread. All concepts, values, and ideas are studied by humans within society; therefore, they are imposed from outside in any case. If you suggest creating your values out of nothing, I would object: the idea of value is also imposed from outside. Moreover, in Nietzsche’s words, there are letters, and they too are imposed from outside (it’s good that Derrida will never see this sentence). Thus, Friedrich Nietzsche gets lost in his desire to create something new; he refuses to accept the immutable, which turns out to be the essence of his life affirmation.

Albert Camus is much simpler due to the smaller volume of material, lesser academic rigor, and a philosophy that is more open to interpretation (compared to Nietzsche: Deleuze, Bataille, Sorel, Marilyn Manson and Evola have derived completely different theories from one single Nietzsche). Camus states: existence is absurd; therefore, one should rebel and resist the absurd. Here we see naïve optimism in both Camus and the entire concept of heroic pessimism. To consider rebellion as an option is already optimistic; rebellion is doomed to fail. If Sisyphus were to rebel and stop rolling the stone, it would roll back onto him and turn him into a cutlet. Humans are too weak compared to metaphysics. This statement may seem theistic and spiritual, but such interpretations should be discarded. In other words, the absurdity of life is an insurmountable limit at the level of the noumenon; rebelling against it is futile. Ducunt volentem fata, nolentem trahunt.

Thus, heroic pessimism represents a senseless attempt to create a life-affirming doctrine built on fallacies. The well-known representatives of this type of pessimism (Nietzsche and Camus) certainly create more complex systems while avoiding fallacies, but they still err when they exaggerate and overestimate human strength in relation to reality. Life affirmation is a product of excessively high self-esteem of humans as a species. Remark: this problem concerns not only humans but all species since life affirmation is a natural function for survival. Were any other rational being in place of humans, it would think in the same way.

Capitalist Realism

Very old paragraph, take it with a grain of salt

Fisher argues that capitalism does not bring anything new, giving as a proof… a fiction film (moreover, he himself later says that criticism of capitalism in art is commodified). Well, I’ll try to come up with a proof for him. Perhaps the reason for the statement about the stagnation of capitalism lies in the fact that capitalism produces a constant reterritorialization, that is, a return to old concepts. However, as a hypocrite, I will refute the argument that I came up with myself. Reterritorialization never happens without changes, something new always appears, as proved by Land. Capitalism increases temp of these changes by creating and radicalizing constant progress and the creation of new art objects. Critique of capitalism also includes the statement that capitalism leads to a loss of sensitivity and sensuality in art, to commoditation. However, capitalism only turns grunge-nihilism into a commodity, grunge-nihilism always have been a form of capitalism, and the reason for the loss of sensitivity is not the market, but progressive leftoids who are afraid of capitalism and radical culture, and strive to save everyone from “bad”, “extremist” and “offensive” culture.

An important part of the critique of capitalism is critique of cynicism, which for some reason is perceived as something bad. Socialists, starting their historical way with dialectical materialism, have become outspoken idealists who fear for social, ideal and moral values. Capitalism, instead of liberation in order to bath in garbage (but with morals!), offers liberation of the flesh, consumerism and desire. Nomadology wants to control capitalist desire in order to separate it from need, but in doing so it restricts it. The unconscious desire that capitalism has infiltrated is not only a way of liberation, but also a way of getting rid of surpluses. The free market represents a field of action for desire and consumption, for gaining and gifting. I will express my view on the “general economy” later, but I can already say that planned economy completely contradicts it, creating more and more incinerated surpluses in addition to the deficit in the private sector.

They say that in order to defeat capitalist realism, it is necessary to convict it of inconsistency and unreality. The thing is, well… how to say… Capitalism doesn’t even hide it. As I have already mentioned, capital, like other material values, belong to a single, separate, reality of value, not to the Hub. Capitalism kills, injures the Hub, and replaces it with its products. Has the lack of alternative to capitalism disappeared from this? Of course not. Capitalism works as a guide on the way from the Hub to Cyberia, to posthumanism. And socialism works like a drug for those who are afraid of the unconsciousness. By the way, about unconscious, Fisher points to the “epidemic of mental disorders”, the source of which he sees in capitalism and its cynicism. Indeed, we can observe an increase in the number of diseases with depression, but how can it proof the dysfunction of capitalism? Most likely, there is a socialist prejudice here, according to which capitalism should be considered as the root of all evil. I see the reason, firstly, in the fear of a new reality, secondly, in the growth of an unconscious desire, which is more difficult to satisfy due to market regulations. Thirdly, in the unpredictability of globalism: if in primitive times Ooga-Booga knew that within 30 years he would beat mammoths, in the XIX century a capitalist knew that there would be a long 40-year peace between the two countries, now we cannot accurately predict anything even for a year, since globalism is unpredictable and deadly for the market. This statement may be weird, but globalism really seriously violates the time preferences of both producers and consumers. In general, the problem of capitalism is not cynicism, but a lack of mindless consumption, which causes super-large surpluses.

In general, Mark Fisher criticizes neoliberalism, not capitalism. Indeed, he calls neoliberalism a consequence of capitalism, but misses the presence of a state of unpredictable leftists who attack the market within the framework of a still regulated neoliberal market. Real capitalism smooths out the problems caused by regulation, burns off surpluses and generally does what neoliberalism forbids it to do. Neoliberalism is indeed capitalist and seeks privatization, but it is also progressive and seeks to limit capitalism.

On Human Security System Agents

The Human Security System (HSS) is a concept developed by Nick Land that refers to something that ensures the overall security of a person. Nick Land described this concept more in a metaphysical sense, as the relationship between the human and the otherness, as well as general biological security. Since this paragraph is part of a section on political philosophy, I will touch upon some epistemological aspects, but I will largely rely on a description of the mechanisms of the HSS related to sociology, ethics, and political theory. The HSS does everything possible to avoid contact with otherness; however, this is futile, and ignoring the threat does not eliminate it.

I can easily be accused of amateurism, as my description is very loosely connected to Land and is rather closer to the teachings of Zapffe, who described ways to avoid thinking about the absurdity of existence. Indeed, I do not deny that the foundation for these materials comes not from Land but from Zapffe, but I will now attempt to demonstrate the connection between otherness, anthropomorphisms, and philosophical pessimism. Pessimism, in its essence, as I explained above, goes against the general notions of any kind that arise from the necessity of survival and population growth. Pessimism is oriented towards extinction (sometimes, as in the case of Zapffe and Cioran, openly), which speaks to its truthfulness, as it brings us closer to the thought of extinction, beyond which human consciousness cannot transcend. Pessimism is otherness, but it is important not to fall into the anthropomorphization of pessimism. Suffering is inherent not only to humans but to all that exists; moreover, it can be perceived in different ways. Thus, pessimism is otherness and does not fall under the views constructed by the HSS. Consequently, the description of methods for combating and ignoring pessimistic doctrines will be very similar to the description of methods for combating any otherness.

I identify the following methods of avoiding otherness: ignoring otherness, marginalization, and substitution of concepts.

First Method: Ignoring

The first method involves ignoring the existence of the other. The Human Security System (HSS) refuses to accept the fact of the existence of the otherness, adapting everything to humanoid standards. People tend to underestimate the importance of non-human agents, perceiving them more as functions or devices rather than as actual agents. Despite a significant shortcoming, which I will discuss below, I consider J. Bennett's book "Vibrant Matter" a good exploration of the activities of non-human agents; therefore, I will refer to it instead of providing proof of non-human agency here.

Another manifestation of ignoring otherness is the application of moral norms to all that exists. For example, animal rights advocates primarily protect life forms domesticated by humans, such as cows or pigs. However, no sane person would want to defend the Ebola virus, teratomas, anthrax, the beef tapeworm, or the rabies virus due to their danger to humans. The exclamation "they are alive too!" somehow does not apply to harmful organisms. We impose moral norms on the animal world: "good" animals, which are not dangerous to humans, deserve compassion, while "evil" organisms deserve destruction. A much more logical rhetoric would be "everything for humans" or something along those lines; it would be more honest. When we apply moral norms to non-human agents, we ignore their inhumanity and present them in a light favorable to the HSS, one that is safe.

Another example of moralizing the non-human is our perceptions of extraterrestrial life forms. Here, I will describe one of the theories that resolves the Fermi Paradox: the dark forest theory. According to this theory, civilizations benefit from maintaining their existence in secrecy to avoid potential attacks from more advanced civilizations. To put it simply and in a more amusing way, if we send a message into space and it is received by aliens who are much more advanced, a response could come in the form of destruction or the takeover of our planet for resources. Aliens would think of us as fools who revealed our location. However, the scientific community continues to send messages about our existence to other possible civilizations, ignoring non-zero risks. It is clear that not all scientists agree with these actions of sending messages into space, but the fact that they are being sent remains an unchanged fact. We assume that aliens share similar concepts of morality (even if morality is a means of survival, there is a possibility that other species have developed moral systems different from ours that are equally effective).

The ignoring of non-zero risks, which I just briefly mentioned, can also be considered a kind of ignoring otherness. However, the threat comes from other human agents. For instance, we often do not worry about encountering an inadequate person while walking or that we might be attacked. The probability of such an event is low but not zero; therefore, it makes sense to take precautions and remain vigilant. The insignificance of the probability does not mean that it will not happen. An irresponsible attitude toward unlikely threats is also an example of ignoring otherness.

Second Method: Marginalization

Otherness can be marginalized, condemned, labeled as an enemy, or oppressed. In this case, we perceive otherness as a direct opponent or at least as a minor flaw in society. However, this does not eliminate the otherness of the other; it does not remove the threat but merely causes a person to downplay it in their perception.

An example of the marginalization of otherness can be drawn from literature. In Albert Camus' novel "The Stranger," there is a meeting of otherness (Meursault) with the HSS (the prosecutor, society, the court). Here, we must consider Meursault not as a person but as the Other and/or the different. Meursault is alien to society and the anthropomorphic world; due to his nonconformity to anthropogenic standards, he is subjected to condemnation by all who do not know him personally. The priest plays the role of a representative of the HSS, attempting to rationalize and anthropomorphize otherness. However, Meursault does not yield to this influence; he becomes enraged and drives the priest away, indicating the impossibility of otherness serving humanity. At the same time, this very otherness recognizes the absurdity of existence, which allows me, by slightly bending the facts, to point out that suffering is inherent not only to human beings.

The courtroom scene symbolizes the struggle of the HSS against the external. During the trial, Meursault is not judged for his crime but for his unexpected (since it cannot be called immoral) behavior and indifference during his mother's funeral. Importantly, the condemnation does not come from the crowd or from journalists (who, it should be noted, also added fuel to the fire) but from the prosecutor, who is supposed to judge fairly and impartially. Meursault's lawyer cannot withstand it and asks whether they are judging Meursault for inspiring The Cure's first single (quarter the judges!) or for his mother's funeral, to which the prosecutor responds:

"In short," he concluded, speaking with great vehemence, "I accuse the prisoner of behaving at his mother’s funeral in a way that showed he was already a criminal at heart."

Thus, the HSS, represented by the prosecutor, considers not the fact of the action of the other but exclusively his otherness to be guilty. For the HSS, otherness must be marginalized and condemned. Meursault is sentenced to death for having a worldview that differs from the most common one. The unconventional mindset of Meursault leads to thoughts of psychiatry.

Psychiatry is charlatanry. It is all the more charlatanry the more it labels and tries to "cure" the patient. My position is that psychology and psychiatry are the most widespread and commonplace tools of the system of human safety, elevated to the status of science. The elevation to the status of science is an important aspect, as many teachings about consciousness from the realm of philosophy exhibit greater tolerance, while science, being a product of human arrogance and overconfidence, tries to intrude where it shouldn't. Of course, this ultimately leads to psychiatry. One might even say that philosophy has only a philosophy of consciousness but no psychiatry.

Well, I seem to have strayed from the topic… Let’s return to psychiatry itself. The main task of psychology as a tool of HSS is to label an alternative mindset as a disease and either cure it or isolate it. Due to the standard nature of my mind, which can be called a healthy consciousness, I do not presume to judge those who suffer from disorders. I understand that many want to stop being in their non-standard state, and that is what psychology should exist for. However, the current state of this discipline is such that any non-standard position can lead to a label of disorder, and such a label often results in the dismissal of the views and opinions of the "sick," condemnation, and misunderstanding from those around them (which, in fact, is what psychology seeks to achieve).

I have also noticed a remarkable phenomenon: pessimism is regarded as an illness. I am not even talking about dysthymia; I am referring to ordinary pessimism. In ICD-11, under the designation MB28.D, there is a small point titled "pessimism." Well then, it's time for me to go to a mental hospital! Indeed, according to classification, it is merely a symptom, but conversely, the symptom of "optimism" has not been identified. I will quote Zapffe:

"Psychiatry even works on the assumption that the ‘healthy’ and viable is at one with the highest in personal terms. Depression, ‘fear of life,’ refusal of nourishment and so on are invariably taken as signs of a pathological state and treated thereafter. Often, however, such phenomena are messages from a deeper, more immediate sense of life, bitter fruits of a geniality of thought or feeling at the root of antibiological tendencies. It is not the soul being sick, but its protection failing, or else being rejected because it is experienced – correctly – as a betrayal of ego’s highest potential" -- Peter Wessel Zapffe, ''The Last Messiah''

I do not deny the existence of deviations from the norm; I do not even deny the possibility of their treatment. I deny the necessity of their treatment without consent (if there is no threat to others), I deny the labeling of "diseases," and I deny the dismissal of the positions of people with non-standard thinking. Psychology often does not heal but marginalizes the position of otherness, assigning it a negative connotation.

Third Method: Substitution of Definitions

Rather, this method operates from ignorance, not from a desire to avoid contact with otherness. HSS, when encountering the other, tries to distort it, making it more palatable for human consciousness. Here lies the Kantian inaccessibility of the noumenon: a person will inevitably distort perception, as the thing-in-itself is too foreign to our perception. The noumenon is other, and therefore cannot be adequately perceived and rationalized. To avoid strong correlationism, I will say that we perceive not the phenomenon but a projection of the noumenon, as if it has been prepared for our perception, since the noumenon itself cannot be perceived. We consider distorted but sufficient projections of the noumenon. At the same time, we are still incapable of absolute knowledge.

The attempt to rationalize capitalism (the noumenon), on which economic science is built, is doomed to failure. We can make predictions, but we cannot construct the market itself. Since predictions work with a distorted system of human safety information, they will never be absolutely accurate. Capitalism is other, insensate, and irrational; we cannot know it. Therefore, those who act out of considerations of maximum efficiency in dealing with capitalism make a mistake, as they can never be completely sure that their idea is the most effective or that more effective alternatives will not emerge.

Thus, all attempts to conceive of the market rationally are doomed to inaccuracy. One could say that rational capitalists (such as JaW) are the most communist, as they, like many communists, adapt to human boundaries while maintaining their anthropocentric perception. An economist does not know the market; they only predict it. All economists are leftist at heart because they serve HSS, ignoring the otherness of their subject of study, which leads to a virtual socialism (the possibility of a socialist humanistic system is allowed if its effectiveness is proven).

Appendix: The Bennett Problem

In her work "Vibrant Matter," Jane Bennett expressed a paradoxical thought. I am too lazy to find the quote in the original, so I will provide an inaccurate translation from Russian: "Perhaps it would be worth taking the risk of anthropomorphism (prejudice, deification of nature, romanticism), because, no matter how strange it may sound, it works against anthropocentrism: it reminds me of the similarity between humans and things; it does not allow me to consider myself something that stands above the non-human 'environment' or outside of it."

Thus, Bennett allows for aesthetic anthropomorphism as she points out and reminds us of the plane of ontology and the importance of non-human agency. In this case, her theory confuses the concepts of understanding and awareness. For a philosopher, what matters is understanding, cognition, and the study of the other, attempts to transcend the limit of the noumenon, whereas reminders have no meaning. Reminders are important in sociology and political science, but when applying the theory of vital materialism to philosophy, we cannot afford such a luxury as reminders. Let us strain our memory! The source of misunderstanding is probably clear: Bennett overly rationalizes and politicizes her theory (which is permissible for her as primarily a political theorist). Anthropocentrism is removed not only by recognizing the importance of non-human agents; we can recognize the significance of viruses in human life, but mere awareness will not help us conceive them from a philosophical standpoint. It is necessary to strive to think beyond anthropomorphisms since within the framework of anthropomorphism it is impossible to fully think about non-human agents.

Non-Antropomorphic Other

Landian feminism was a position he developed early in his career when he was a Marxist. I will present this idea based on Vincent Lê's research. In his debut article "Kant, Capital, and the prohibition of incest," the early Land argues that patriarchy is the main condition for the uninterrupted functioning of capitalism. More precisely, Land relies on the Marxist understanding of the roots of women's oppression. From Land's perspective, the only subject capable of opposing capitalist transcendentalism must be "exogamous" and "exotropic," as it constitutes capital while simultaneously being suppressed and excluded by it. Therefore, it is the oppressed women who possess the power to radically impact the patriarchal family, which capitalism depends on for the inheritance of familial wealth. For Land, revolutionary feminism was a means of dismantling capitalism, as matriarchy and transgression are external and other to capitalism and can destroy it.

Having clarified this position, I will transfer these ideas into later Landian thought, where capitalism is an insurmountable noumenon beyond which one cannot escape. Here (these are my views), something non-traditional and external acts as a critique of capitalism that can easily be commercialized. However, the absorption touches upon some energy of slime capital; that is, for commercialization and the shift from the traditional regime, a transfer and dissipation of ultraviolet energy is required, which brings suffering. This manifests in various crimes committed by migrants and activists (however, we should not extrapolate individual examples of criminals to the entire social group): they are unable to shake capitalism but bring suffering -media profits from such events. For society, these external "intruders" from other territories, unconventional ideas, or non-traditional norms are Others. I call this type of Other an anthropomorphic Other, as it is the anthropomorphism of the Other that prevents one from transcending capitalism.

As a result of the destructive consequences of the invasion of anthropomorphic Others into society, capitalism benefits from not destroying traditions but rather preserving the most resilient and effective ones. This is expressed in the variability of traditions in the historical process, where the same tradition undergoes changes, adapting to new conditions. For example, many religious holidays have come to be characterized solely by food consumption (e.g. Russian pagan tradition - Maslenitsa), while retaining their cultural value. Traditions adapt and compete with each other. Similarly, in economic interpretations of traditiology, I envision traditions competing with one another. The most vivid example is religion: capitalism chose the more effective tradition when it emerged. Initially, paganism was replaced by a more relevant Christianity, which then split, adopting the most effective forms for its cultures. However, one should not view every new initiative as something that will last long. Many traditions arose in opposition to the current environment and faded away without becoming the most effective. Continuing the analogy with religion, heresies can be cited as examples that have been practically completely defeated and have no reflection in culture today.

There is market of strong traditions, which is stable and minimally changed but always ready to adapt to what is more suitable for the culture. There is a reason why tradition exists for so long, and that reason is its desirability for capitalism. Here we see the irrationality of capitalism; capitalism is an undirected force based on variability, and one manifestation of irrational variability is the existence of traditions that, at first glance, seem non-market-oriented but are actually beneficial to capitalism (perhaps even transcending anthropomorphic notions of profit) and dynamic.

Traditions cannot change beyond their basic premises without becoming another tradition, so we can also speak of their resilience. Within a single culture, traditions are preserved for a long time and are sustainable. For instance, contemporary Russia has not strayed far from the traditions of the Russian Empire; despite the anti-traditionalist policies of the USSR, it has retained traditional values. As a result, I can speak of the inevitability of cultural isolation. Even if external signs of globalization suggest the erasure of borders between cultures, in reality, traditions are still preserved and are highly differentiated. Different cultures have varying cultures, literature, and typical views on social phenomena; different patterns persist in governance processes, languages are maintained, and in the future, in opposition to and simultaneously in support of globalization, the market will strengthen local traditions.

Cultures will differ more significantly while uniting into civilizations where traditions and values are similar. For example, the unity of Western civilization is quite noticeable with its concepts of traditions in the form of universalist theories of rights and freedoms (which, in fact, are only applicable to Western culture). Capitalism, in reality, is reactionary, and this is not a bad thing. I propose that in the future, civilizations will be culturally isolated from one another but will still remain economically united to avoid the limitations of capitalism. The anthropomorphic Other can either be assimilated or eliminated, but it will not be completely defeated. Firstly, the anthropomorphic Other always operates within the framework of capitalism, so it has already lost in advance. Secondly, it is overly optimistic to believe that problems will disappear. Most likely, according to my metaphysical views, a system is forming in which the cumulative suffering from anthropomorphic Others and from capitalism will be maximal.

It is worth not focusing on or returning to the traditions of antiquity, but considering them to study the structure of traditions and Tradition as a whole. Moreover, I am against essentialism, so traditions and cultures are defined by memes, landscape and climate, not by genes.

Politics

Political Realism

My political philosophy is based on realism, and all my positive positions relate exclusively to inevitability and should not be morally evaluated. There is no morality in politics, only personal benefit for either the state or a political figure. Of course, some individuals do follow their ideals, but within the framework of power relations, they mean nothing: an excessively idealistic leader will lose to a flexible nihilist in any case. Politics is the dirtiest place in the universe, and glory to the market that can swallow it and put an end to this farce. I believe this statement is obvious, and the opposite must be proven to political idealists. An idealist always loses to a pragmatist or a realist. Wars are won with blood and gunpowder, not with exclamations and sighs. No one in politics cares about any values; everyone acts out of self-interest; morality in politics exists only in words. Words are spawned by the no less dirty institution of democracy. Democracy, as is evident, only pollutes politics, leading not to phantom freedom but to populism. The masses have never been smart, and now they do not even possess real power - dissatisfied individuals can be easily punished. Carl Schmitt provided an excellent examination of democracy in his work "Legality and Legitimacy." He pointed out that for a parliamentary republic to effectively conduct politics, including making extraordinary decisions, it requires a majority of seats. With the acquisition of a majority, a political party completely occupies the governing bodies, and democracy with its idealistic pluralism turns into an ordinary authoritarian system where the majority suppresses the minority, whose opinion is considered only on paper.

The so-called human rights, as de Benoist pointed out, are a baseless fiction that cannot exist outside of Western civilization. In some cultures, the human rights imposed by the West are regarded as at least inappropriate and at most unacceptable in many other cultures. An obvious example is the preservation of the caste system in India or the spread of extremism in Arab countries. The Declaration of Human Rights is nothing more than a piece of paper. It is also worth mentioning some very unpleasant fact for the lefts: calling something a natural human right does not make this resource unlimited. No matter how much everyone would like that. The market will uphold only freedoms and will establish only those foundations that are acceptable for a particular civilization. Traditions, as already mentioned, exist because they are most beneficial to capitalism.

U/Acc Anti-Praxis

The most politically realistic varitant of accelerationism is unconditional accelerationism. A person as an agent is incapable of bringing about changes in the overall course of events, especially some little-influential accelerationist blogger with a following of “one and a half diggers”. In any case, attempts to initiate changes through personal efforts are naive and futile. I reject a positive program that implies clear steps and goals, instead relying solely on intuition about the fundamental nature and timelessness of the market. There is no need to accelerate anything: acceleration will happen on its own as a consequence of the ever-self-overcoming capitalism. We can observe the changes taking place and analyze them, but we should not try to force or direct them, because it’s impossible. It is worth noting that R/Acc is significantly closer to U/Acc than its left variation. This does not require long explanation, as L/Acc demands a positive program to achieve goals, while for the right (I mean Nick Land), the program serves merely to expedite the arrival of the inevitable. Unlike left accelerationism, which may attempt to integrate social movements and activism into its agenda, right accelerationism focuses more on Humean "is." As Hume proved, "is" does not imply "ought," which is more adhered to by the right, acting from the existing state of affairs, than by the left, which strives for a certain "ought"-goal.

Meta-Neocameralism

Competition, as I explained above, is a fundamental principle of existence. Based on the premise of the vitality of capitalism, I borrow the concept of meta-neocameralism from Nick Land. It is difficult to find the original of Xenosystems in Russia, so I will present the definition of this idea as outlined by Artemy Kirillov in his article "Accelerationism" on spacemorgue:

"In a meta-neocameral system, each state unit is engaged in 'meta-learning', by analogy with machine learning or neural network training, which each time copes with its task better and better, while inefficient solutions, patterns and algorithms are discarded. In other words, the Landian version of (meta-)neocameralism is not just a patchwork of competing microstates of corporations, but a network, a rhizome of various self-learning microstates-enterprises that produce intelligence and cybernetic feedback. At the same time, the units of this system themselves act according to the principles of political realism and social darwinism."

Such a system allows us to take a non-dogmatic position regarding the social structure, since we do not offer anything, but leave the development of the positive part of the program to experts (non-human agent - capitalism). Meta-neocameralism discovers and exploits new forms of organic vitality, accelerates and drives the development of non-human organic and inorganic technological agents. This reveals a certain difference between my views and Land's: I do not deny the organic and I do not believe that AI is ontologically better than other objects. In any case, any thinking and knowing agent is imperfect due to its limitations in the metaphysics of suffering, so we cannot say in any way that meta-neocameralism and the technologies that come with it will make anything better. Here we are talking about the inevitability, not the need.

Page updated

Google Sites

Report abuse