“A Reference Dependent Regret Theory” (with Pengfei Zhang and Felipe A. Araujo). Decision 9(1), 1-20, January 2022.
Abstract:
We propose an extension of the classical regret theory model (Loomes & Sugden, 1982; henceforth LS) incorporating the notion of a reference point. As in LS, the model can account for a number of documented deviations from expected utility theory. Additionally, we show that our model is consistent with a class of behaviors known as omission bias, for example a reluctance to exchange lottery tickets, and generates predictions which are consistent with recent empirical evidence on the common-ratio effect with correlated outcomes. The model also provides a novel interpretation for risk aversion in small-stakes, equiprobable gambles. The predictive power of the theory, as well as its relative shortcomings and advantages, are examined and compared to that of other extensions of regret theory and three alternative reference-dependent models.
“Decision-Making” (with Valerie F. Reyna). Published In R. Sternberg & W. Pickren (Eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of the Intellectual History of Psychology (Cambridge Handbooks in Psychology, pp. 216-249, June 2019). New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
Abstract:
The history of the psychological study of decision-making has its roots in modern theory of probability in the seventeenth century. Here, we describe the historical evolution of ideas from a conception of decision-making as rational to one that is biased and emotional. The historical periods can be divided into two parts, roughly before and after the 1950s. Before the 1950s, decision-making in the mind was thought to reflect pure mathematics. After the 1950s, the weaknesses and inconsistencies of human decision-making became more and more obvious. Ultimately, the elegance of pure mathematics was rejected in favor of theories that captured the messy irrationality of the human mind. The most recent theory shows how biases and emotionality can be part and parcel of advanced decision processes that involve intuitive gist. Thus, modern theory has begun to move beyond Cartesian dualism to encompass cognition, emotion, personality, and social values to predict decision-making.
"When Drive Drives Risky Choices: The Effect of Hunger on Risk-Taking Behavior for Food and Money" (with Valerie F. Reyna and Rebecca B. Weldon), Link
Abstract:
Evidence from a growing number of empirical studies suggests a causal effect of motivational drives in various domains of decision making. Yet, there are very few theoretical models that propose a formal account for this effect in the context of risky choice. In the current work, we manipulated hunger to assess its influence on risk preferences and rational choice behavior in a framing task, and contrasted our results against a number of theoretically driven hypotheses from three distinct models – two traditional dual-system models and fuzzy-trace theory. We show that being in a drive state of hunger increased risk aversion for food and money but did not generate a stronger framing bias. Particularly, this pattern of risk attitude was robust across both gain and loss-framed decisions, which contradicts formal predictions of the two dual-system models. Our findings pose a challenge to existing theories, and suggest that hungry people tend to settle for something with certainty rather than take a chance of ending up with nothing – irrespective of whether the decision is framed as a gain or as a loss. Future directions for theoretical research are discussed.
"Unbalanced Funding of Local Authorities: A Local Perspective to National Priorities" (with Dan Ben-David). Link (in Hebrew)
“When changes in probability near the midpoint produce large changes in risk preferences: Contrasting fuzzy-trace and dual-system affective models” (with Valerie F. Reyna).
“Reversing typical framing biases predicts self-reported psychopathy: A fuzzy-trace theory approach” (with Christos Panagiotopoulos & Valerie F. Reyna).