Working Papers

"Lobbying for Trade Liberalization and its Policy Influence"

Presented at: Stony Brook International Conference on Game Theory (2022), Midwest Trade and Theory Conference (2023)

R&R at Review of International Economics

Abstract: Lobbying activities are important to promoting Free Trade Agreements (FTAs). I quantify the influence of lobbying on the ratification probability of FTAs in the U.S. using a contest model of lobbying where heterogeneous players choose expenditures to affect the ratification probability of FTAs. Results suggest that lobbying in the manufacturing sector increased ratification probability by 12 percentage points on average, and the expected gains from lobbying are 2.5 times the lobbying expenditures on average. Counterfactual analysis shows that free riding lowers lobbying expenditures by 50%. These findings highlight the effects of lobbying on the formation of international agreements.

"Optimal Export Policy with Global Value Chain"

Presented at: Red-Blue Seminar at UNR (2024)

R&R at the World Economy

Abstract: What is the optimal trade policy? With WTO largely lowering the import tariffs, export tax is a possible alternative policy tool to restore protection. This work explores the determinants of optimal export tax when exporters participate in the Global Value Chain (GVC). I theoretically decompose the influence of GVC linkages on the optimal export tax and empirically show that the implemented export tax in China during 2003-2012 significantly responded to the GVC linkages. These results highlight the importance of participation in the GVC in shaping a country's trade policy.

"Estimating Tax-Dependent Compliance: Theory and Evidence on Tariffs in Trade War" (draft coming soon)

with Andrew Bibler, Laura Grigolon and Mark J. Tremblay

Presented at Midwest Trade and Theory Conference (2025)

Abstract: Tax evasion is prevalent in many markets. However, evasion rates are generally unobservable. In this paper, we develop an approach to estimate the level of tax compliance from variations in tax rates. The imperfect compliance is identified from the different responses of demand to changes in price and tax rates. Our framework also allows the compliance rate to depend on the level of the tax. Using data on US exports to countries that imposed tariff hikes during the 2018 trade war, we estimate the level of compliance in the importing countries, finding compliance rates around 90%.

Work in Progress

Working Papers

"Lobbying for Trade Liberalization and its Policy Influence"

"Optimal Export Policy with Global Value Chain"

"Estimating Tax-Dependent Compliance: Theory and Evidence on Tariffs in Trade War" (draft coming soon)

with Andrew Bibler, Laura Grigolon and Mark J. Tremblay

"Measuring the Effects and Evolution of Non-tariff Measures"