My research lies primarily at the intersection of philosophy of mathematics and epistemology. I am particularly concerned with whether mathematical knowledge might fail to be a priori, as well as related issues concerning fallibility, defeasibility, and the notion of mathematical rigor. I have also recently begun to develop an interest in the PMP (philosophy of mathematical practice), including topics such as mathematical diagrams and visualization, mathematical explanation, and mathematical understanding.

In this paper, I argue against the increasingly influential fallibilist view on mathematical justification and defend infallibilism. Specifically, I examine the fallibilist account offered by De Toffoli (2021), which is the most developed version in the literature. From the objections emerges the positive view that I go on to develop and defend, which is a bi-level theory of mathematical epistemology. Based on my picture, I then advocate an infallibilist view of mathematical justification.

18th Cambridge Graduate Conference on the Philosophy of Mathematics and Logic, Cambridge, United Kingdom, Jan. 2025.