Publication
"Voluntary contributions to a public good: when and how much?" (with Simona Fabrizi and Steffen Lippert), Journal of Public Economic Theory 27(3), 2025, e70042.
We analyze voluntary public good contributions with incomplete information. A fundraiser chooses simultaneous or sequential contributions, and two players choose the size and (eventually) order of their contributions. Simultaneous contributions minimize free-riding incentives of players with low valuations, whereas sequential contributions minimize those of players with high valuations. Hence, to maximize aggregate contributions, a fundraiser allows for sequential contributions when high valuations for the public good are prevalent or significantly higher than low valuations and, otherwise, only allows for simultaneous contributions. With low bliss points, sequential contributions maximize aggregate payoffs. For higher bliss points, the distribution of and difference in valuations becomes important.
Work in Progress
"Waiting and Preemption in Public Good Contributions"
We study the private provision of a threshold public good by two players who learn its quality from private signals arriving over time. The first contribution plays two strategic roles: its timing conveys information about whether the first mover has received good news, while its amount allocates the funding burden between the first mover and the follower. Taking the first-contribution amount as exogenous, we characterize the trade-off between the informational value of waiting and the incentive to secure provision. This tension gives rise to three distinct equilibrium patterns: separation, in which only players with good news initiate; preemption, in which uninformed players race to contribute at the outset; and pooling, in which players with good news wait until the same contribution becomes sufficiently credible to induce an uninformed follower to complete the project, while uninformed players also initiate with positive probability at that time. Finally, we show that the first-contribution amount can serve as a design instrument. By reallocating the funding burden across contribution positions, a fundraiser can implement the first-best outcome: immediate provision when delay is sufficiently costly, and provision after good news when learning is sufficiently valuable.
"Prize Sharing in Dynamic Discovery Races" (with Vladimir Smirnov)
"Learning Private Values in Public Good Contributions" (with Simona Fabrizi and Steffen Lippert)
Presentations
2026
[1] CMSS Seminar Series, Centre for Mathematical Social Science, University of Auckland (Auckland, New Zealand)
[2] PhD Students Seminar Series, University of New South Wales (Sydney, Australia)
[3] EDG Seminar Series, University of Technology Sydney (Sydney, Australia)
[4] General Seminar, Australian National University (Canberra, Australia)
Scheduled:
[5] Research Seminar, University of Queensland (Brisbane, Australia)
[6] Research Seminar, Macquarie University (Sydney, Australia)
[7] Brown Bag Seminar, Department of Economics, University of Auckland (Auckland, New Zealand)
[8] CDS Seminar Series, Centre for Decision Sciences, University of Auckland (Auckland, New Zealand)
[9] Research Seminar, University of Melbourne (Melbourne, Australia)
[10] Research Seminar, Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology (Melbourne, Australia)
[11] Research Seminar, Deakin University (Melbourne, Australia)
2025
[1] 39th PhD Conference in Economics and Business, November 2025. Sydney, Australia.
[2] PhD Conference, Faculty of Business and Economics at the University of Auckland, November 2025. New Zealand.
[3] 24th Annual Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory Conference, June - July 2025. Ischia, Italy.
[4] International Conference on Public Economic Theory, June 2025. Lisbon, Portugal.
[5] Lisbon Meetings in Game Theory and Applications, June 2025. Lisbon, Portugal.
[6] Australasian Economic Theory Workshop, February 2025. Sydney, Australia.
Awarded “Best Poster Presentation by a PhD Student” in the Workshop
[7] Microeconomic Theory Workshop (Invited), March 2025. Wellington, New Zealand.
2024
[1] AUT Mathematical Modelling and Analytics Summer Symposium, December 2024. Auckland, New Zealand.
[2] 7th World Congress of the Game Theory Society, August 2024. Beijing, China.
[3] 41st Australasian Economic Theory Workshop, February 2024. Melbourne, Australia.
[4] International Conference on Public Economic Theory, January 2024. Santiago, Chile.
[5] 23rd Annual Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory Conference, January 2024. Santiago, Chile.
2023
[1] Business School Ph.D. Conference at the University of Auckland, December 2023. Auckland, New Zealand.
Awarded “Best Presenter” in the Future Economies session
[2] Ph.D. Confirmation Presentation at the University of Auckland, October 2023. Auckland, New Zealand.
[3] Brown Bag Seminar at the Department of Economics at the University of Auckland, May 2023. New Zealand.
[4] AUT Mathematical Modelling and Analytics Summer Symposium, February 2023. Auckland, New Zealand.
[5] Research seminar hosted by the Centre for Mathematical Social Science (CMSS) at the University of Auckland, October 2022. New Zealand