Publication
"Voluntary contributions to a public good: when and how much?" (with Simona Fabrizi and Steffen Lippert), Journal of Public Economic Theory 27(3), 2025, e70042.
We analyze voluntary public good contributions with incomplete information. A fundraiser chooses simultaneous or sequential contributions, and two players choose the size and (eventually) order of their contributions. Simultaneous contributions minimize free-riding incentives of players with low valuations, whereas sequential contributions minimize those of players with high valuations. Hence, to maximize aggregate contributions, a fundraiser allows for sequential contributions when high valuations for the public good are prevalent or significantly higher than low valuations and, otherwise, only allows for simultaneous contributions. With low bliss points, sequential contributions maximize aggregate payoffs. For higher bliss points, the distribution of and difference in valuations becomes important.
Work in Progress
"Waiting and Preemption in Public Good Contributions"
This paper explores voluntary contributions to a public good of uncertain, common quality. Two players receive costless signals about the quality over time and endogenously decide when to contribute. Using a threshold model, we identify conditions on the contribution amounts of first and second movers under which various equilibria exist. We first show a separating equilibrium, where contributions occur only after players learn that the quality is high. We also explore equilibria in which players contribute at the outset -- i.e., uninformed about the quality, either asymmetrically or symmetrically. We then establish a pooling equilibrium, in which uninformed players wait to contribute at a specific time when the other player follows immediately. In this equilibrium, players who learn the high quality early delay their contributions to prompt an immediate following.
Presentations
2025
[1] 39th PhD Conference in Economics and Business, November 2025. Sydney, Australia.
[2] PhD Conference, Faculty of Business and Economics at the University of Auckland, November 2025. New Zealand.
[3] 24th Annual Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory Conference, June - July 2025. Ischia, Italy.
[4] International Conference on Public Economic Theory, June 2025. Lisbon, Portugal.
[5] Lisbon Meetings in Game Theory and Applications, June 2025. Lisbon, Portugal.
[6] Australasian Economic Theory Workshop, February 2025. Sydney, Australia.
Awarded “Best Poster Presentation by a PhD Student” in the Workshop
[7] Microeconomic Theory Workshop, March 2025. Wellington, New Zealand.
2024
[8] AUT Mathematical Modelling and Analytics Summer Symposium, December 2024. Auckland, New Zealand.
[9] 7th World Congress of the Game Theory Society, August 2024. Beijing, China.
[10] 41st Australasian Economic Theory Workshop, February 2024. Melbourne, Australia.
[11] International Conference on Public Economic Theory, January 2024. Santiago, Chile.
[12] 23rd Annual Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory Conference, January 2024. Santiago, Chile.
2023
[13] Business School Ph.D. Conference at the University of Auckland, December 2023. Auckland, New Zealand.
Awarded “Best Presenter” in the Future Economies session
[14] Ph.D. Confirmation Presentation at the University of Auckland, October 2023. Auckland, New Zealand.
[15] Brown Bag Seminar at the Department of Economics at the University of Auckland, May 2023. New Zealand.
[16] AUT Mathematical Modelling and Analytics Summer Symposium, February 2023. Auckland, New Zealand.
[17] Research seminar hosted by the Centre for Mathematical Social Science (CMSS) at the University of Auckland, October 2022. New Zealand