TIE-ML (Temporal Information Event Markup Language) first proposed by Cavar et al. (2021) provides a radically simplified temporal annotation schema for event sequencing and clause level temporal properties even in complex sentences. TIE-ML facilitates rapid annotation of essential tense features at the clause level by labeling simple or periphrastic tense properties, as well as scope relations between clauses, and temporal interpretation at the sentence level. This paper presents the first annotation samples and empirical results. The application of the TIE-ML strategy on the sentences in the Penn Treebank (Marcus et al., 1993) and other non-English language data is discussed in detail. The motivation, insights, and future directions for TIE-ML are discussed, too. The aim is to develop a more efficient annotation strategy and a formalism for clause-level tense and aspect labeling, event sequencing, and tense scope relations that boosts the productivity of tense and event-level corpus annotation. The central goal is to facilitate the production of large data sets for machine learning and quantitative linguistic studies of intra- and cross-linguistic semantic properties of temporal and event logic. 

Keywords: TIE-ML, event sequencing, semantic annotation, temporal logic

A contrary-to-duty obligation (CTD obligation) is a type of conditional obligation that tells us what to do when a primary duty is violated. Chisholm’s Paradox is one of the most famous deontic puzzles about CTD obligations. It is widely believed that Chisholm’s Paradox does not arise for ordering semantics, today’s orthodox semantics for modals and conditionals. In this paper, I propose a new puzzle, the CTD Trilemma, to show that ordering semantics still has difficulties in adequately representing natural reasoning with CTD obligations. I argue that to solve the CTD Trilemma a formal account must attend to two different functions played by ought-statements in our normative reasoning and discourse: ought-statements as normative rules and normative judgments. To formally capture this distinction I develop a new dynamic account of ought-statements and normative reasoning inspired by Frank Veltman’s update semantics for default reasoning. Finally, I show how my update semantics for normative reasoning provides a simple and elegant solution to the CTD Trilemma and explains seemingly inconsistent data about inferences using ought- statements in normative reasoning.

This paper is concerned with the notion of silencing discussed and developed to defend the Silencing Claim in the anti-pornography argument: Pornography silences women and thereby violates women’s free speech rights. After Langton’s (1993) “Speech Acts and Unspeakable Acts,” a great deal has been said by philosophers regarding in what sense women are silenced by pornography. Langton and Hornsby provide a speech theoretic analysis of silencing as illocutionary disablement. Maitra and McGowan define silencing as communicative disablement. By analyzing silencing as a type of discursive disablement (whether illocutionary or communicative), this literature sheds new light on the speech-related oppression and subordination of women. 

In this paper, I critically discuss whether the notion of silencing in this tradition is indeed adequate to problematize speech-related harms as well as the infringement of women’s free speech rights. I argue that there is a conceptual mismatch between the notion of silencing defined in terms of lack of uptake and the notion of silencing that constitutes the violation of free speech rights. Noting such a conceptual mismatch would help us see why a general skepticism about the extent of pornography’s silencing power renders the philosophers’ defenses of the silencing claim less convincing. Finally, I propose a notion of discursive inability that would allow us to talk about speech-related harms from the victim-centric perspective without committing to controversial empirical presumptions about pornography. 

Keywords: silencing, Langton, illocutionary disablement, communicative disablement, uptake, J.L. Austin  

Presentation
Sep 23rd 2022 /  Department Lecture in Sage School of Philosophy at Cornell University. 

In this paper, I discuss a discursive phenomenon involving hepeating and attempt to locate the harm and wrongness of it. Hepeating happens in the following manner in workplaces and academic settings: a woman speaker proposes an idea, but there is no uptake of it; later her male colleague puts forward the very same idea, and everyone loves it. I argue that hepeating as a discursive phenomenon involves a kind of harm and wrongness that do not reduce into moral transgression or distributive injustice. I claim that there is a distinctive discursive harm to the woman speaker where hepeating happens, but the existing notion of illocutionary silencing does not adequately explain it. I develop the notion of discursive alienation as discursive harm and discuss how it problematizes social conditions and discursive contexts that alienate speakers.

April 3rd 2021 / HCC Symposium : Philosophy and Humanities Conference and Workshop 2021
July 16th-18th 2021 / The SWIP Panel at The Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society & the Mind Association

Presentation
Nov 7th 2022 / Cornell Semantics Group 

I have previously proposed a dynamic semantics for normative reasoning and discourse involving conditional “ought”-statements that solves Chisholm’s Paradox and related puzzles. My account was inspired by Veltman’s (1996) update semantics, augmented with two dyadic operators for different functions served by “ought”-statements in normative discourse and reasoning. In this talk, I further develop my dynamic account for moral dilemmas and reasoning with moral conflicts. First, I discuss the characteristic features of genuine moral dilemmas and define different types of moral conflicts in the dynamic framework. Then, I survey different views on the possibility of genuine moral dilemmas. Roughly, there are three metaethical views: (i) one view simply denies the possibility of genuine moral dilemmas; (ii) another acknowledges that there can be conflicting moral reasons for action, but holds that they still guide our action instead of issuing conflicting commands; and (iii) the last view maintains that not only can moral reasons be in conflict, but also they can lead to conflicting moral judgments. I will show how these three views are captured in my dynamic semantic framework and contrast them by discussing how they deal with different types of moral conflict situations.

Feb 16th, 2022 / Logic  Group Seminar at Indiana University, Bloomington 

Horgan and Timmons (1991, 1992a, 1992b, and 2009)’ Moral Twin Earth argument is designed to disprove the descriptivist account of the meaning of moral terms. It deploys the following simple observation about genuine disagreements: to have a genuine disagreement between two parties, they have to mean the same thing by the words used in their dispute; otherwise they are just talking past each other. In this paper, I analyze the structure of the argument, identify its most problematic premise, and discuss how the proponents of descriptivism can and should respond to the argument, in particular regarding the elicited intuitions from the Moral Twin Earth thought experiment.

Ordering semantics is the orthodox semantics for moda ls and conditionals today, most famously developed by Angelica Kratzer and David Lewis. I critically discuss the ordering semantic account of deontic ought-statements which we use to express duties and obligations. I put forward three puzzles to show the limitations of the ordering semantic account of oughts. (i) Ordering semantics cannot adequately capture the notion of moral dilemma because two conflicting obligations leads to deontic explosion. (ii) The possibility of supererogation is denied given the ordering semantic account of oughts. (iii) Our natural reasoning pattern with a contrary-to-duty obligation when one’s primary obligation is violated is not faithfully represented in ordering semantics. I claim that the ordering semantic framework is inadequate for normative language because it fails to recognize the two functions served by ought-statements in normative discourse and reasoning: axiological and deontological meanings of oughts. The ordering semantic account of oughts cannot represent the deontological use of oughts, and I call this the Axiological Reduction.