Publications
Partial-implementation Invariance and Claims Problems, with Bas Dietzenbacher and William Thomson, accepted at Social Choice and Welfare.
Policy Polarization, Primaries, and Strategic Voters, with Diego Carrasco Novoa, Shino Takayama, and Terence Yeo, accepted at Mathematical Social Sciences.
Stable and Efficient Reallocations When Preferences Are Single-dipped, with Bas Dietzenbacher, Economics Letters, 231,2023.
Some Characterizations of Generalized Trading Cycles, with Acelya Altuntas and William Phan, Games and Economic Behavior, 141, 156-181, 2023.
Object Reallocation Problems with Single-dipped Preferences, Games and Economic Behavior, 140, 181-196, 2023.
The Crawler: Three Equivalence Results for Object (Re)allocation Problems When Preferences Are Single-peaked, with Hadi Hosseini, Journal of Economic Theory, 203, 2022.
Object Reallocation Problems under Single-peaked Preferences: Two Characterizations of The Crawler, International Journal of Game Theory, 51, 537-565, 2022.
Nash Equilibrium and Party Polarization in an Electoral Model with Mixed Motivations, with Shino Takayama and Terence Yeo, Journal of Public Economic Theory, 21(2), 219-240, 2019.
Working Papers
Obvious Strategy-proof Rules for Object Reallocation. (New version coming soon.)
- This paper was previously circulated under the title “A Characterization of Obviously Strategy-proof Rules for Object Reallocation Problems with Single-peaked Preferences.''
Fair Resource Redivision with Single-peaked Preferences. (New version coming soon.)
An Efficient, Computationally Tractable School Choice Mechanism, with Andrew McLennan and Shino Takayama.
Fair and Efficient Resource Allocations When Preferences Are Single-dipped, with Bas Dietzenbacher.