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Publications

  • Fair and Efficient Resource Allocations When Preferences Are Single-dipped, with Bas Dietzenbacher, Journal of Mathematical Economics, 115, 2024.

  • Partial-implementation Invariance and Claims Problems, with Bas Dietzenbacher and William Thomson, Social Choice and Welfare, 63, 203-229, 2024. 

  • Policy Polarization, Primaries, and Strategic Voters, with Diego Carrasco Novoa, Shino Takayama, and Terence Yeo, Mathematical Social Sciences, 127, 19-35, 2024.

  • Stable and Efficient Reallocations When Preferences Are Single-dipped, with Bas Dietzenbacher, Economics Letters, 231,2023. 

  • Some Characterizations of Generalized Trading Cycles, with Acelya Altuntas and William Phan, Games and Economic Behavior, 141, 156-181, 2023.

  • Object Reallocation Problems with Single-dipped Preferences, Games and Economic Behavior, 140, 181-196, 2023.

  • The Crawler: Three Equivalence Results for Object (Re)allocation Problems When Preferences Are Single-peaked, with Hadi Hosseini, Journal of Economic Theory, 203, 2022.

  • Object Reallocation Problems under Single-peaked Preferences: Two Characterizations of The Crawler, International Journal of Game Theory, 51, 537-565, 2022. 

  • Nash Equilibrium and Party Polarization in an Electoral Model with Mixed Motivations, with Shino Takayama and Terence Yeo,  Journal of Public Economic Theory, 21(2), 219-240, 2019. 

Working Papers 

  • Efficient Computationally Tractable School Choice Mechanisms, with Andrew McLennan and Shino Takayama.

  • Equal Opportunity in School Choice Lotteries with Acelya Altuntas and William Phan.

  • TTC Domains with Sumit Goel. 

  • Characterizations of Proportional Division Value in TU-Games via Fixed-Population Consistency with Yukihiko Funaki, Yukio Koriyama, and Satoshi Nakada,

  • Characterizing ELS Values via Fixed-Population Consistency with Yukihiko Funaki, Yukio Koriyama, and Satoshi Nakada.

  • Obvious Strategy-proof Rules for Object Reallocation. 

  • Fair Resource Redivision with Single-peaked Preferences. 

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