Abstract: This paper studies a two-period model with a monopolist and a consumer. The firm makes two offers (product-price pairs) in the first period and makes one offer in the second period. The single consumer’s type is unknown to the firm, and she chooses at most one offer each period. Products are horizontally differentiated and the consumer prefers products closer to her type. Two privacy settings are considered. In one setting, the consumer cannot hide her purchase history (i.e., cannot opt out) whereas she can in the other setting. We characterize the firm-optimal equilibria in both settings and show that when the opt-out choice is added, the ex-ante producer surplus increases while the ex-ante consumer surplus decreases. How the interim consumer surplus changes depends on her type. Our results suggest that sometimes privacy protection tools can harm consumers and help firms, and the dynamic and strategic interaction between the two sides need to be considered by regulators when assessing such tools.

Abstract: In this paper, we analyze censorship using a cheap-talk model. In our model, besides the message by the sender, there is an external binary signal. The sender does not learn the realization of the signal but can censor it. Apart from the message by the sender, the receiver learns the signal realization if the sender does not censor it. We focus on two-interval partition equilibria and characterize three of them - the full-censorship equilibrium, the censor-by-lows equilibrium, and the no-censorship equilibrium. We compare the ex-ante expected payoffs and find that 1) partial censorship is always inferior to no censorship for both agents; 2) the welfare comparison between no censorship and full censorship depends on bias.

Abstract: Graduate school admission in China has both centralized and decentralized features. In the initial assignment process, each student applies to one school and takes a nationwide exam. The score of the exam affects students’ eligibility for school-specific exams. Students unadmitted after the initial assignment proceed to the adjustment process (tiaoji in Chinese) where they can apply to up to three schools at the same time, and schools independently make admission decisions. In this study, we model the adjustment process as a two-period decentralized matching game and analyze the equilibrium strategies and outcomes. We consider four different cases in which side is uncertain about student ability, and whether cutoffs are fixed for the two periods. We find that 1) all students applying to the better school first is an equilibrium for all cases; 2) it is the unique equilibrium when cutoffs are fixed; 3) perfect sorting is the unique equilibrium outcome when students are uncertain about their abilities. Some comparative statics results are provided, and we relate them to a supply-demand framework. Finally, we discuss how the equilibrium may change when the number of schools exceeds the number of periods.

Abstract: Excuse-seeking behavior that facilitates replacing altruistic choices with self-interested ones has been documented in several domains. In a laboratory study, we replicate three leading papers on this topic: Dana et al. (2007), and the use of information avoidance; Exley (2015), and the use of differential risk preferences; and Di Tella et al. (2015), and the use of motivated beliefs. The replications were conducted as part of a graduate course, attempting to embed one answer to the growing call for experimental replications within the pedagogic process. We fully replicate the simpler Dana et al. paper, and broadly replicate the core findings for the other two projects, though with reduced effect sizes and a failure to replicate on some secondary measures. Finally, we attempt to connect behaviors to facilitate the understanding of how each fit within the broader literature. However, we find no connections across domains.