Yuanqing (Lorna) Zhong
Yuanqing (Lorna) Zhong
Embedded Files
PhD Candidate in Finance
Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto
I'm on the 2026-27 academic job market!
Research Interests
Primary: Corporate Finance, Corporate Governance and Control, Entrepreneurial Finance
Secondary: Economics of Innovation, Law and Finance
Contact
Email: lorna.zhong@rotman.utoronto.ca
Phone: (+1) 647-898-8105
Address: RT467, 105 St George Street, M5S 3E6, Toronto, Ontario, Canada
Job Market Paper
Why Do Venture Capitalists Bet Young? Conflict between VC and Founder Horizons (draft available upon request)
Abstract: This paper uncovers a mismatch between venture capital (VC) allocation and entrepreneurial success: VC funding disproportionately flows to young founders, even though founders of the fastest-growing firms are often middle-aged. I examine this divergence and argue that VCs’ preference for young founders is at least partly due to exit alignment. I document that young founders achieve M&A exits sooner, and VCs become more likely to back young founders as funds approach the end of their investment horizons. This age tilt becomes more pronounced following a court ruling that weakened investors’ ability to force exits, supporting an exit-alignment mechanism. I further investigate founders’ outside opportunities as a potential driver of earlier exits. Using a within-startup design, I find that younger founders are more likely to launch another VC-backed startup or transition to outside employment after exit. They also experience greater improvements in post-exit labor market outcomes, suggesting that stronger outside opportunities facilitate earlier exits. Overall, VCs' tendency to bet young could be a constrained-optimal response to finite fund horizons.
Presentations: AFA Poster Session (2027, scheduled), WEFI Student-Led Workshop (2026, scheduled), University of Toronto (2026, scheduled)
Working Papers
Abstract: Non-compete agreements (NCAs) limit outside employment options and, therefore, increase personal costs of job displacement for managers. Using state-level changes in NCA enforceability as a natural experiment, we find that managers are more averse to horizontal takeovers when NCA enforcement tightens. In particular, higher enforceability is associated with fewer same-industry takeovers. Those that do materialize are more likely to be hostile, involve higher premiums, and are less likely to complete. Overall, the findings indicate that the use of NCAs and their enforceability have important implications for the market for corporate control.
Presentations: Annual Conference of Financial Economics and Accounting (2026, scheduled), European Finance Association (2026), Johnston Centre Research Roundtable (2026), National University of Singapore (2026), Singapore Management University (2026), Nanyang Technological University (2026), American Finance Association (2025), Financial Intermediation Research Society (2025), Santiago Finance Workshop (2025), American Law and Economics Association (2024), 8th Annual M&A Research Centre Conference (2024), New Economic School (2024), University of Oregon (2024) University of Toronto (2023)
Featured in: ECGI, Johnston Centre
Acquiring Liability: Patent Litigation and the Market for Corporate Control, with Adel Khusnulgatin (draft available upon request)
Abstract: This paper examines how litigation risk affects acquisition decisions. Acquisitions transfer legally exposed targets to acquirers with greater litigation capacity but eliminate targets’ standalone limited liability protection, potentially reducing merger synergies. We first document that adverse Non-Practicing Entity (NPE) litigation shocks to a firm are followed by a 10-15% decline in acquisition activity involving other potential targets in the same industry. We then exploit the 2017 Supreme Court decision in TC Heartland, which restricted patent litigation venue choices and increased the importance of geographic ties to plaintiff-friendly Texas. Following the decision, non-Texas firms reduce acquisitions of Texas targets in industries with greater pre-decision exposure to Texas patent litigation. A one-standard-deviation increase in exposure is associated with a 5–7% decline in acquisitions. Our findings show that contingent legal liabilities shape firm boundaries by discouraging the consolidation of otherwise valuable assets.
Page updated
Google Sites
Report abuse