Manuscripts
[arXiv] PiKE: Adaptive Data Mixing for Multi-Task Learning Under Low Gradient Conflicts
with Zeman Li, Peilin Zhong, Meisam Razaviyayn, and Vahab Mirrokni
2025+
[arXiv] Approximately Efficient Bilateral Trade with Samples
with Jieming Mao, Balasubramanian Sivan, Kangning Wang, and Jinzhao Wu
To appear in EC 2025
[arXiv] Procurement Auctions via Approximately Optimal Submodular Optimization
with Amin Karbasi, Vahab Mirrokni, Renato Paes Leme, Grigoris Velegkas, and Song Zuo
To appear in ICML 2025 (Spotlight)
[arXiv] Addax: Utilizing Zeroth-Order Gradients to Improve Memory Efficiency and Performance of SGD for Fine-Tuning Language Models
with Zeman Li, Xinwei Zhang, Peilin Zhong, Meisam Razaviyayn, and Vahab Mirrokni
ICLR 2025
2024
Autobidder's Dilemma: Why More Sophisticated Autobidders Lead to Worse Auction Efficiency
with Jieming Mao, Vahab Mirrokni, Hanrui Zhang, and Song Zuo
NeurIPS 2024
[arXiv] Efficiency of the First-Price Auction in the Autobidding World
with Jieming Mao, Vahab Mirrokni, Hanrui Zhang, and Song Zuo
NeurIPS 2024
[PDF] LLMs at the Bargaining Table
with Vahab Mirrokni, Renato Paes Leme, Hanrui Zhang, and Song Zuo
Agentic Markets Workshop @ ICML 2024
[PDF] Auto-bidding and Auctions in Online Advertising: A Survey
with Google Colleagues
SIGecom Exchanges 2024
[SSRN] Optimal Mechanisms for a Value Maximizer: The Futility of Screening Targets
with Santiago Balseiro, Jieming Mao, Vahab Mirrokni, and Song Zuo
EC 2024
[arXiv] Non-uniform Bid-scaling and Equilibria for Different Auctions: An Empirical Study
with Jieming Mao, Vahab Mirrokni, Yifeng Teng, and Song Zuo
TheWebConf 2024
[arXiv] Efficiency of the Generalized Second-Price Auction for Value Maximizers
with Mohammad Mahdian, Jieming Mao, Vahab Mirrokni, Hanrui Zhang, and Song Zuo
TheWebConf 2024
[arXiv] Individual Welfare Guarantees in the Autobidding World with Machine-learned Advice
with Negin Golrezaei, Patrick Jaillet, Jason Cheuk Nam Liang, and Vahab Mirrokni
TheWebConf 2024
2023
[arXiv] Multi-channel Autobidding with Budget and ROI Constraints
with Negin Golrezaei, Patrick Jaillet, Jason Cheuk Nam Liang, and Vahab Mirrokni
ICML 2023
[arXiv] Autobidding Auctions in the Presence of User Costs
with Jieming Mao, Vahab Mirrokni, Hanrui Zhang, and Song Zuo
TheWebConf 2023
[arXiv] Optimal Pricing Schemes for an Impatient Buyer
with Jieming Mao, Balasubramanian Sivan, and Kangning Wang
SODA 2023
2022
[PDF] Posted Pricing and Dynamic Prior-independent Mechanisms with Value Maximizers
with Vahab Mirrokni, and Hanrui Zhang
NeurIPS 2022
[SSRN] Optimal Mechanisms for Value Maximizers with Budget Constraints via Target Clipping
with Santiago Balseiro, Jieming Mao, Vahab Mirrokni, and Song Zuo
EC 2022
[arXiv] Approximately Efficient Bilateral Trade
with Jieming Mao, Balasubramanian Sivan, and Kangning Wang
STOC 2022
2021
[AIJ] Coalitional Permutation Manipulations in the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
with Weiran Shen, Pingzhong Tang
Artificial Intelligence (supersedes AAMAS'18 version)
[PDF] Robust Auction Design in the Auto-bidding World
with Santiago Balseiro, Jieming Mao, Vahab Mirrokni, and Song Zuo
NeurIPS 2021
[PDF] Prior-independent Dynamic Auctions for a Value-maximizing Buyer
with Hanrui Zhang
NeurIPS 2021
[PDF] Revenue-Incentive Tradeoffs in Dynamic Reserve Pricing
with Sébastien Lahaie, Vahab Mirrokni, and Song Zuo
ICML 2021
[SSRN] The Landscape of Auto-Bidding Auctions: Value versus Utility Maximization
with Santiago Balseiro, Jieming Mao, Vahab Mirrokni, and Song Zuo
EC 2021
[SSRN] Welfare-maximizing Guaranteed Dashboard Mechanisms
with Jason Hartline, Jieming Mao, and Balasubramanian Sivan
EC 2021
[SSRN] Non-clairvoyant Dynamic Mechanism Design with Budget Constraints and Beyond
with Vahab Mirrokni and Song Zuo
EC 2021
[PDF] Towards Efficient Auctions in an Auto-bidding World
with Jieming Mao, Vahab Mirrokni, and Song Zuo
TheWebConf 2021
[PDF] Online Combinatorial Auctions
with Debmalya Panigrahi and Hanrui Zhang
SODA 2021
2020
[PDF] Bayesian Repeated Zero-Sum Games with Persistent State, with Application to Security Games
with Vincent Conitzer and Shaddin Dughmi
WINE 2020
[PDF] Robust Pricing in Dynamic Mechanism Design
with Sébastien Lahaie and Vahab Mirrokni
ICML 2020
[Link] Dynamic Mechanism Design in Complex Environments
Ph.D. Thesis
2020 ACM SIGecom Doctoral Dissertation Award - Honorable Mention
2020 IFAAMAS Victor Lesser Dissertation Award - Honorable Mention
Outstanding Ph.D. Dissertation at Duke CS
[PDF] A Data-Driven Metric of Incentive Compatibility
with Sébastien Lahaie, Vahab Mirrokni, and Song Zuo
TheWebConf 2020
2019
[PDF] Strategizing against No-regret Learners
with Jon Schneider and Balasubramanian Sivan
NeurIPS 2019 (Oral) [Poster]
[PDF] Prior-Free Dynamic Auctions with Low Regret Buyers
with Jon Schneider and Balasubramanian Sivan
NeurIPS 2019 [Poster]
[PDF] A Robust Non-Clairvoyant Dynamic Mechanism for Contextual Auctions
with Sébastien Lahaie and Vahab Mirrokni
NeurIPS 2019 [Poster]
[PDF] Preferred Deals in General Environments
with Sébastien Lahaie and Vahab Mirrokni
IJCAI 2019
[PDF] Testing Dynamic Incentive Compatibility in Display Ad Auctions
with Sébastien Lahaie
KDD 2019 [Poster]
[PDF] Multi-unit Supply-monotone Auctions with Bayesian Valuations
with Debmalya Panigrahi
SODA 2019
2017
[PDF] Homotopy Analysis for Tensor PCA
with Anima Anandkumar, Rong Ge, and Hossein Mobahi
COLT 2017
[PDF] Disarmament Games
with Vincent Conitzer
AAAI 2017
[PDF] The Complexity of Stable Matchings under Substitutable Preferences
with Debmalya Panigrahi and Bo Waggoner
AAAI 2017
[PDF] Moral Decision Making Frameworks for Artificial Intelligence
with Vincent Conitzer, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Jana Schaich Borg, and Max Kramer
AAAI 2017, Senior Member / Blue Sky Track
2016
[PDF] Complexity and Algorithms of K-implementation
with Pingzhong Tang and Shuran Zheng
AAMAS 2016
Miscellaneous
[PDF] Establishing Universal Cooperation in Finitely Repeated Games via Limited-Altruism Types
with Vincent Conitzer