PUBLICATIONS
Zombie Stocks, Harvard Business Law Review, 14, (2024), 186-233 (with Joseph E. Engelberg, Frank Partnoy, Adam V. Reed, and Matthew C. Ringgenberg)
o Best Paper Award, Securities Law and Finance, American Law and Economics Conference 2023
When Losers Talk: Information Diffusion, Social Norms, and Conversations of Investors, Financial Management (Forthcoming)
o Presentations: 2021 FMA annual meeting, 2020 KAFA-KCMI Joint Symposium, the University of California San Diego, the University of North Dakota, Monash University, North Dakota State University, San Diego State University
WORKING PAPERS
Partisan Ingroup-Outgroup Bias in Investment Decisions (With Yongqiang Chu, Chih Ming Tan, and Ruiyao Zhu)
We experimentally document a novel “negative peer effect” in financial markets: investors actively trade against recommendations from political opponents. Using over 30,000 investment decisions, we show that investors both follow politically aligned peers and oppose misaligned peers. We also show the effect is mainly (but not entirely) driven by investors’ inferring the political leanings of firms based on the peer recommenders’ ideologies. These partisan biases persist even with the presence of transparent fundamentals (earnings guidance, analyst targets), indicating that investors derive direct utility (disutility) from investing in politically aligned (misaligned) firms.
o Presentations: 2025 FMA annual meeting, University of North Dakota
When Portfolios Speak: Identity Signaling in Congressional Trading (With Xiang Gao) (Revise and Resubmit)
We investigate whether legislators use equity trading as a form of political expression. Using comprehensive congressional transaction data, we document a robust gender-based asymmetry: male legislators allocate significantly more capital to firms with greater female board representation, whereas female legislators exhibit no comparable pattern. Exploiting California Senate Bill 826 as an exogenous shock to board gender composition, we establish a causal effect. The evidence supports a signaling mechanism: male legislators—especially Democrats, those facing imminent elections, and those representing female-majority constituencies—use observable portfolio choices to signal support for gender diversity, rather than trading on superior firm performance or lower risk associated with gender-diverse boards. Overall, our findings suggest that for U.S. legislators, the stock market functions not only as a venue for wealth accumulation but also as a stage for identity signaling.
Managerial Avoidance at Annual General Meetings and ESG Reputational Risk: Evidence from South Korea (With Daewoung Choi, Jieun Im, Yong Hyuck Kim, and Hojong Shin) (Under Review)
Mechanisms of Partisan Bias in Investment Decisions (With Peter Ammermann, Yong Hyuck Kim, Asli Salih, and Hojong Shin)
Understanding the Mechanism behind the Ownership Bias
WORK IN PROGRESS
Social Interaction and Reference Point Adaptation
Social Interaction and Disposition Effect
Large Shareholders of Rating Agencies and Predicting Rating Changes (With Xiang Gao)