On the Nature of Conditional Cooperation [Paper Link]
Abstract: In this paper, we experimentally study conditional cooperation, an instance of reciprocity that frequently arises in social dilemmas. We aim to better understand the nature of conditional cooperation and in turn the nature of reciprocity, given that existing models of reciprocity fail to explain some of the empirical regularities. Using sequential prisoner’s dilemma games, we systematically examine how distinct payoff components influence conditional cooperation. In particular, our design manipulates first-mover payoffs and second-mover payoffs separately, an aspect that has not been explored in previous studies. We find that both payoff dimensions shape second-mover decisions in different ways. Our results highlight the need for richer theoretical frameworks of reciprocity than those currently used.
Kindness Matters: A theory of Reciprocity
A large body of evidence suggests that people are willing to sacrifice their own material payoffs to reward those who are kind to them or to hurt those who are unkind to them. In this paper, we present a theory of reciprocity, which consists of intentional kindness of other people (incorporating views about what payoffs other people can receive and what they should receive), and consequential kindness of other people (in which the decision maker dislikes inequitable outcomes for themselves). We also introduce a new definition of efficient strategy that successfully solves paradoxes in existing behavioural models. Moreover, we show that our model reflects the findings of a host of experiments on games such as the ultimatum game and the sequential prisoner’s dilemma, which neither the standard theory nor other existing reciprocity models can explain.
Work in Progress
Gender bias in AI-Mediated Economic Decisions
Restricted communication, information aggregation, and efficiency