Yiqing Xing
Working Papers
Which to Sell First? Optimal Ordering of Heterogeneous Items in Sequential Auctions (with Fanqi Shi), July 2018
This paper studies the following two questions:
- How to order heterogeneous items when they are auctioned sequentially?
- Is sequential auction good to use, in terms of efficiency and optimal revenue?
Intermediated Implementation (with Anqi Li), July 2018, R&R, new version coming soon
In a hidden type framework, can a principle with limited power/knowledge implement a (second-best) allocation through intermediaries?
Negotiation as the Art of the Deal (with Matthew Jackson, Hugo Sonnenschein, Christis Tombazos and Omar Al-Ubaydli), May 2018
Stable Allocations with Network-Based Comparisons (with Chen Cheng), new version coming soon
Which networks permit stable allocations, when people care about their rankings among their neighbors on the network?
A Theory of Efficient Negotiations (with Matthew Jackson and Hugo Sonnenschein), March 2016
Negotiations are often complex and a deal generally has many aspects. We model such negotiations and identify situations in which efficiency can be achieved, even in the presence of substantial two-sided asymmetric information.
Who Shares Risk with Whom and How? Endogenous Matching and Informal Risk Sharing
How partnership formation and the strategic interactions that followed relate to each other?