The Network Effects of Agency Conflicts (with Rakesh Vohra and Wu Zhu), March 2020

Firm-level agency conflicts play a crucial role in amplifying or muting the propagation of exogenous shocks.

Screening with Network Externalities (with Fanqi Shi), March 2020

We study monopolistic pricing with optimal screening of network information, i.e., how well an agent is connected.

Stable Allocations with Network-Based Comparisons (with Chen Cheng), Oct 2019, R&R Theoretical Economics

Which networks permit stable allocations, when people care about their rankings among their neighbors on the network?

Implementing Optimal Mechanisms through Sequential Auctions (with Fanqi Shi), Oct 2019, R&R Journal of Economic Theory

We show that properly ordered sequential auctions achieve efficiency and profit-maximization (with reserve prices).

The Efficiency of Negotiations with Uncertainty and Multi-Dimensional Deals (with Matthew Jackson, Hugo Sonnenschein, Christis Tombazos and Omar Al-Ubaydli), Feb 2020

Negotiations are often complex and a deal generally has many aspects. We model such negotiations and identify situations in which efficiency can be achieved, even in the presence of substantial two-sided asymmetric information.

The Complementarity between Community and Government in Enforcing Norms and Contracts, and Their Interaction with Religion and Corruption (with Matthew Jackson), Aug 2019

We model the complementarity between informal institutions (communities) and formal institutions (government, market, etc.). Religious beliefs enhance this complementarity, while corruption undermines it.

Who Shares Risk with Whom and How? Endogenous Matching and Informal Risk Sharing

How partnership formation and the strategic interactions that followed relate to each other?

A Screening Perspective on Experimental Reform (with Chen Cheng)