The Complementarity between Community and Government in Enforcing Norms and Contracts, and Their Interaction with Religion and Corruption (with Matthew Jackson), April 2019

We model the complementarity between informal institutions (communities) and formal institutions (government, market, etc.). Religious beliefs enhance this complementarity, while corruption undermines it.

Stable Allocations with Network-Based Comparisons (with Chen Cheng), December 2018

Which networks permit stable allocations, when people care about their rankings among their neighbors on the network?

Screening with Network Externalities (with Fanqi Shi), November 2018

We study monopolistic pricing with optimal screening of network information, i.e., how well an agent is connected.

Intermediated Implementation (with Anqi Li), April 2019

In a hidden type framework, can a principle with limited power/knowledge implement a (second-best) allocation through intermediaries?

Which to Sell First? Optimal Ordering of Heterogeneous Items in Sequential Auctions (with Fanqi Shi), July 2018

This paper studies the following two questions:

• How to order heterogeneous items when they are auctioned sequentially?
• Is sequential auction good to use, in terms of efficiency and optimal revenue?

A Theory of Efficient Negotiations (with Matthew Jackson, Hugo Sonnenschein, Christis Tombazos and Omar Al-Ubaydli), May 2018 (new version coming soon)

Negotiations are often complex and a deal generally has many aspects. We model such negotiations and identify situations in which efficiency can be achieved, even in the presence of substantial two-sided asymmetric information.