Implementing Optimal Mechanisms through Sequential Auctions (with Fanqi Shi), Oct 2019, R&R Journal of Economic Theory
We show that properly ordered sequential auctions achieve efficiency and profit-maximization (with reserve prices).
Negotiations are often complex and a deal generally has many aspects. We model such negotiations and identify situations in which efficiency can be achieved, even in the presence of substantial two-sided asymmetric information.
We model the complementarity between informal institutions (communities) and formal institutions (government, market, etc.). Religious beliefs enhance this complementarity, while corruption undermines it.
Culture-dependent Strategies in Coordination Games (with Matthew Jackson), Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (PNAS), Vol. 111:3, pp.10889-10896, 2014
Auctions with both common-value and private-value bidders (with Xu Tan), Economics Letters, Vol. 111.1, pp.99-103, 2011
"Status quo, History and Thoughts on House Site", as Chapter 4 in The Road to Property Rights Delineation: Experience of Chengdu, China, Peking University Press, 2010