The Complementarity between Community and Government in Enforcing Norms and Contracts, and Their Interaction with Religion and Corruption (with Matthew Jackson), October 2018

We model the complementarity between informal institutions (communities) and formal institutions (government, market, etc.). Religious beliefs enhance this complementarity, while corruption undermines it.

Mechanism Design with Network Externalities (with Fanqi Shi), October 2018

We study monopolistic pricing with optimal screening of network information, i.e., how well an agent is connected.

Which to Sell First? Optimal Ordering of Heterogeneous Items in Sequential Auctions (with Fanqi Shi), July 2018

This paper studies the following two questions:

• How to order heterogeneous items when they are auctioned sequentially?
• Is sequential auction good to use, in terms of efficiency and optimal revenue?

Intermediated Implementation (with Anqi Li), Online Appendix, July 2018, R&R.

In a hidden type framework, can a principle with limited power/knowledge implement a (second-best) allocation through intermediaries?

Negotiation as the Art of the Deal (with Matthew Jackson, Hugo Sonnenschein, Christis Tombazos and Omar Al-Ubaydli), May 2018

Stable Allocations with Network-Based Comparisons (with Chen Cheng), new version coming soon

Which networks permit stable allocations, when people care about their rankings among their neighbors on the network?

A Theory of Efficient Negotiations (with Matthew Jackson and Hugo Sonnenschein), March 2016

Negotiations are often complex and a deal generally has many aspects. We model such negotiations and identify situations in which efficiency can be achieved, even in the presence of substantial two-sided asymmetric information.