Yiqing Xing

Working Papers

Which to Sell First? Optimal Ordering of Heterogeneous Items in Sequential Auctions (with Fanqi Shi, updated Nov 2017)

This paper studies the following two questions:

  • How to order heterogeneous items when they are auctioned sequentially?
  • Is sequential auction good to use, in terms of efficiency and optimal revenue?

Intermediated Implementation (with Anqi Li, updated Jan 2018)

In a hidden type framework, can a principle with limited power/knowledge implement a (second-best) allocation through intermediaries?

A Theory of Efficient Negotiations (with Matthew Jackson and Hugo Sonnenschein, new version coming soon)

Negotiations are often complex and a deal generally has many aspects. We model such negotiations and identify situations in which efficiency can be achieved, even in the presence of substantial two-sided asymmetric information.

Who Shares Risk with Whom and How? Endogenous Matching and Informal Risk Sharing

How partnership formation and the strategic interactions that followed relate to each other?

Stable Allocations in Social Networks with Local Comparison (with Chen Cheng, coming soon)

Which networks are stable when people care about their rankings among their neighbors on the network?

Research in Progress

Sustaining Cooperation with Multiple Relationships (with Chen Cheng and Wei Huang)

The Interaction of Communities, Religion, and Governments in the Enforcement of Social Norms (with Matthew Jackson)

A Screening Perspective on China's Experimental Reform (with Chen Cheng)