My main research concerns how we should inquire as socially situated, non-ideal epistemic agents. I am also interested in related issues in normativity, social and applied epistemology.
My main research concerns how we should inquire as socially situated, non-ideal epistemic agents. I am also interested in related issues in normativity, social and applied epistemology.
"Disagreement and Higher-Order Evidence" (Co-authored with Alex Worsnip), 2024, in Maria Baghramian, J. Adam Carter & R.A. Rowland (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Disagreement, Routledge
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A paper that proposes a form of evidentialism that evaluates the epistemic justification of beliefs not only against the evidence one has, but also against the evidence one ought to have
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A paper arguing against the duty to be disposed to gather further evidence for one's belief
A paper on biased inquiry
A paper on the 'beyond a reasonable doubt' standard of evidence in criminal trials
A paper on the nature of doubt