Course Descriptions

Language Acquisition and the Mental Representations of Minimal Interfaces: Recursion, Point of View, False Belief, Speech Acts and Arithmetic

Tom Roeper (UMass, Amherst)

We will address issues in how children acquire complex syntax and their philosophical connections. This entails detailed experimental discussion of long distance wh-movement (over 3 clauses), quantification (including new work each), ellipsis, and recursion with possessives, PP's, relative clauses and sentences. Larger issues include the role of Speech Acts, False Belief, and Questions Under Discussion. For instance, what reasoning about other minds is involved for this 6yr old "I knew she thought I thought that Easter was only three days and I told her Easter was one day ." We will discuss how Speech Acts map onto the syntax of Negation, inversion, and exclamatives "(isn't she sweet!").

These topics will be embedded in a teleological conception of UG and the projection of Minimal Interfaces across modules (including syntax, semantics, pragmatics). How far should we expect linguistic X-bar theory to extend in Cognitive Science?

We will sketch a theory of Minimal Interfaces and their role in acquisition with an additional reference to an underlying philosophical issue: the role of notation in representing psychological reality. The core argument is that the child's pursuit of Minimal Interfaces across syntax, semantics, and pragmatics provides an acquisition engine that allows the child to reject or prefer certain grammars that have or lack "ideal" or "perfect" interface relations. Does this reasoning extend to other parts of mind? That question will be addressed in terms of new correlations between recursion and the representation of counting above 100 in English and Chinese. The strongest hypothesis is that math ability can be triggered by linguistic recursion.

Open discussion from any perspective is encouraged. In addition, those interested in developing experimental ideas will be encouraged in separate workshop sessions.

Foundations of Machine Learning for linguists

Markus Egg (Humboldt University)

This class offers an introduction to Machine Learning (ML) for linguistics. ML is a widely used method of current empirical linguistic research. In ML, learning methods are applied to corpora, with the goal of acquiring a strategy of extracting specific information from such corpora. In a second step, the learned strategy is then used for the automatic large-scale analysis of new linguistic data.

1) Introduction: Basic principles and ideas of ML and their application in empirical linguistic research

2) A first algorithm: k-nearest neighbours

3) Naïve Bayes

4) Support Vector Machines

5) Neuronal processing


Morphologies in contact

Nikita Bezrukov (University of Pennsylvania)


The goal of this course is to familiarize students with a number of foundational readings in contact linguistics with a particular focus on morphological contacts, which is considered to be a much rarer phenomenon than, say, borrowing of lexical and functional elements. Overall, we’ll zoom out to see what linguists currently think about language change and what it means to be a grammar in contact, and we’ll zoom in onto individual cases of morphological borrowing in the languages of the world.


Justice: A Contemporary Introduction


Anthony Nguyen (University of Southern California)


What does a just society look like? In this introductory course, we will survey several of the most influential answers to this question in contemporary analytic philosophy. We will begin with John Rawls' justice as fairness, the conception of justice defended in his groundbreaking book A Theory of Justice. We will then discuss Robert Nozick's libertarianism and G.A. Cohen's luck egalitarianism. Next, we will look at Elizabeth Anderson's "sufficientarian" view of justice as democratic equality. Finally, we will discuss John Rawls' political liberalism and its distinction between political conceptions of justice and comprehensive conceptions of justice. For each of these theories of justice, students will learn what its main claims are as well as what some of the most prominent objections raised against it are. This course will heavily incorporate both lecturing and discussion. No prior experience with, or knowledge of, political philosophy will be assumed.


Ancient Philosophy


Marianna Koshkaryan (University of Georgia)



This course will primarily explore the philosophy of Plato; other important teachings (as those of Presocratics, Aristotle, Stoics and some other Hellenistic philosophers) will be analyzed as our study of Plato will require it. Our approach to Plato’s dialogues will be quite nontraditional: we will read them in the larger context of Ancient Greek culture, paying attention to the problems Plato inherited from poets and tragedians, as well as the structure of Platonic dialogues being the “tragedies in prose.” At the same time, a considerable part of our course will be devoted to the study of the innovations introduced by Plato into philosophy and religion, and we will see why the latter became incompatible with the traditional views of the world as expressed in the works of Greek poets and authors of tragedies.

Then we will turn to the subsequent development of philosophy of Plato - via Middle Platonism and some syncretic Hellenistic systems - to Neoplatonism (and first of all, the oeuvre of Plotinus), the latter being both the rival of Early Christianity and the most important source of Christian metaphysics.

We will conclude our course with a survey of the main problems of the contemporary studies of Plato, the leading European and American scholars working on them, as well as the international societies and philosophical journals uniting the efforts of these scholars.


Epistemology of Ignorance

Melanie Altanian (University College Dublin)

In this course, students will learn about current debates on the complex phenomenon of ignorance. In particular, we will discuss conceptions of ignorance that treat ignorance not merely as a lack of knowledge/true belief, but acknowledge agential, institutional and structural dimensions of ignorance, such as active ignorance and ignorance as substantive epistemic practice. This shifts our focus to the problem of “being ignorant” and how institutional and structural factors can constitute ignorant epistemic agents