R: Negotiate with Terrorists

American diplomatic policy in this age of modern warfare and the Global War on Terror is a bit murky, to say the least. I the wake of the tragedies on September 11, 2001, it became the Party line on both sides of the aisle to declare “The United States does not negotiate with terrorists!” And, it made sense. Yet, it has been 18 years since the war began, and many people today are calling for an end to that noble but perhaps harmful stance. Thus, this week, we as a party shall take up the issue by debating Resolved: Negotiate with Terrorists.

Many today see diplomatic and negotiated deals with terrorists and their organizations as preferable to military action, at least military action by the United States. For the families of journalists, doctors, and others taken hostage by ISIS and other terror networks around the globe, being told by the State Department that the US doesn’t negotiate with terrorists feels like the passage of a death sentence upon their loved ones. If we are indeed at war with these terrorist organizations, then those captured by them should be seen as prisoners of war, deserving of every effort the United States can make at bringing them home safe and sound. In addition, in the case of terror organizations making demands such as the withdrawal of US forces and threatening violence against non-combatants as a consequence of noncompliance, would it not be right to at least agree to begin negotiations in the hope of saving innocent lives?

Yet, there is a strong argument to be made against this kind of placation of individuals and groups who are perpetrating evil acts against the innocent. Negotiating with terrorists gives legitimacy to these individuals and groups which in turn encourages further acts of terrorism because they know it will bring the United States to the table. If we pay ransoms then it incentivizes hostage-taking. If we sit down at the negotiation table as a sovereign state, then it gives terror networks the motif, however illusory it may be, of statehood. At a deeper level, there is a case to be made that negotiating with evil, to condone evil to exist and operate – even on a minuscule level, is impermissible because it would make us coconspirators with evil and rightly guilty as accomplices.

This debate is quite policy-oriented yet is also more broadly concerned with describing the metric by which we go about negotiations in general with those we view as our enemies. It will force us to consider the history of our deals with hostile actors as well as the future of our stance toward the war on terror. Are there some evils which we must accept in order to increase the good of society overall? What are the consequences of fully committing to a policy of negotiating with terror groups? Who gets to make the decision about what our policy should be in particular situations? Should it be the President or Congress? If only a part of an organization is considered fundamentally “evil” should that still prohibit us from negotiating with the less radical elements in order to pursue peace?