R: America Needs a Cincinnatus

Daniël Mijtens, Charles I (1600–1649), King of England, 1629, oil on canvas, 200.3 × 140.7 cm, Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York.

Faced with a global pandemic, we have the opportunity to reflect on whether America's political system possesses the means to adequately respond to crisis. In situations of rapidly-changing information, high uncertainty, and urgent need for action, we may prefer to temporarily concentrate power and decision-making authority in the hands of a few capable leaders. In the time that it would take for a representative legislature to draft, discuss, and implement a crisis response plan, an authoritarian ruler could take initiative more quickly and boldly.

The Roman Republic understood the benefits of centralized power in times of crisis. When invaders or rebels threatened Rome's security, the Senate could choose to appoint a temporary dictator in hopes of restoring peace and order. Cincinnatus was one such example, a man who twice was named dictator and twice gave up his power in a matter of days, after successfully averting the crisis at hand. The central question for this debate is the following: should the Constitution of the United States of America imitate the Roman Republic, and allow Congress to appoint a dictator in times of crisis? 

Even if we prefer living in a democracy over a dictatorship under normal circumstances, we should investigate whether it is possible to get the best of both worlds. Is it asking too much to simultaneously desire the transparency and accountability of a democracy, while asking a dictator to rule by decree in times of crisis? If we were to appoint a dictator less virtuous than Cincinnatus, by what mechanism would we ensure that he or she relinquishes power after putting the crisis to bed?