R: Drag Them to Heaven in Chains

We'll be debating Resolved: Drag Them to Heaven in Chains, a resolution that has been floated many times and is finally coming to the floor. This is a very divisive topic for the big tent American Right, not only because it pits libertarians against conservatives, but because authentic conservatives also find themselves on opposite sides of the resolution. At the heart of the matter is the legislation of morality by the state. Does the state have an obligation to ensure that its citizens behave morally, even where private behavior is concerned? We can all agree that immoral acts like murder and theft should be prohibited, at the very least because they cause grave harm to others. But should the law extend into the private sphere, to address matters like drug use, premarital sex, and (if the health-nuts have their way) diet?

The social liberal—operating by Mill's harm principle—would respond to that question with an impassioned "no." In On Liberty, Mill argues that, "The only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others." The classical liberal conception of humanity is that we are all created unto ourselves as individuals endowed with rights, and that the state is the vehicle by which these rights can be protected. (Modern liberalism adds positive rights—and their equal provision—to the mix.) Legislating a moral system beyond the basic harm principle cannot fit within the liberal framework because, according to classical liberalism, citizens do not have social obligations to act a certain way, as long as they don't trespass on others' rights. Modern liberalism's conception of obligations is generally limited to ensuring that others have access to all enumerated rights and the ability to make their own choices. Where choice is paramount, the idea of forcing correct behavior—through the state or other means—seems absurd.

Conservatives reject the notion that the basic harm principle represents morality in full. (I say "basic" because it is possible to think of more comprehensive moral systems as reflecting deeper understandings of the harm principle. Many private matters—like sex and drugs (and even rock & roll)—can have very real social consequences.) They also tend to agree on the existence of truth, and hold that some choices—even if permitted by law—are objectively wrong. It does not necessarily follow from these assumptions, however, that conservatives should all agree to legislate morality. Many conservatives are skeptical of human goodness, and this skepticism very much extends to those in power. Even if we can agree on the sorts of morals we would like to legislate—unlikely in our increasingly pluralistic society—would we want bureaucrats and local policemen enforcing them? And should we be punished in this life for transgressions that carry more weight in the next? Perhaps the benefits of this sort of legislation still outweigh the potential dangers. Even where enforcement might be lax, the law informs culture. Attitudes about morality might be harder to preserve when the law ignores them altogether (or, worse, acts against them). A legal system based exclusively on the harm principle seems to imply—especially in the eyes of future generations—that that is all there is to morality.

Still, legislation is not the only way to "drag them to heaven," and those on both sides of the resolution should reflect on the proper role of private citizens and associations in encouraging correct behavior. Whereas we may have a duty to ensure that our friends and family members make good choices, does this extend to strangers? Is the peace—as delicate as it may be—that we've brokered between groups with different conceptions of the good in our pluralistic society worth compromising so that what we know to be true might triumph? On the other hand, can we afford to grant others the freedom to be immoral? Morality is not an arbitrary set of rules that promises great heavenly rewards for those who obey; it is an understanding that is essential to fostering social cohesion, not to mention guiding us toward the good life.

A final point to consider is the moral philosophical implications of being coerced to act a certain way. Does moral behavior "count" for less when the law leaves us with no other choice? Must a moral act be chosen freely to be truly moral (i.e., must we also have the option to act immorally)? Or is the act itself the only thing that matters? If this is the case, the law is certainly in a position to shape our behavior. We are reminded of the MLK quote, "Morality cannot be legislated, but behavior can be regulated. Judicial decrees may not change the heart, but they can restrain the heartless."