Dallas 24 and FT 50 Publications

Lending Relationships and the Pricing of Syndicated Loans, with Donghang Zhang (USC Darla Moore) and Yijia Zhao (UM Boston), Management Science, 70(2), 2024, pp.1113-1136


Real Disinvestments and the Distress Anomaly: Evidence from Stocks, Bonds, and Loans, with Kevin Aretz (AMBS) and Shuwen Yang (UST Beijing), Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis forthcoming


The Unintended Impact of the Volcker Rule on Primary Market Bond Pricing: Evidence from the Rule 144A Bond Market, with Eric Powers (USC Darla Moore) and Donghang Zhang, Review of Finance forthcoming


Under Revision

Costly Information Acquisition and Informed Speculation with Imperfect Competition: Evidence from Collateralized Loan Obligations, sole-authored, revise and resubmit at The Accounting Review

CLOs in a same loan disagree on the loan value. They trade small amounts with high frequencies, which leads to adverse selection concerns of dealers and reduces loan liquidity.


Underwriting and Primary Market Price Discovery of Syndicated Loans: Theory and Evidence, with Donghang Zhang and Yijia Zhao, revise and resubmit at Review of Corporate Finance Studies

Syndicated loan offerings exhibit U-shaped underpricing. Hot loan underpricing is to induce investors to reveal positive information. Cold loan underpricing is to compensate bank's retention cost.


Working Papers

Your Enemy's Friend Can Be Your Friend: Borrowing from A Competitor’s Bank, sole-authored

Fourty percent of firms share banks with their industry competitors. Borrowing from a competitor’s bank is an optimal financial arrangement that mitigates agency conflicts and deters product market predation.


Implicit Government Guarantee, Bank Monitoring, and Borrower Stock Price Crash Risk, with Jian Sun (CUFE) and Yiming Yang (CUFE)

In the default of the Baoshang Bank in 2019 in China, deposits above $72,500 were partially refunded, from 70% to 90%. The reduction in implicit government guarantee (IGG) increases bank monitoring and weakens borrowers' incentives to hide negative information. In a DiD regression, we find that firms borrowing from systematically unimportant banks experience a greater decrease in stock price crash risks than firms borrowing from systematically important banks after the default of the Baoshang Bank.


CLOs, Loan Spreads, and Corporate Investments, with Donghang Zhang

CLOs reduce market friction due to market segmentation and information asymmetry. CLO ownership in a loan captures these efficiency gains. A higher CLO ownership leads to a lower loan spread and more capital expenditures. 


Loan Market Informativeness and Financing Cost, with Yifan Ji (UNC Chapel Hill) and Donghang Zhang

Un-informed investors can learn about the value of a loan from secondary market trading of another loan issued by the same firm. This can reduce loan underpricing for the firm.


Learning Through Your Lenders:  Common Lenders and Interfirm Knowledge Transmission, with Bingbing  Hu (HK Baptist) and Lan Jin (HK Baptist)

Common lenders, by lending to geographically and technologically distant  firms, mitigate the localization of knowledge transmission.


Book Chapter

Syndicated Lending, with Donghang Zhang and Yijia Zhao. The Oxford Handbook of Banking 4th Edition (Editors: Allen N. Berger and John O.S. Wilson)


Selected Discussions

Beyond Banks: Lender Heterogeneity in Monetary Policy Pass-Through, Roman Goncharenko and Elizaveta Lukmanova, EFA 2026

Preemptive Corporate Environmental Investment: Evidence from Toxic Releases, Sangeun Ha and Manpreet Singh, SDU 2026

Judicial Enforcement and the Transmission of Bankruptcy through Firm Networks, Geraldo Cerqueiro and Gil Nogueira, LDWCF 2026

The Industry Expertise Channel of Mortgage Lending (JFQA , 2026), Yongqiang Chu, Zhanbing Xiao, and Yuxiang Zheng, AFBC 2023

Inflexibility and Corporate Bond Yield Spreads (RCFS, 2025), Zhe An, Abe de Jong, Ying Xia, and Zhaofeng Xu, AFBC 2023

Hedge Funds and Financial Intermediaries, Magnus Dahlquist, Valeri Sokolovski, and Erik Sverdrup, MFA 2022

Passing the Parcel ? Relationship Banking at the Onset of Financial Distress, Federica Salvade, Nicolas Taillet, and Micheal Troege, FMA Europe 2022