Xin Wang

Publications

• Who Provides Liquidity, and When? (with Mao Ye and Sida Li), 2021, Journal of Financial Economics, 141.3: 968-980.

2nd SAFE Market Microstructure Conference (Goethe University Frankfurt), 2018 Stern Microstructure Conference, 11th Financial Risks International Forum (Paris), 2018 NTU Finance Conference,​ 2018 Front Range Finance Seminar​*, UCLA Anderson*, Telfer Annual Conference on Accounting and Finance 2018*, University of Florida*, University of Rochester*, Carlson Junior Conference at the University of Minnesota*, Wabash River Conference at the Indiana University*, Smokey Mountain Conference* (* indicates presentation by co-author)

Abstract: We model competition for liquidity provision between high-frequency traders (HFTs) and slower execution algorithms (EAs) designed to minimize investors’ transaction costs. Under continuous pricing, EAs dominate liquidity provision by using aggressive limit orders to stimulate HFTs’ market orders. Under discrete pricing, HFTs dominate liquidity provision if the bid-ask spread is binding at one tick. If the tick size (minimum price variation) is not binding, EAs choose between stimulating HFTs and providing liquidity to non-HFTs. Transaction costs increase with the tick size but can be negatively correlated with the bid-ask spread when all traders can provide liquidity. 

Working Papers

• Financial Development, Non-bank E-Money, and Central Bank Digital Currency, with Xiaoxiong Hu​

Revise & Resubmit, The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis

Invited by the Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis for dual submission (17th Central Bank Conference on the Microstructure of Financial Markets)

Abstract: We develop a new framework to examine the effects of retail central bank digital currencies (CBDCs) on financial inclusion and stability, particularly how the results depend on an economy's existing degree of financial development. We demonstrate that when offering CBDCs in underdeveloped economies, some households migrate from cash to CBDCs. However, the competition between CBDCs and non-bank-issued electronic money (e-money) poses a significant threat to disintermediate banks. When offering CBDCs in developed economies, few households migrate from cash to CBDCs. Nevertheless, CBDCs can effectively constrain non-bank e-money and hence strengthening financial stability. Overall, our findings suggest that retail CBDCs can be useful for promoting financial inclusion only in underdeveloped economies and strengthening financial stability in terms of curbing non-bank e-money only in developed ones. An economy needs to consider the motivations and existing degree of financial development when offering CBDCs.

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• ​ Missing Best Price in Lightning-Fast Markets

EFA 2018, Finance Down Under 2018, 16th Annual International Industrial Organization Conference

Abstract: I develop a model to study the frequency of trade-throughs, i.e., an order is executed at an inferior price than the best price quoted on other exchanges, by explicitly modeling exchanges' order-processing speeds and the connection speeds between exchanges. I find that trade-through frequency can increase when all exchanges speed up order processing. In contrast, increasing connection speeds between exchanges can significantly reduce trade-through rates. I further show that exchanges seem only to have incentives to compete on the "wrong" speed---order-processing speeds, not connection speeds. 

• ​ Digital Convenience in Credit Markets, with Songan Huang

NTU Banking and Finance Brown Bag Seminar, Nov. 2025, Edinburgh Financial Technology Conference (2026)

Abstract: We analyze how digital convenience affects competition in lending markets. Perhaps surprisingly, we show that a lender offering high convenience can lose to a traditional lender with low convenience, even if the former has better creditworthiness screening ability. A lender with high convenience may charge higher rates, but also attracts more borrowers with higher default rates, thereby worsening the overall risk profile of the lender’s borrower pool. Our findings not only explain the recent decline of peer-to-peer lending and the lax screening of some Buy Now, Pay Later lenders, but also shed light on the slow digitalization in the insurance and over-the-counter trading markets.

• ​Can Stock Exchanges with 'Speed Bump' Designs Survive? 

University of Illinois Brown Bag Seminar 

​Abstract:  New stock exchange designs, such as frequent batch auctions and order-delay designs, have been proposed to slow down the trading speed and eliminate the speed arms race among high-frequency traders (HFTs). This paper investigates how newly designed exchanges with these 'speed-bump' features would compete against traditional exchanges. I find that among order-delay proposals, the most effective design is to delay only liquidity-taking orders as proposed by the Chicago Stock Exchange. Frequent batch auctions are shown not to improve liquidity when the degree of private information is high enough. Moreover, when frequent batch auctions are implemented, exchanges have incentives to compete on the frequency of batch auctions. Finally, I show that exchanges with a large market share of total trading volume may lack incentives to implement a 'speed bump' even when these innovative designs could improve long-term investor welfare. Therefore, the interests of exchanges may not be aligned with those of long-term investors with regard to how they value designs that alleviate 'sniping' by HFTs.

Work in Progress​​

• Virtual Banks and SMEs Financing, with Xiaoxiong Hu

• Payment Trilemma

Teaching

• FinTech in Investment Management at Nanyang Technological University, Spring 2019-present

• International Finance and Emerging Markets at Nanyang Technological University, 2020                                                                                                                 

• Financial Economics (Investments) at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Fall 2015-Spring 2017