Intermediation and Imperfect Credit (with Wright, Qiao, and Gong)
abstract: We study environments with intermediation (trade via middlemen) and credit that is constrained (either exogenously, or endogenously due to limited commitment). Existing models of middlemen assume they have advantages in search, bargaining, information, etc. Here they have advantages using credit, because they are better at credibly promising payments or enforcing others’ payments. With exogenous debt limits there is a unique equilibrium transaction pattern —
direct trade, indirect trade, or both — depending on parameters. With endogenous limits, there are multiple equilibria, including ones where credit conditions fluctuate as self-fulfilling prophecies. Depending on details, intermediaries may
attenuate or amplify credit cycles.
Refereed Publications
Millennials' transition from School to Work (with Bowlus) Economics Letters (2024)
A Dynamic Duration Approach to Venture Capital Exit Finance Research Letter (lead article) (2024)
Intermediation in Markets for Goods and Markets for Assets (with Nosal and Wright) Journal of Economic Theory, 183 (2019): 876-906
More on Middlemen: Equilibrium Entry and Efficiency in Markets with Intermediation (with Nosal and Wright) Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking (lead article), 47 (2015): 7-37
Buyers, Sellers, and Middlemen: Variation in Search Theoretic Themes (with Wright), International Economics Review, 55 (2014):375-397
Computers and Gender Wage Differences. Journal of Income Distribution, special issue edited by M. Sattinger, 17, n3 (2008): 93-114.
A Bivariate Interval Censorship Model for Partnership Formation (with Yu), Journal of Multivariate Analysis, 98, n2 (2007): 370-383.
On Estimation of a Two-Sided Matching Model, in Contributions to Economic Analysis: Structural Models of Wage and Employment Dynamics, edited by Bunzel, H., B.J. Christensen, G. Neumann, and J-M Robin —North-Holland. 2006.
Why Do Only 5.5% of Black Men Marry White Women? The Impact of the Mating Taboo, Courtship Opportunities, and Individual Endowments, International Economics Review (lead article) 44, n3 (2003): 803-826.
Structural Estimation of Marriage Models, Journal of Labor Economics, 21, n3 (2003): 699-728.
Can the Mortensen-Pissarides Model with Productivity Changes Explain U.S. Wage Inequality? Journal of Labor Economics, 21, n1 (2003): 70-105
Specific-Capital in an Equilibrium Search Model, Economic Letters, 74 (2002): 203-209
Wage Differences and the Mating Taboo, 1970-1980, Journal of Economics, 28 (2001): 21-40.
Memeos
Structural Unemployment Duration (2017)
Does Marriage Make Cents? (2016)
Venture Capital Cycle (2016)