Wolfgang Pesendorfer

Theodore A. Wells '29 Professor of Economics



Working Papers

The Thrill of Gradual Learning  with Faruk Gul, Paulo Natenzon and Erkut Ozbay

Lindahl Equilibrium as a Collective Choice Rule  with Faruk Gul 

Efficient Allocations of Indivisible Goods in Pseudo-Markets with Contraints, with Faruk Gul and Mu Zhang,  conditionally accepted,  Journal of Political Economy. 


Random Evolving Lotteries and Intrinsic Preference for Information  with Faruk Gul and  Paulo Natenzon.  Econometrica, 2021.     Online appendix

Evaluating Ambiguous Random Variables from Choquet to Maxmin Expected Utility Theory,   with Faruk Gul, Journal of Economic Theory,  2021.  (working paper)

Calibrated Uncertainty,  with Faruk Gul.  Journal of Economic Theory, 2020.

Coarse Competitive Equilibrium and Extreme Prices, with Faruk Gul and Tomasz Strzalecki. American Economic Review 2017

Interdependent Preference Models as a Theory of Intentions,  with Faruk Gul.Journal of Economic Theory 2016.

Hurwicz Expected Utility and Multiple Sources, with Faruk Gul. Journal of Economic Theory, 2015.

Random Choice as Behavioral Optimization, with Faruk Gul and Paulo Natenzon.  Econometrica, 2014.

Expected Uncertain Utility Theory, with Faruk Gul. Econometrica, 2014.

Temptation, with Bart Lipman, in Acemoglu, Arellano, and Dekel, eds., Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Tenth World Congress, Volume 1, Cambridge University Press, 2013. 

The War of Information, with Faruk Gul.  Review of Economic Studies, 2012.

Strategic Redistricting, with Faruk Gul. American Economic Review, 2010

A Comment on Bernheim's Appraisal of Neuroeconomics,  American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2009. 

Partisan Politics and Aggregation Failure with Ignorant Voters,  with Faruk Gul.  Journal of Economic Theory, 2009.

Welfare Without Happiness, with Faruk Gul.  American Economics Review, P&P 2007.

The Case for Mindless Economics , with Faruk Gul.  In: The Foundations of Positive and Normative Economics, by Andrew Caplin and Andrew Shotter (eds.). Oxford University Press. 2008.

The Evolution of Cooperation Through Imitation, with David Levine.  Games and Economic Behavior, 2007.

Harmful Addiction with Faruk Gul.  Review of Economic Studies, 2007.

Behavioral Economics Comes of Age, Journal of Economic Literature, 2006.

Random Expected Utility with Faruk Gul.  Econometrica, 2006.

The Revealed Preference Theory of Changing Tastes with Faruk Gul.  Review of Economic Studies, 2005.

Reputation with Equal Discounting in Games with Strictly Conflicting Interests  with Martin Cripps and Eddie Dekel.  Journal of Economic Theory 2005.

Self-Control and the Theory of Consumption, with Faruk Gul.  Econometrica 2004.

Self control, revealed preference, and consumption choice, with Faruk Gul.  Review of Economic Dynamics 2004.

Second Opinions and Price Competition: Inefficiency in the Market for Expert Advice, with Asher Wolinksy.  Review of Economic Studies 2003.

Temptation and Self-Control, with Faruk Gul.  Econometrica 2001.

Evolution and Information in a Gift-Giving Game,  with David K. Levine and Phillip Johnson,  Journal of Economic Theory, 2001.

Efficiency and Information Aggregation in Auctions. with Jeroen Swinkels.  American Economic Review, 2000.

Election, Information Aggregation and Strategic Voting, with Timothy Feddersen, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 1999.

Convicting the Innocent: the Inferiority of Unanimous Jury Verdicts, with Timothy Feddersen.  American Political Science Review, 1998.

When are Non-Anonymous Players Negligible, with Drew Fudenberg and David Levine.  Journal of Economic Theory, 1998.

The Loser`s Curse and Information Aggregation in Common Value Auctions, with Jeroen Swinkels.  Econometrica, 1997.

Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections with Private Information, with Timothy Feddersen, Econometrica, 1997.

The Swing Voterˈs Curse, with Timothy Feddersen. American Economic Review, 1996.

Reputation in Dynamic Games, with Marco Celentani.  Journal of Economic Theory, 1996

Maintaining a Reputation against a Long-Lived Opponent, with Drew Fudenberg and David Levine. Econometrica, 1996

When are Agents Negligible?  with David Levine.  American Economic Review,  1995.

Design Innovation and Fashion Cycles, American Economic Review,  1995

Financial Innovation in a General Equilibrium Model, Journal of Economic Theory, 1995